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Abstract 
 
Investigating the Relationship between Targeted Killing, American 
Exceptionalism and Kriegsraison: Repercussions for International Law 
Catherine Connolly 
For nearly seventeen years, targeted killing has been lauded by the United States as the 
optimum method of disrupting terrorist activities carried out by al-Qaeda and ‘affiliated forces’ 
not only in Afghanistan and Iraq, but outside the immediate zone of hostilities in Pakistan, 
Somalia, Yemen, Libya, Niger and Syria. While thousands of civilians and suspected militants 
have been killed in such strikes, their effectiveness in disrupting terrorist activity appears 
minimal. This thesis investigates the relationship between targeted killing, the doctrine of 
Kriegsraison (which posits that states may use all means considered necessary, however 
unlawful, to protect the security of the state), and international law. It does so in order to 
examine how targeted killing and Kriegsraison harm international law at the same time as they 
employ international law as a validating tool. The thesis undertakes a theoretical and doctrinal 
study of international law using a critical approach, and clarifies the legality of the targeted 
killing programme and how the political actions and context that influence the United States’ 
legal actions and interpretations have led to the return of Kriegsraison. Given Kriegsraison’s 
self-judging nature, it is particularly damaging to the international legal order and international 
relations.  
 
The thesis engages directly with the questions raised by the United States use of armed drones 
as the main method of carrying out the targeted killing programme. Furthermore, through an 
assessment of the domestic context that informs the United States’ ambivalent relationship with 
public international law, the thesis contends that the resurrection of Kriegsraison is a violent 
expression of U.S. legal imperialism, and of the United States’ long-held belief that it exists in 
its own, permanent state of exception. Finally, the thesis concludes that Kriegsraison itself 
operates in a state of exception inside the liberal order, often through the harnessing of 
international law rules. 
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Introduction 
‘in principle...states have equal rights...in reality they are unequal in their significance and 
their power’.1 
This thesis argues that the United States’ targeted killing programme - in which individuals are 
identified as members of non-state armed groups posing a potentially imminent security threat 
to the U.S., and then targeted and killed in drone strikes – demonstrates the continuing presence 
of Kriegsraison in international law. According to Kriegsraison, an 18th-century doctrine with 
German origins, if a state decides that a military act is necessary for its security, that act does 
not have to comply with the rules of international law.2 The Kriegsraison doctrine established 
the supremacy of state security above all other relevant considerations, including a state’s 
international (and indeed, domestic) legal obligations. In this thesis, I argue that Kriegsraison, 
far from being merely a doctrine concerned with the law of armed conflict, operates at both the 
level of politics and the level of military action and decision-making. It encourages states to 
argue that the security and safety of the state is under threat, to the extent that military force 
must be used to counter this threat. Whether the threat is real or merely perceived is beside the 
point, and the decision to use force can be taken irrespective of the domestic or international 
rules surrounding the initial decision to use force, and the secondary decision as to how exactly 
that force will be used. Despite Kriegsraison being the exception that undoes international law 
protections, arguments that employ the logic of Kriegsraison are often framed in legitimising 
or legal language. As such, in the present moment, Kriegsraison operates less as a ‘doctrine’ 
in the legal sense, and more as a modality - a pattern of argument and reasoning - which asserts 
a strategic legalism steeped in the reasoning of the older Kriegsraison doctrine. I further 
contend that the modality of Kriegsraison employed by the U.S. is demonstrative of U.S. 
imperialism, and that this imperialism  - both capital and racial – is inherent in U.S. readings 
of the international law on the use of force and international humanitarian law. That 
Kriegsraison can be employed so readily by the United States is a testament to American 
exceptionalism; without the considerable power it wields on the international stage, the U.S. 
could not use Kriegsraison with such success, and so widely, in multiple states and against 
multiple, amorphous enemies. Consider the ‘unwilling or unable doctrine’ (discussed in 
Chapter 1), through which the U.S. argues that it can use force in or against states who are 
                                                           
1 EB Pashukanis, ‘International Law’, in Beirne & Sharlet (eds) (1980) 178. 
2 See Catherine Connolly, ‘Necessity Knows No Law: The Resurrection of Kriegsraison Through the U.S. Targeted Killing 
Programme’ (2017) Journal of Conflict & Security Law 3 (1) 463. 
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unwilling or unable to deal with terrorist threats emanating from their territory against the 
United States. As Tzouvala argues: 
‘This sort of argument does away even with formal legal equality amongst 
states, and only gives the full range of legal rights to powerful states, or to states 
that follow specific counter-terrorism policies. This way of organising lawful 
violence closely resembles 19th-century, imperial international law, which, in 
turn raises the question whether international law ever became truly post-
colonial.’3 
The ‘unwilling or unable’ argument is a new and unprecedented development in international 
law. That the U.S. has been able to wield it effectively speaks volumes. 
The United States’ approach to public international law, in particular its approach to 
international human rights law and the international law on the use of force, is both highly 
utilitarian and deeply exceptionalist. While the U.S. views itself both as an exceptional state 
and as a state who can, when necessary, exempt itself from the international legal system and 
the rule of law, it tends to do so through the ‘creative’ interpretation of already existing legal 
rules, and of course the obvious flouting of others (in particular, the international law on the 
use of force). U.S. exceptionalism is thus situated not in a sphere outside the international rule 
of law, but rather in an exceptional space within a structurally imperial rule of law system. 
The U.S. has consistently asserted that the targeted killing programme complies with 
international law. It argues that, under the international law on the use of force, targeted killings 
are carried out in self-defence against an imminent threat to the United States and in pursuit of 
U.S. objectives in the ‘war on terror’, according to Article 51 of the Charter of the United 
Nations. Regarding international humanitarian law, also known as the law of armed conflict, 
the U.S. contends that the targeted killing programme complies with the relevant rules, that 
strikes are carried out against individuals who are members of non-state armed groups involved 
in hostilities against the United States, and that strikes are both militarily necessary and 
proportionate.4 It does not consider international human rights law a relevant consideration for 
                                                           
3 Greek News Agenda, Ntina Tzouvala on the history of international law and its impact on the Balkans (2019), 
http://www.greeknewsagenda.gr/index.php/articles/recent/15-interviews/7014-ntina-tzouvala-on-the-development-of-
international-law-and-its-impact-on-the-history-of-the-
balkans?fbclid=IwAR2nXYLm88nwch8CqFqh7CZxlGSAgSWhXp2kRjO9jeYed2Mm5w5IZ1IJBss, accessed 01 July 2019 
4 See Department of Justice (2011), Department of Justice White Paper: Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against 
a U.S. Citizen Who Is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qa’ida or An Associated Force, 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/602342-draft-white-paper.html, accessed 17 December 2018. 
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the targeted killing programme. The United States has couched its arguments justifying the 
targeted killing programme in terms of military necessity and self-defence, claiming that the 
targeted killing programme is necessary to ensure the security, safety, and continued survival 
of the United States and the American way of life.5 The Trump administration’s 2018 National 
Strategy for Counterterrorism reiterates that the U.S. is ‘a nation at war—and it is a war that 
the United States will win.’6  
Domestically, successive U.S. presidents – George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald 
Trump – have justified uses of force against various terrorist groups in different countries as 
part of the U.S. ‘war on terror’, under the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force 
(2001 AUMF). The 2001 AUMF was passed three days after the al-Qaeda attacks of September 
11th 2001 on the United States. In the Senate, the AUMF was passed 98-0, while in the House 
of Representatives, it was passed by a vote of 420-1. The 2001 AUMF authorized President 
Bush to: 
‘…use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or 
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that 
occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to 
prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such 
nations, organizations or persons.’7 
It is from the 2001 AUMF that Presidents Bush, Obama, and Trump have derived their 
authority to carry out the targeted killing programme. Under the 2001 AUMF, President Obama 
oversaw its expansion to include Libya in 2012, while the Trump administration has overseen 
the expansion of the programme to include Niger. Many of the groups targeted by drone strikes 
in the targeted killing programme were not in existence at the time of the 9/11 attacks in 2001, 
and are often only loosely affiliated with al-Qaeda, if indeed they are at all. Furthermore, strikes 
against the Assad regime in Syria by the Trump administration, and U.S. involvement in the 
Saudi-led coalition in the war in Yemen, have each been justified under the 2001 AUMF. As 
such, the presidential authority derived from the 2001 AUMF is in question. Such conduct 
amounts to an expansion in presidential war powers, and inaction from Congress in this regard 
has led to accusations that Congressional war powers are now irrelevant and dead, or at the 
                                                           
5 The White House (2018), National Strategy for Counterterrorism of the United States of America 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/NSCT.pdf, accessed 17 December 2018. 
6 Ibid, II. 
7 115 STAT. 224 PUBLIC LAW 107–40—SEPT. 18, 2001 (2001 AUMF) 
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very least ‘on life support.’8 While the Senate voted on 13th December 2018 to end U.S. military 
assistance to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, marking the first ever use of the controversial 
War Powers Resolution of 1973, it remains to be seen whether Congress will vote likewise in 
2019, and what the exact repercussions of such a vote for presidential war powers would be.9 
In any case, regardless of whether U.S. military assistance to the Saudi-led coalition is ended, 
the targeted killing programme in Yemen will continue.  
Since the beginning of the targeted killing programme under the administration of President 
George W. Bush in 2002, an estimated 11,880 people have been killed in drone strikes in 
Afghanistan, Yemen, Pakistan and Somalia. More have been killed in Iraq, Syria, Niger and 
Libya. Operated over a distance of some 13,000 kilometres (or 8000 miles), drone strikes kill 
identified or suspected militants and civilians, while U.S. drone pilots sit safely ensconced in 
locations such as the Creech air force base in the Nevada desert, in the United States. In 
government statements and news reports, reports regarding the targeted killing programme tend 
to focus on drones and the missile strikes they perform. These strikes are described as ‘precision 
strikes’, erasing the significant destructive impact of the missiles deployed in drone strikes, 
such as the 500lb GBU-38 missile and the 100lb AGM-114 Hellfire missile.  
Aside from the substantial kinetic impact of the missiles carried by drones, including causing 
injury and death, and damage to infrastructure and the wider environment, drones also have a 
detrimental psychological effect on the communities over which they hover. The Reaper drone 
has an endurance time of over 27 hours, allowing it to loiter for substantial periods of time over 
a specific area.10 This loitering capacity has affected community and familial relationships and 
social cohesion.11 Communities have described reducing the time they spend socialising, 
avoiding large family and other gatherings, and feeling afraid to go to mosques.12 There have 
been numerous reports of drone strikes on funerals and weddings.13 In a study by the Alkarama 
                                                           
8 See, for example, Keith E. Whittington (2018), ‘R.I.P. Congressional War Power’ (Lawfareblog.com, 20 April 2018) 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/rip-congressional-war-power, accessed 17 December 2018. 
9 Julie Hirschfeld Davis and Eric Schmitt (2018), ‘Senate Votes to End Aid for Yemen Fight Over Khashoggi Killing and 
Saudis’ War Aims’ (The New York Times, 13 December 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/13/us/politics/yemen-
saudi-war-pompeo-mattis.html, accessed 17 December 2018. 
10 General Atomics Aeronautical (2015), MQ-9 Reaper/Predator B: Persistent Multi-Mission ISR, http://www.ga-
asi.com/Websites/gaasi/images/products/aircraft_systems/pdf/MQ9%20Reaper_Predator_B_032515.pdf. 
11 Alaa Hijazi et al (2017), ‘Psychological Dimensions of Drone Warfare’, Current Psychology, available online at: 
https://link-springer-com.dcu.idm.oclc.org/article/10.1007/s12144-017-9684-7, accessed 17 December 2018. 
12 Ibid. 
13 See, for example, Conor Friedersdorf (2013), ‘Drone Attacks at Funerals of People Killed in Drone Strikes’ (The Atlantic, 
24 October 2013) https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/10/drone-attacks-at-funerals-of-people-killed-in-
drone-strikes/280821/, accessed 17 December 2018; Spencer Ackerman (2013), ‘Air strike in Yemen kills 15 wedding 
guests mistaken for al-Qaida – officials’ (The Guardian, 12 December 2013) 
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Foundation, PTSD was found to be prevalent in adults living in an area in Yemen frequented 
by drones, along with ‘constant anxiety’ and ‘constant fear’.14 Children, in particular, have 
suffered psychological ill-effects. Children no longer want to play outside with their friends, 
and prefer when the sky is grey – because when the sky is blue, the drones can fly.15 74% of 
children in the same Alkarama study reported having feelings of fear ‘when they hear sounds 
that resemble the buzzing of drones.’16 
In the U.S, the targeted killing programme continues to be largely regarded as unproblematic. 
In the most recent Pew survey of public opinion on drone strikes, carried out in 2015, 58% of 
respondents approved. 74% of Republicans approved of drone strikes, while 52% of Democrats 
and 56% of Independent felt likewise. Only 29% of respondents were concerned about whether 
drone strikes were being conducted legally.17 That the targeted killing programme and drone 
strikes continue to maintain broad support, both among the American public and politicians, 
has a lot to do with the fact ‘that drones are frequently described as precise instruments of 
warfare, carrying out surgical strikes while reducing risks to American forces.’18  
The U.S. is now going into its nineteenth continuous year at war. Currently, there is little sign 
of that war, or its global reach, abating. As of 11th September 2018, U.S. teenagers who were 
not born when the events of 9/11 occurred are eligible to enlist in the U.S. military.19 The 
federal defence budget has risen by 12% in the past two years, and now stands at $695.1 billion 
dollars - totalling more than the next seven countries (including Russia and China) combined.20 
The U.S. appetite for war, or at the very least preparing for war, appears unsatiated. Relatedly, 
the U.S. continues to express anxiety about its safety and security – a feature of American 
                                                           
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/12/air-strike-yemen-15-wedding-guest-killed-mistaken-al-qaida, accessed 17 
December 2018. 
14 Women’s International League for Peace & Freedom (2017), The Humanitarian Impact of Armed Drones, 
https://wilpf.org/the-many-humanitarian-impacts-of-armed-drones/, 41. 
15 Karen McVeigh (2013), ‘Drone strikes: tears in Congress as Pakistani family tells of mother's death’ (The Guardian, 29 
October 2013) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/29/pakistan-family-drone-victim-testimony-congress, accessed 
17 December 2018. 
16 Women’s International League for Peace & Freedom (n12), 43. 
17 Pew Research Center (2015), ‘Public Continues to Back U.S. Drone Attacks’ www.people-press.org/2015/05/28/public-
continues-to-back-up-drone-attacks, accessed 17 December 2018. 
18 Loren DeJonge Schulman (2018), ‘Precision and Civilian Casualties: Policymakers Believe Drones Can Be Precise. That 
May Not Be Enough.’ (Just Security, 02 August 2018) https://www.justsecurity.org/59909/precision-civilian-casualties-
policymakers-drones-precise-enough, accessed 17 December 2018. 
19 J.D. Simkins (2018), ‘A person born on Sept. 11, 2001, can now enlist to fight in the war that day spawned’ 
(MilitaryTimes.com, 11 September 2018) https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2018/09/11/a-person-born-on-
sept-11-2001-can-now-enlist-to-fight-in-the-war-that-day-spawned/, accessed 17 December 2018. 
20 Peter G. Peterson Foundation (2018), ‘U.S. Defense Spending Compared to Other Countries’, https://www.pgpf.org/chart-
archive/0053_defense-comparison, accessed 17 December 2018. 
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national life since before the country’s founding. In his November 2018 statement on 
supporting Saudi Arabia in the face of criticism for the murder of Jamal Khasoggi, President 
Trump proclaimed that ‘the world is a very dangerous place!’21 In the 2017 National Security 
Strategy, the administration stated that the U.S. ‘faces an extraordinarily dangerous world, 
filled with a wide range of threats that have intensified in recent years’.22  Such perceptions of 
insecurity, combined with the U.S.’ long history of war-making and war-fighting, have 
coalesced to make all actions which are counter to American interests appear as threats to its 
national security, its domestic safety, and the American way of life. War is, as Adrienne Rich 
wrote in 1991, the ‘absolute failure of imagination’. 23 For decades now, the United States has 
failed to imagine a different way of life. 
In 2018, the U.S. dropped more bombs in Afghanistan than in any year since 2004.24 The 
targeted killing programme has been expanded to Niger.25 Strikes under the targeted killing 
programme in Somalia have more than doubled since 2016.26 The Trump administration has 
expanded the CIA’s strike authority in Africa, after the agency had its responsibilities rolled 
back by the Obama administration.27 Hellfire missile production (the main missile of choice 
for drone strikes) is set to increase by 50% in 2019.28 The Trump administration has relaxed 
the military’s rules of engagement.29 Such decisions accord with President Trump’s promise 
while on the campaign trail when discussing how he would deal with terrorists: namely, that 
                                                           
21 The White House, Statement from President Donald J. Trump on Standing with Saudi Arabia (20 November 2018) 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-donald-j-trump-standing-saudi-arabia/, accessed 26 
November 2018. 
22 The White House (2017), National Security Strategy of the United States of America. 
23 Adrienne Rich, What Is Found There: Notebooks on Poetry and Politics (W.W. Norton & Company 1991) 16. 
24 Niall McCarthy, ‘The US Never Dropped As Many Bombs on Afghanistan As It Did In 2018’, (Forbes.com, 13 
November 2018) https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2018/11/13/the-u-s-never-dropped-as-many-bombs-on-
afghanistan-as-it-did-in-2018-infographic/#31841cbf2fae, accessed 17 December 2018. 
25 Eric Schmitt, ‘A Shadowy War’s Newest Front: A Drone Base Rising From Sahara Dust’ (The New York Times, 22 April 
2018) https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/22/us/politics/drone-base-niger.html, accessed 17 December 2018. 
26 Christina Goldbaum, ‘A Trumpian War on Terror That Just Keeps Getting Bigger’ (The Atlantic, 11 September 2018) 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/drone-somalia-al-shabaab-al-qaeda-terrorist-africa-
trump/569680/, accessed 17 December 2018. 
27 Joe Penney et al, ‘C.I.A. Drone Mission, Curtailed by Obama, Is Expanded in Africa Under Trump’ (The New York Times, 
09 September 2018) https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/09/world/africa/cia-drones-africa-military.html, accessed 17 
December 2018. 
28 Kris Osborn, ‘U.S. Army: We Will Increase Hellfire Missile Production by 50-Percent in 2019’ (The National Interest, 16 
November 2017) https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/us-army-we-will-increase-hellfire-missile-production-by-50-
23218, 17 December 2018. 
29 Helene Cooper (2017), ‘Trump Gives Military New Freedom, But With That Comes Danger’ (The New York Times, 05 
April 2017) https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/05/us/politics/rules-of-engagement-military-force-mattis.html, accessed 17 
December 2018. 
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he would ‘bomb the shit out of ‘em’.30 The number of civilian casualties has risen accordingly. 
In Yemen, for example, around a third of those killed in U.S. drone strikes in 2018 to date are 
believed to have been civilians.31  
The paragraph above illustrates why simply asking which rules of international law are violated 
by the targeted killing programme does not go far enough in its inquiry. If American military 
supremacy and unlawful uses of force are to be effectively challenged, we must grasp how the 
United States’ has long held itself out as an arbiter and creator of universal values and 
standards, and as a protector of rules in the realm of international law and international security, 
while simultaneously flouting, or essentially ignoring, many of those rules and standards it has 
played a key part in creating. Consequently, while this thesis attempts to provide clarification 
on the history and development of the principles of military necessity and self-defence in 
international law and the history of the Kriegsraison doctrine, as well as analysing the legal 
environment in which the targeted killing programme occurs in order to better understand 
which legal rules are applicable to the programme, it also endeavours to understand the 
historical and political origins of the United States’ fraught relationship with those bodies of 
law related to the use of force; namely, the law on the use of force (jus ad bellum), and 
international humanitarian law and international human rights law (jus in bello). To do so, two 
key features of American history are explored: the experience of warfare in the United States 
since the country was first settled by colonists; and the creation of the U.S. Constitution in 
1789, with a specific focus on The Federalist Papers.  
The thesis also considers what Kriegsraison itself tells us about international law on the use of 
force and international humanitarian and human rights law, and what this tells us about 
international law and its future. It argues that while international law has the capacity to provide 
a radical and liberating framework for those opposing the use of armed force, it is imperative 
that international law’s role in countenancing and enabling uses of force, and particularly 
imperial uses of force, is recognised and questioned. 
Given the above, this thesis attempts to answer a number of questions. The core question is 
this: to what extent does US use of targeted killings constitute a manifestation of Kriegsraison? 
Secondarily, why does international humanitarian law, international human rights law, and the 
                                                           
30 Jared Keller, ‘Trump is making good on his promise to ‘bomb the sh*t’ out of terrorists’ (Taskandpurpose.com, 13 
September 2017) https://taskandpurpose.com/trump-bomb-shit-afghanistan-isis/, accessed 17 December 2018. 
31 Maggie Michael and Maad Al-Zikry, ‘The hidden toll of American drones in Yemen: civilian deaths’ (APNews.com, 14 
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international law on the use of force allow for the United States to make, and act on, claims 
regarding the targeted killing programme which are plainly unlawful, without sanction or 
censure, and how exactly does the targeted killing programme violate the relevant rules of 
international humanitarian and human rights law? Finally, how has the history of U.S. war-
making and war-fighting influenced its approach to those bodies of international law relevant 
to war and armed conflict? What can we learn about U.S. interpretations of the relevant law 
from The Federalist Papers and its approach to international law domestically?  
The core argument of this thesis is that the U.S. targeted killing programme represents a 
manifestation of Kriegsraison to the fullest extent possible today, and that it can harness the 
modality of Kriegsraison and justify its targeted killing programme under the guise of legality 
due to the continued imperial character of international law. While the imperialism of early 
international law is now widely acknowledged, the continued relevance of imperialism to the 
international law on the use of force, international humanitarian law and international human 
rights law is less often considered.32 The role of capital, empire and race in international 
humanitarian law and international law on the use of force is perhaps less readily apparent than 
it is in other bodies of law; for example, international economic law. Nonetheless, capital, 
empire, and race continue to exert a strong and sustained influence on the legal rules and 
institutions relevant to war and armed conflict. As Knox notes, international law is ‘the legal 
form of the struggle of the capitalist states among themselves for domination over the rest of 
the world’ (cite). Imperialist states – the U.S. chief among them – use international law to 
articulate their interests, with international law serving to “concretize” economic and political 
relationships. This thesis clarifies how the international law on the use of force, international 
humanitarian law and international human rights law lend themselves to manipulation by those 
same powerful actors.  
The language and strategic legalism used in the targeted killing programme is demonstrative 
of Kriegsraison. Through the targeted killing programme, Kriegsraison manifests as a reading 
of international law in which the state is always right, in which all kinetic actions are necessary 
to ensure the security of the state, and in which (as is discussed later) instances of civilian death 
are explained away as accidents, errors and tragic incidents. That any violence against civilians 
that comes as a result of the targeted killing programme is explained away as accidental again 
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links us to imperialism. Knox highlights how violence is divorced from imperialism’s logic, 
treated instead as an aberration, ‘pathological to capitalism’s normal function’. 33  
The thesis contributes to the literature on critical international law and critical security studies 
in important and original ways The thesis explains how Kriegsraison has been used by the 
United States through its targeted killing programme, filling a gap in the critical international 
law literature by identifying how the U.S. employs the logic of Kriegsraison to directly advance 
its interests at the operational level in a way that makes use of existing international law. The 
thesis demonstrates that, far from being resigned to the past with the advent of the post-WWII 
Geneva Conventions, Kriegsraison continues to exist and make itself available to powerful 
state actors.  In discussing the history of U.S. war-making and war-fighting and the continued 
influence of The Federalist Papers, the thesis identifies important connections between 
American exceptionalism – from the past through to the present day – and the ways in which 
the U.S. deals in law, domestically and internationally. Further, it highlights the importance of 
racialised concepts to the international law on the use of force and the international law of war. 
Regarding critical security studies, the research calls attention to the influence of militarism 
and national identity on U.S. foreign policy, particularly in terms of the sustained influence of 
The Federalist Papers on this issue. It further elucidates how the U.S. harnesses the role of 
racialised concepts such as ‘civilisation’ in employing international law to achieve its foreign 
and security policy priorities and goals and the importance of international law for U.S security 
policy framing.  
In terms of critical international law, this thesis is situated in the ‘Intersectional Marxist 
Approaches to International Law’ (IMAIL) framework articulated by B.S. Chimni and the 
‘Stretched Marxism’ approach put forward by Rob Knox.34 As such, the thesis directly engages 
not only with questions of capital, but also with questions of ‘civilisation’ in international law, 
the role of race and civilisation in the foundation of the United States, and the racial beliefs of 
early international lawyers such as Francis Lieber. While numerous scholars have written on 
critical approaches to international law and on international law as it relates to targeted 
killing,35 to date, there has not been a work which focusses specifically on the targeted killing 
                                                           
33 Knox (n32) 92. 
34 See: B.S. Chimni, International Law and World Order: A Critique of Contemporary Approaches (Cambridge University 
Press, 2018) ; Knox (n32) 
35 See, for example: B.S. Chimni, International Law and World Order: A Critique of Contemporary Approaches (Cambridge 
University Press, 2018); Matthew Stone, Ilan rua Wall and Costas Douzinos (eds.), New Critical Legal Thinking: Law and 
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programme as an expression of U.S. imperialism through an international law framework, 
combining critical legal analysis with a study of the history of U.S. militarism and war-making 
in U.S. national identity. Similarly, while there is a host of scholarship on targeted killing 
scholarship in the field of critical security studies,36 this thesis makes an original contribution 
to the field by identifying how the United States uses international law to frame and structure 
its choices in the area of security policy and identifies how the history of war in the United 
States continues to influence U.S. Security policy. 
 
Methodology 
This thesis adopts a critical, Marxist analysis of international law. As Knox notes: 
‘Marxist approaches are committed to grounding the law in its wider material context: 
understanding the ways in which political-economic relationships—and their attendant 
conflicts—shape and are manifested within (international) law. As such, any critical 
analysis of international law should seek to ask what part, if any, international law plays 
in ‘the reproduction of the structural inequalities which characterise capitalist 
societies’.37  
A critical approach to international law should thus bring ‘to light the hidden forms of 
domination and exploitation which shape it.’38 As such, this thesis engages in critical research 
by examining traditional, doctrinal sources of international law such as treaties, conventions, 
and jurisprudence, and ‘soft law’, such as legal memos from the U.S. Department of Justice 
and the Office of the Legal Counsel, and statements from key figures in the Executive Branch 
of successive U.S. administrations, including the President George W. Bush administration, 
the administration of President Barack Obama, and the administration of President Donald 
Trump, from a critical perspective. It seeks to uncover the ways in which the international law 
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on the use of force and the international law relevant to war and armed conflict are complicit 
in reifying existing material structures of imperial domination by the U.S. in the countries in 
which it carries out the targeted killing programme, and how bodies of law such as international 
humanitarian law lend themselves to such practices. ‘Soft law’ sources, including statements 
and speeches from U.S. presidents, legal advisors, Secretaries of Defense and State etc., 
provide clarity as to how Kriegsraison operates at the political level and, in highlighting U.S. 
reliance on arguments of military necessity, self-defence and self-preservation in its pursuit of 
the targeted killing programme, help us to understand U.S. legal interpretations in more depth; 
as Koskenniemi says, ‘authoritative speech migrates between technical disciplines – that… is 
a large part of how power operates.’39 Through its examination of the history of warfare in the 
United States, and The Federalist Papers, this thesis also engages in historical research and, in 
the final chapter, includes an overview of the legitimating rhetoric used by the U.S. to support 
its various legal positions.  
The thesis proceeds as set out below.  
Chapter One traces the history of the legal development of the principle of military necessity 
and the right of self-defence in international law, and provides an in-depth discussion on the 
history of the Kriegsraison doctrine. It presents an overview of the debate surrounding different 
conceptions of the central purposes of the rules of war: whether the rules of war are supposed 
to restrain or enable military activity. It also addresses the various arguments in support of, and 
against, interpreting the right of self-defence, as found in Article 51 of the UN Charter, 
restrictively. This chapter asserts that the United States relies on claims of military necessity 
and self-defence in justifying its targeted killing programme, to the extent that the targeted 
killing programme is representative of Kriegsraison.  
Chapter Two examines the U.S. targeted killing programme and its effectiveness in achieving 
the United States’ proclaimed aim of eradicating the global terrorist threat against the state’s 
security and safety. Much of the focus on the targeted killing programme in news media and in 
government statements has been on the method by which targeted killings are executed – 
namely, with drone strikes. In contrast to much of the literature on targeted killing, this chapter 
engages directly with the primary arguments put forward by the U.S. government to support 
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the targeted killing programme and it’s use of armed drones. Claims of drone strikes’ cost-
efficiency, ‘humanity’, and precision are interrogated and exposed as misleading, and often 
illusory. The chapter then explores the issues of ‘accidental’ civilian deaths caused by drone 
strikes, and the diffusion of responsibility that comes with an often complex and convoluted 
chain of command, before focussing on the importance of adequate and reliable intelligence 
for drone strike operations. It illuminates how drones have been portrayed as exceptionally 
precise and exceptionally humane, successfully allowing consecutive presidential 
administrations to present the targeted killing programme as a unique tool in the ‘war on terror’. 
Chapter Three situates the targeted killing programme in international law and applies the rules 
of international humanitarian law (IHL) to the targeted killing programme. It examines the 
categorisation of conflicts under international law, i.e. international armed conflict (IAC) and 
non-international armed conflict (NIAC). The chapter argues that if we accept the United 
States’ argument that it is involved in an internationalised NIAC, the targeted killing 
programme is still extremely legally problematic, particularly given the United States’ 
overbroad interpretations of proportionality and the principle of distinction, and its reliance on 
the principle of military necessity. Therefore, the chapter considers the rules of IHL relevant 
to targeting in a NIAC. It surveys the distinctions and differences in the targeting rules applied 
to civilians directly participating in hostilities and to individuals who are members of non-state 
organised armed groups, and engages in a detailed appraisal of the legality of personality and 
signature strikes under the applicable rules.  
Given that some targeted killings in the targeted killing programme, for example in Niger and 
Libya, take place away from ‘hot’ battlefields or ‘outside an area of active hostilities’- a 
category that does not exist in international law – international human rights law (IHRL) should 
then apply to such drone strikes. Chapter Four addresses the questions which arise from 
applying international human rights law to the targeted killing programme. First, it asks 
whether international human rights law applies extraterritorially – the U.S. maintains that it 
does not. The chapter then examines how, and to what extent, IHRL applies in armed conflict, 
and how it interacts with IHL. Finally, the chapter evaluates the targeted killing programme 
under the relevant rules of IHRL, and finds that the U.S. has purposely confused the legal 
frameworks applicable to the targeted killing programme. 
Chapter Five considers the American approach to security and international law through an 
examination of the place of war and law in American national identity. The chapter traces 
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America’s experiences of war and insecurity from the 1600s to the present day, with a particular 
focus on the writings of three of the ‘Founding Fathers’ in The Federalist Papers. The 
Federalist Papers, which remain extremely influential in the American mythos today, provides 
a valuable insight into the pre-eminence of security concerns in the drafting of the new 
American constitution in the late 1780s. This chapter emphasises how the militarism of U.S. 
society throughout its history, accompanied by the militarisation of the state after WWII and 
the legalism found in American national identity has contributed to a reading of international 
law in which legal rules are interpreted as serving America’s security interests. Further to this, 
the domestic war powers, and powers of international law interpretation of the Executive 
Branch of U.S. government are also addressed, and the implications of the 2001 AUMF on 
same is examined.  
The concluding chapter, Chapter Six, asks what the return of Kriegsraison itself represents for 
international law. Employing a critical analysis of international law, the chapter argues that 
Kriegsraison is representative of an imperialism which, though often erased in discussions on 
international law, exists to allow states to use international law rules to further imperious and 
predatory conduct. Declaring the legality of the targeted killing programme under a melange 
of criteria from different bodies of international law has allowed to the U.S. to escape ethical 
and moral discussions on the targeted killing programme, reducing the conversation to 
questions of pure legality. Yet legality does not impute ethicality or morality. This raises larger 
questions for international law. The chapter asks how individuals and communities can resist 
imperial readings of international law, so that individuals and society can ensure that 
international law does not accommodate injustice. 
 
Why is this thesis relevant and necessary? 
There are several reasons why the study performed in this thesis is important and necessary. 
It provides a detailed account as to how the targeted killing programme has been justified and 
clarifies its legality under the relevant rules of international law. Furthermore, in exploring 
how the United States’ historical experiences of war and insecurity directly influences U.S. 
conduct in the targeted killing programme and in the international law sphere today, the 
thesis also brings to light how Kriegsraison cannot be fully eradicated from international law. 
First, it elucidates that the development of international humanitarian law, and in particular the 
principle of military necessity and the rights of self-defence, do not have the purely altruistic 
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and humanitarian nature often attributed to them. However, it also emphasises that since the 
creation of the U.N. Charter in 1945, the majority of states in the international system have 
taken a narrow view of the right of self-defence, and that increasingly, the principle of military 
necessity is viewed as restrictive rather permissive. This is especially important given ongoing 
attempts not only by the United States, but by states such as Russia and Israel, to expand the 
right of self-defence and adopt a lax reading of the principle of military necessity.   
Secondly, the fallacies surrounding the targeted killing programme’s drone strikes – that they 
are ‘precise’, without clarifying what precision means; that they are cost-efficient, without 
detailing the actual costs involved; and that they are ‘humane’, without acknowledging the 
death and destruction they cause – necessitate examination, given that it is those 
aforementioned arguments, accompanied by claims as to the targeted killing programme’s 
legality, that have given it its legitimacy and allowed the U.S. to expand the programme. It 
appears increasingly likely that lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) will be employed 
by states such as the U.S. in the future. It is probable that claims of precision, cost-effectiveness 
and humanity will accompany the use of LAWS and it is therefore incumbent upon us to 
interrogate these misleading claims while drones remain under meaningful human control.  
Thirdly, the rules applicable to the targeted killing programme remain contentious and must be 
further explicated. Whether it is international humanitarian law or international human rights 
law which applies to the targeted killing programme, the U.S. has deliberately conflated aspects 
of the jus ad bellum with the jus in bello, taking an à-la-carte approach to international law that 
serves the interests of the state more than it does the interests of those most affected by armed 
conflict and terrorism. 
Fourth, the history of U.S. war-making and its domestic experiences of conflict, along with the 
nation’s approach to law, directly influences the United States’ interpretations of international 
law today, and the war powers of the president. Furthermore, taking an ahistorical approach to 
the subject fails to appreciate the specifically American nuances of the Kriegsraison doctrine 
as it appears through the targeted killing programme today. 
Finally, imperialism remains embedded in aspects of modern international law, even while that 
same law is invoked for radical and emancipatory purposes. We must remain alive to these 
opposing approaches when construing how international law does, or does not, contribute to 
the furthering of respect for human rights and the mitigating of suffering in times of armed 
conflict.   
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Chapter One: Military Necessity, Kriegsraison and Self-Defence 
 
The principle of military necessity and the right of self-defence are two of the most pertinent 
facets of public international law, particularly when examining the issue of targeted killing. 
Targeted killings have primarily been justified as militarily necessary acts carried out in self-
defence due to extreme circumstances in an exceptional time. Therefore, these concepts 
demand detailed discussion. Due to their being invoked in unprecedented ways, the concepts 
have also come under increased scrutiny in recent years. International humanitarian law is 
‘predicated on a subtle equilibrium between two diametrically opposed impulses: military 
necessity and humanitarian consideration’.40 If this equilibrium is unsettled, so too is the 
entirety of international humanitarian law. Similarly, modern international relations are reliant 
upon the assertion in Article 51 of the UN Charter that states may only use force in self-defence. 
Should force be used by a state for a reason other than this, or should a state invoke a right to 
use force in self-defence dishonestly, the principles of sovereign equality and territorial 
integrity are thrown into doubt. Therefore, respect for each concept is considered as being of 
the utmost importance for the maintenance of public international law. Unfortunately, this 
respect does not appear to have been particularly forthcoming in recent history, particularly 
following the events of September 11th 2001, with many states attempting, and often 
succeeding, to ignore the law for expediency’s sake. This phenomenon has become one of the 
greatest challenges facing public international law, and it is incumbent upon the international 
community to examine not just how this is happening, but why, and furthermore to assess how 
these important concepts came into being.  
 
In response to this, the following section examines the concept of military necessity, its extreme 
expression in the form of the doctrine of Kriegsraison, and the history of its codification. Next, 
there is a discussion on the (now unaccepted) right of self-preservation, and the development 
of the modern right of self-defence. This final section also addresses the arguments for and 
against a restrictive interpretation of self-defence as it is articulated in Article 51 of the UN 
Charter.  
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Military necessity 
Military necessity represents one of international humanitarian law’s most challenging 
principles. Invoked for many years to justify a plethora of unlawful acts, it continues to defy 
definition.   
The principle first appeared in codified form in the Lieber Code of 1863 and received greater 
recognition in the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration.41 Although not explicitly named as military 
necessity, the Declaration states in its preamble that ‘the only legitimate object which States 
should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy’, 
which Solis terms ‘the core concept of military necessity’.42  
The principle of military necessity allows for whatever lawful force is necessary to accomplish 
a legitimate military purpose not otherwise prohibited by international humanitarian law, where 
the only legitimate military purpose is to weaken the military capacity of the other parties to 
the conflict.43 The ICRC states that the purpose of international humanitarian law is to ‘strike 
a balance’ between military necessity and humanitarian exigencies.44  
Military necessity is inextricably linked to the principles of unnecessary suffering and 
proportionality, and requires an action invoked in its name to provide some kind of military 
advantage, namely the weakening of enemy forces. Unsurprisingly, given its pliability, there 
have been many readings and interpretations of military necessity by States, international 
organisations such as the UN and the ICRC, and NGOs. Some of these interpretations have 
veered toward the extreme, such as the doctrine of Kriegsraison.  
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The doctrine of Kriegsraison 
The doctrine of Kriegsraison (reason of war) holds that in war, necessity knows no law, and is 
considered as the ‘affirmation of raison d’état in the context of armed conflict’.45 Oppenheim 
states that it ‘dates very far back in the history of warfare’, originating ‘in those times when 
warfare was not regulated by laws of war, i.e. generally binding customs and international 
treaties, but only by usages’.46   
The principle of military necessity as expressed by Kriegsraison has its roots in natural law 
understandings of necessity found in the just war doctrine. The just war doctrine held that the 
just side in war was permitted to use whatever degree of force was necessary in the particular 
circumstances of the case to bring about victory; beyond that, all force became unlawful.47 
Grotius and Vattel represent the most important of these writers in the just war tradition to 
express the principle of military necessity and linking the jus in bello to the jus ad bellum.48  
There is, writes Boed, a ‘Grotian understanding of necessity as a right’.49 This right is closely 
linked to the doctrine of self-preservation – Boed explains that ‘when a threat to self-
preservation arose, it was considered justified to take any steps necessary to preserve one’s 
existence, even if such steps would have been unlawful had they been taken in the absence of 
a threat to self-preservation’.50 Thus, there existed not only a right to self-preservation, but a 
right to do whatever was necessary to achieve one’s self-preservation.   
Whilst Grotius wrote that ‘in war things which are necessary to attain the end in view are 
permissible’, he did place limitations on this necessity: 
‘…we must not attempt any thing [sic] which may prove the destruction of innocents, 
unless for some extraordinary reasons, and for the safety of many.’51 
Elsewhere, Grotius also states that ‘advantage does not confer the same right as necessity’.52 
This means that ‘not everything that is militarily advantageous is militarily necessary’, despite 
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the fact that there may be protestations to the contrary by military forces. 53 As noted by Boed, 
while Grotius recognised a right to occupy neutral soil should the exigencies of war make it 
necessary, he nonetheless placed a number of restrictions on this right, writing that ‘nothing 
short of extreme exigency can give one power a right over what belongs to another no way 
involved in the war’.54  
However, it remains clear that ‘virtually unmitigated military necessity was the state of the law 
as Grotius perceived it’.55 Despite the restrictions, all actions are allowed where there is 
‘extreme exigency’ or ‘extraordinary reasons’.  
Military necessity as it relates to the just war doctrine is also to be found in Vattel’s work: 
‘… from the object of a just war: for, when the end is lawful, he who has a right to 
pursue that end, has, of course, a right to employ all the means which are necessary for 
its attainment’.56 
He also writes: 
‘As soon, therefore, as we have declared war, we have a right to do against the enemy 
whatever we find necessary for the attainment of that end, for the purpose of bringing 
him to reason, and obtaining justice and security from him.’57 
Vattel also places limitations on this right, noting that no more than the means necessary should 
be used in attaining the ends, with whatever is done beyond that being ‘reprobated by the law 
of nature’ and ‘condemnable at the tribunal of the conscience’.58  
Despite the positive law developments surrounding military necessity during the 19th century, 
Kriegsraison is rooted in this natural law approach which holds that ‘if an end is permissible, 
the necessary means to that end are also permissible’.59 The doctrine was advocated by 
numerous German writers who maintained that ‘the laws of war lose their binding force in the 
case of extreme necessity’. 60 This approach to military necessity represents a continuation of 
a particularly German view expressed most famously by ‘Prussian military genius’ and ‘the 
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law of war’s fiercest nineteenth-century critic’, Carl von Clausewitz, in his book On War, 
published posthumously in 1832.61 Deeming war ‘a mere continuation of policy by other 
means’, Clausewitz writes that: 
Self-imposed restrictions, almost imperceptible and hardly worth mentioning, termed 
usages of International Law, accompany it (war) without essentially impairing its 
power. Violence, that is to say, physical force…is therefore the means; the compulsory 
submission of the enemy to our will is the ultimate object. In order to attain this object 
fully, the enemy must be disarmed, and disarmament becomes therefore the immediate 
object of hostilities…62 
And further that: 
As the use of physical power to the utmost extent by no means excludes the co-
operation of the intelligence, it follows that he who uses force unsparingly, without 
reference to the bloodshed involved, must obtain a superiority if his adversary uses less 
vigour in its application.63  
The Clausewitzian approach is obvious in the doctrine of Kriegsraison. Although the doctrine 
had been in existence for many years prior, Kriegsraison was exposited principally by 
Professor Carl Lueder in the book Handbuch des Völkerrechts: Auf Grundlage europäischer 
Staatspraxis, published in Germany in 1886. Lueder, elucidating the doctrine, wrote that in 
war, in extreme circumstances, states were not obligated to observe the laws of war. The 
circumstances under which this could be so were: 
1.      In case of extreme necessity, when the object of war can only be achieved by non-
observance and would by observance be frustrated; 
2.      as retaliation, in case of unlawful non-observance of Kriegsmanier by the enemy. 
Any departure from Kriegsmanier is justified when circumstances are such that the 
accomplishment of the war-aim, or the escape from extreme danger, is hindered by 
sticking to it. 64 
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According to Best, Lueder was ‘peculiarly insistent that nothing in international law (or the 
moral philosophy which some found to be attached to it) obliged you to stick to the rules if 
your opponent gave you any excuse or pretext for breaking them. Further, Kriegsraison: 
‘made no distinction between the violation of the law of war and transgression of law 
in war, and did not indeed concern itself with it very much.’65  
Colonomos argues that this point, namely the differences between the violation of the law of 
war and of law in war, ‘remains in suspense’, and is one of the ‘ambiguities of the legal idea 
of military necessity’.66  
Kriegsraison, then, allows belligerents to do whatever they feel necessary to prevail in armed 
conflict, as military necessity overrules all law.67 If applied practically, Solis finds that: 
…if a belligerent deems it necessary for the success of its military operations to violate 
a rule of international law, the violation is permissible. As the belligerent is the sole 
judge of the necessity, the doctrine is really that the belligerent may violate the law or 
repudiate it or ignore it whenever that is deemed to be for its military advantage.68 
Essentially, Kriegsraison is the ‘unlimited application of military necessity’, and emphasises 
the exceptional character of a conflict or situation in order to breach the law.69  
The Kriegsraison doctrine was invoked by the German Armies during both World Wars I and 
II as a defence for a range of actions. On the invasion of Belgium by the Germany Army in 
1914, Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg stated in the Reichstag: 
‘Gentlemen, we are now in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law…He who 
is menaced as we are and is fighting for his highest possession can only consider how 
to hack his way through’.70 
Solis writes that in the course of WWI, Kriegsraison was used to justify the killing in the water 
of survivors by the submarines that had targeted their ship.71 Similarly, the use of chemical 
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weapons in the course of WWI was also repeatedly qualified by the doctrine of Kriegsraison – 
the World Health Organisation, in their ‘Public health response to biological and chemical 
weapons’, for example, makes explicit mention of Kriegsraison in their recounting of the 
events of 22nd April 1915, when Germany released some 180 tonnes of liquid chlorine into the 
air that is believed to have killed as many as 15,000 soldiers. 72   
During World War II, the doctrine was employed to justify actions including, but not limited 
to, the compulsory recruitment of labour from occupied territories, the seizure of property and 
goods, the killing of prisoners of war and scorched earth policies. World War II was to prove 
a turning point for the doctrine, with Kriegsraison being referenced numerous times in a 
number of cases before the U.S. Military Tribunals at Nuremberg (which occurred after the 
trial of the major war criminals), notably in U.S. v List (the Hostage case) and in U.S. v Von 
Leeb et al (the High Command case). 
The List case, commonly known as the Hostage case, tried twelve defendants on four counts 
of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity through being principals in and 
accessories to the murder of thousands of persons from the civilian population of Greece, 
Yugoslavia, Norway, and Albania between September 1939 and May 1945 by the use of troops 
of the German armed forces under their command of and acting pursuant to their orders issued; 
participation in a deliberate scheme of terrorism and intimidation, wholly unwarranted and 
unjustified by military necessity, by the murder, ill-treatment and deportation to slave labour 
of prisoners of war and members of the civilian populations in territories occupied by the 
German armed forces; by plundering and pillaging public and private property and wantonly 
destroying cities, towns, and villages for which there was no military necessity.73  
Regarding the justification of unlawful acts in military necessity, the judgment stated: 
It is apparent from the evidence of these defendants that they considered military 
necessity, a matter to be determined by them, a complete justification of their acts. We 
do not concur in the view that the rules of warfare are anything less than they purport 
to be. Military necessity or expediency do not justify a violation of positive rules. 74 
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And later: 
Here again the German theory of expediency and military necessity (Kriegsraison geht 
vor kriegsmanier) superseded established rules of international law. As we have 
previously stated in this opinion, the rules of International Law must be followed even 
if it results in the loss of a battle or even a war. Expediency or necessity cannot warrant 
their violation.75 
The U.S. v Von Leeb et al, also known as the High Command case, was the final of the twelve 
Nuremberg trials. Fourteen defendants, all of them having been either leading command or 
staff officers in the German armed forces, were charged with crimes against peace; war crimes; 
crimes against humanity; and a common plan or conspiracy to commit the crimes charged in 
the first three counts. Regarding the German’s plea of military necessity, the tribunal held that: 
This theory (of military necessity as an excuse for justification of scorched earth policy 
during retreat) is nothing more than the reapplication of the well-known German 
principle ‘Kriegsraison geht vor kriegsmanier’ which has been advanced by various 
German writers and faithfully transmitted into action by the German Armies during the 
last two world wars. According to this theory, the laws of war lose their binding force 
in case of extreme necessity which was said to arise when the violation of the laws of 
war offers other means of escape from extreme danger, or the realization of the purpose 
of war – namely, the overpowering of the enemy. Such a theory is merely a denial of 
all laws, and a reaffirmation of the philosophy that the end justifies the means. 76 
The Nuremburg judgements, along with the 1949 Geneva Conventions, ‘put the last nails in 
the coffin of the doctrine of Kriegsraison.’77 The 1987 Commentary to Additional Protocol I 
to the Geneva Conventions makes specific reference to Kriegsraison in its discussion of Article 
35, and states: 
…Law is a restraint which cannot be confused with more usages to be applied when 
convenient. The doctrine of "Kriegsraison" was still applied during the Second World 
War. It is possibly the uncertainty as to the applicability of the Hague law in conditions 
which had changed considerably since 1907 that contributed to this to some extent. 
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However, it is probable that the resort to this doctrine was above all based on contempt 
for the law, the weakening of which is may be characteristic and a danger of our age. 
"Kriegsraison" was condemned at Nuremberg, and this condemnation has been 
confirmed by legal writings. One can and should consider this theory discredited. It is 
totally incompatible with the wording of Article 35, paragraph 1, and with the very 
existence of the Protocol.  
Kriegsraison is thus seen as a defunct doctrine and has not been invoked by any state, at least 
by name, for any action since World War II. This is due in no small part to the codification of 
military necessity, one of the aims of which was said to be the restraint of the doctrine.78  The 
untrammelled right of military necessity had, arguably, already begun to fade. Yet, as is 
demonstrated throughout this thesis, Kriegsraison remained available to states with sufficient 
military power, political power and wealth – notably, the United States. As noted in the 
introduction, Kriegraison, as it is currently manifested, appears less as a doctrine than as a 
modality, as a form of strategic legalism. Following the creation of the UN Charter, this 
modality, this logic and reasoning of Kriegsraison, could now be accessed by an invocation of 
self-defence, as laid out in Article 51 of the UN Charter. With the embedding of the WWII 
Allies’ political power in the creation of the UN Security Council, the U.S. (at whose behest 
Article 51 was added to the Charter, as is discussed at more length in Chapter 5), helped to 
create a system in which it would be possible to justify almost every instance of the use of 
armed force, as long as it could be said to be necessary for its self-defence, and in which it 
would be next to impossible to censure or punish the country for any unlawful uses of force, 
as per the rules of IHL, within this area.79 That this use of Article 51 remains available to the 
United States (and, indeed, the other countries who make up the Security Council’s P5) speaks 
to the embedding of material political-economic relationships in international law. No other 
country has so successfully, or repeatedly, invoked Article 51 of the Charter as a blanket 
justification for otherwise unlawful uses of force.80  
As Sanders argues, ‘legal cultures…play a significant role in shaping state conduct… legal 
cultures underwrite how political actors interpret, enact, and evade legal norms.’81 The strong 
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legal culture of the United States, which is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, is such that 
its decisions in the arena of armed conflict are imbued with the kind of strategic legalism found 
in Kriegsraison, even if, under even a broad reading of the relevant rules of international law, 
U.S. conduct in this area is found to be unlawful. That the U.S. can repeatedly engage in such 
before and still find the framing of Kriegsraison amenable to their conduct speaks volumes – 
not only about U.S. exceptionalism, but about the character of international law itself. 
The Lieber Code 
As previously stated, military necessity was first codified in the Lieber Code, written in 1863 
by Clausewitz’s fellow Prussian Francis (also known as Franz) Lieber.82 The ‘Lieber Code’ 
was officially known as ‘Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the 
Field or General Order 100’, and was issued by President Abraham Lincoln on 24th April 
1863. In the Code, Lieber wrote: 
‘military necessity, as understood by modern civilized nations, consists in the necessity 
of those measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and which 
are lawful according to the modern law and usages of war.’83  
Often called a ‘humanitarian milestone’84, the Code is more aptly described as ‘tough 
humanitarianism’.85 While considered a blueprint for our modern conception of military 
necessity, the Lieber Code was not particularly constraining. Witt notes that in its most open-
ended provision, the Code authorised any measure necessary to secure the ends of war and 
defend the country, with Lieber writing that ‘to save the country is paramount to all other 
considerations.’ 86 Lieber was, however, concerned at ‘the prospect of Kriegsraison emerging 
as a rule’, or as a ‘rule-swallowing exception’, and his codification of military necessity was 
directed at its limitation. 87  
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Despite this, the strong influence of Clausewitz in Kriegsraison is also to be found in the Lieber 
Code.88 Lieber himself stated that ‘the more vigorously wars are pursued, the better it is for 
humanity’. It fails to contradict a ‘rather Clausewitzian view of warfare: the shortest wars are 
the best’.89 This, combined with the lack of a restriction on armed forces in measures allowing 
them to secure the ends of war, demonstrates that the Lieber Code does not ‘run radically 
counter to Kriegsraison.’90 The Lieber Code itself also contains elements of imperial racism 
(discussed further in Chapter 6), arguing that the rules of the Code are not applicable to the 
‘uncivilised’ nations or the ‘barbarous’ races.91  
In fact, the Lieber Code has been considered by some to have informed the modern formulation 
of Kriegsraison. A similar code was adopted by Prussia in 1870, whose Chancellor Otto von 
Bismarck had remarked “what leader would allow his country to be destroyed because of 
international law?"92 Horton writes that the doctrine of military necessity was an issue of 
contention in the state, with Prussia, and then Germany, embracing ‘an unrestrained 
Clausewitzian view of the doctrine’, exemplified by Kriegsraison.93  
Given the Clausewitzian connection in both the doctrines of Kriegsraison and military 
necessity, along with each having been in some way informed by the other, it is not difficult to 
understand why Colonomos argues that there is no stable foundation for the principle of 
military necessity when one considers the fluid terrain on which it has been built.94 This fluidity 
remains an issue today, as can be seen as the following section investigates how military 
necessity is interpreted around the globe, not just by States, but by international organisations 
such as the UN, the ICRC, and NGOs.  
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Law of Armed Conflict or International Humanitarian Law? Contrasting conceptions 
of the rules of war 
The wording of military necessity found in the Lieber Code is the ‘closest international law 
comes to a generally accepted statement of the doctrine’.95 Disagreement as to the application 
of the principle, and its limits once applied, abound within the international community. 
Tension continues to exist between what Luban terms the ‘LOAC vision’ and the ‘IHL vision, 
with the former beginning with armed conflict and believing that military necessity and the 
imperatives of war-making should be afforded primary status, and the latter beginning with 
humanitarianism and assigning human rights and human dignity primary status.96  
Luban argues that the LOAC ‘vision’, in ‘taking necessity seriously, is ‘less restrictive’ than 
the IHL approach.97 The LOAC vision is that held by military lawyers, who principally work 
for militaries and government departments, with the humanitarian vision being the one held by 
lawyers working in NGOs and organisations such as the ICRC. Luban acknowledges that many 
people will, at some point in their careers, have worked for both military and humanitarian 
organisations, and also notes that not every military lawyer will agree with the LOAC vision, 
and vice versa for humanitarian lawyers and the humanitarian vision. However, Luban holds 
that ‘the two visions of the laws of war closely track organisational cultures’. Furthermore, he 
believes that in the last decade the cleavages between these two visions have become more 
pronounced, leading to the creation of two teams whose ‘goal is to ensure their vision of law 
prevails’.98 
For the LOAC vision, ‘taking necessity seriously’ involves the assumption that the purpose of 
the laws of war is ‘to give full sway to military necessity and protect civilians (only) against 
military excess’.99 The LOAC vision prioritises operational aspects of LOAC, and thus places 
extra weight on the perspectives of ‘specially affected’ states. 100 
The humanitarian vision, on the other hand, advocates an entirely different approach. This 
vision sees the core purpose of the laws of war as being the protection of civilians ‘to the 
maximum extent possible, against the violence and indignities of war’. IHL, says Luban, 
provides a ‘civilian’s-eye view of war, and gives ground grudgingly to claims of military 
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necessity’. Thus, although both sets of lawyers for ‘the most part read and accept the same 
body of jurisprudence’, and ‘admit that war and human dignity belong to the human world’, 
the conclusions they reach are different ‘because they assign military necessity and human 
dignity different logical priority’.101 The humanitarian vision maximises legal interpretation in 
the ‘restraints and obligations of warriors’, as opposed to the LOAC vision which minimises 
that interpretation. Likewise, the IHL vision minimises interpretation in discretion and 
deference to the military, where LOAC maximises it.102  
Where the LOAC vision relies on state practice and, the IHL vision embraces ‘a variety of soft-
law instruments from multiple sources as evidence of opinion juris’, and holds the verbal 
practice of States (i.e. official state statements) as opposed to practice on the ground as ‘law-
generative state practice’.103 This expansiveness in treaty interpretation extends to an 
expansiveness in the domain of state practice and opinio juris that the IHL vision canvasses to 
identify customary international law. Luban notes that these methods have been ‘ratified’ by 
international courts and tribunals, meaning the IHL vision has ‘gained a foothold in positive 
law – it is not simply wish-fulfilment fantasies of humanitarian reformers’.104  
Reeves and Thurnher, respectively a Major and a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Army, 
highlight the divide verbalised by Luban. They set out their belief that the law of armed conflict 
has begun to prioritise humanitarianism over military necessity, to the detriment of the entire 
international community. Correct in their statement that the law of armed conflict  is 
‘predicated on the existence of a balance between the traditionally recognised principles of 
military necessity and humanity’, with the relationship between these two principles being 
rather delicate, they go on to assert that ‘external influences have begun hindering the ability 
of states to preserve the appropriate equilibrium’. This is deemed to be a ‘troubling trend’. 
Reeves and Thurnher opine that states are the primary figures in the creation of international 
law, and must retain the ‘flexibility’ to ‘adjust the law as needed’. 105 
Reeves and Thurnher attempt to support their point by illustrating three case studies in which 
they believe there is an excess of humanitarianism taking precedence over military necessity: 
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the ‘capture or kill’ debate, the autonomous weapons debate, and the cyber warfare debate. 
Those ‘external influences’ becoming a hindrance to states, including the ICRC, NGOs such 
as Human Rights Watch and ‘many in the media’, are variously portrayed as ‘overreaching’, 
of having little expertise with which to assess where the balance between humanitarianism and 
military necessity should lie, and of taking things out of context ‘in rather dramatic ways’. 
Debates around the three aforementioned issues serve, say Reeves and Thurnher, to ‘act in 
concert to subvert the principle of military necessity and tip the scale in favour of humanity’.106 
The language employed by Reeves and Thurnher to describe the ‘threat’ from ‘external 
influences’ echoes that used by Yoram Dinstein (and cited by Luban in his piece referenced 
above) in his closing remarks at a 2011 conference on International Law and the Changing 
Character of War at the U.S. Naval College. In his address, Dinstein referred to the evolving 
‘menace’ to the law of armed conflict from ‘the human rights zealots’ and ‘do-goodniks’ 
(which he terms ‘human rights-niks’) who are said to be attempting ‘a hostile takeover of 
LOAC’.107  Reeves and Thurhner conclude by writing that states must not yield their authority 
to ‘unaccountable ideologues’, and must strive to keep military necessity and humanity in 
balance.108 
 
Military necessity in state practice 
The tension in the different visions of military necessity and its place in the law of armed 
conflict are apparent in the different interpretations of military necessity found in states’ 
military manuals around the globe and the interpretations of military necessity situated in 
international treaties. 
An example of state practice on military necessity is to be found in the ICRC’s customary law 
guide, in the section relating to rule 54, ‘attacks against objects indispensable to the survival of 
the civilian population’. Referencing a number of military manuals, it is notable that in many 
of the LOAC guides or handbooks (e.g. Canada, Netherlands, Spain, Germany) ‘scorched 
earth’ policies are permitted in cases of ‘imperative military necessity’, following the wording 
of article 54. What exactly constitutes ‘imperative military necessity’ is not defined. Other 
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manuals do not require that the case be imperative – for example, Russia’s manual allows for 
the commander, in exceptional cases and ‘proceeding from the principle of military necessity’ 
to define which objects to attack, destroy or put out of commission. Israel’s, meanwhile, does 
not mention military necessity in relation to rule 54 at all. The United States (who have not yet 
ratified API) allows for scorched earth policies where required by military necessity, without 
the need for this military necessity to be ‘imperative’.109 The varying interpretations of military 
necessity demonstrate that the reading of the principle as understood in treaty law and by 
international tribunals is more restrictive than the understanding of the principle held by 
militaries themselves.  
What, then, are the practical implications of the tension between the two cleavages of the 
IHL/LOAC ‘visions’ and the different interpretations of military necessity? Regarding the two 
different visions of the laws of war, Luban finds that the result is a ‘practical indeterminacy in 
the law’, leaving the laws of war susceptible to ‘systematically inconsistent interpretations’. 
This is particularly a problem for military lawyers in the field, who may be left confused as to 
whether they should veto a tactic or targeting choice that their commander wishes to employ, 
given that the different visions of the laws of war may provide two different answers.110  Luban 
also references the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia’s 2011 Gotovina decision, 
in which the Trial Chamber found that ‘a Croatian artillery officer named Rajcic 
indiscriminately shelled a city by firing at the enemy commander’s apartment in a civilian 
neighbourhood.’ General Gotovina, who had ordered the action, was given a 24-year sentence 
for war crimes.111 The Trial Chamber stated that they found the risk to be: 
‘Excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage of firing at the two locations 
where the HV believed Martic to have been present. This disproportionate attack shows 
that the HV paid little or no regard to the risk of civilian casualties and injuries and 
damage to civilian objects when firing artillery at a military target…’112 
Though Gotovina’s conviction was subsequently reversed by the Appellate Chamber, for 
military commanders, says Luban, the decision of the Trial Chamber was outrageous. In their 
view, judges should not be able to ‘second-guess a field commander’s risk-benefit assessment 
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on such a fact intensive and situation-sensitive decision’.113 A trial court is seen to be ‘badly 
situated to offer a concrete assessment of comparative military advantage’. This is 
representative of the wider view held by the LOAC vision, under which external accountability 
is not trusted and universal jurisdiction is ‘particularly deplorable’.114  
On the IHL side, Luban discusses the 2012 Haditha case, in which a U.S. military court 
acquitted the last suspect in the 2005 killing of unarmed civilians at Haditha, Iraq, of the most 
serious charges. Luban quotes from a New York Times report on the case: 
The Haditha case also fits another pattern: Many cases involving civilian deaths arise 
during the chaos of combat or shortly afterward, when fighters’ emotions are running 
high; they can later argue that they feared they were still under attack and shot in self-
defense. In those so-called fog-of-war cases, the military and its justice system have 
repeatedly shown an unwillingness to second-guess the decisions made by fighters who 
said they believed they were in danger, specialists say. 
There is, says Luban, a high acquittal rate in U.S. trials for war crimes committed in combat 
zones, further observing that NATO has failed to investigate civilian deaths caused by their 
bombings in Libya, despite a U.N. investigating commission recommending that NATO do so. 
This aligns with the IHL vision’s opinion that ‘international law is already too deferential to 
military commanders’, which in turn undermines accountability.  
As Schmitt notes, and as indeed Reeves and Thurnher noted, military necessity and humanity 
‘exist in fragile equipoise’ in international humanitarian law.115 The (sometimes subtle) 
differences between states also highlight the malleability of the principle.  The delicate balance 
between humanity and necessity becomes increasingly precarious as states enact policies which 
directly and indirectly contravene treaty and customary law as they attempt to mould the 
principle to fit the form they desire it to take. 
 In recent years, we have largely seen this reshaping of the principle of military necessity come 
from those States who proclaim that they are doing so for reasons of self-defence and the 
security of their nation.  In this light, the following section examines the doctrine of self-
preservation and the principle of self-defence.  
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Self-Preservation and Self-Defence 
Just as the doctrine of Kriegsraison was invoked to justify the unlimited application of military 
necessity, the doctrine of self-preservation allowed for recourse to force for any reason related 
to the preservation of the security of the State. It can, then, be considered a specific application 
of the broader concept of necessity – with anything necessary for the State’s security 
warranting the use of force.  
Self-preservation evolved from the Grotian understanding of necessity discussed earlier,116 and 
likewise was considered a ‘natural’ or ‘inherent’ right117, related to the ‘right to security’ in 
Vattel.  Vattel states that ‘self-preservation is not only a natural right, but an obligation imposed 
by nature’ and further states that ‘it is this right to preserve herself from all injury that is called 
the right to security’.118 This ‘right to security’ states that every nation not only has a right to 
protect and defend its interest from injury, but indeed a duty to do so on behalf of the life of 
the nation. Due to this right, in the interest of self-preservation, Fenwick states that ‘a state may 
violate the sovereignty of another state to prevent a threatened evil whether it be proximate or 
remote’.119 Vattel also writes that ‘a nation has the right…to anticipate designs against itself, 
though it must be careful not to become itself an unjust aggressor’ and also states that ‘nature 
gives men the right to use force when it is needed for the defense and preservation of their 
rights’.120 This conception of the doctrine of self-preservation as a right that can be employed 
to ensure the security of the nation has implications for the current arguments employed by 
those states advocating for a broader right of self-defence, as will be discussed later.  
A further discussion of self-preservation can be found in Westlake’s Collected Papers, where 
he describes the doctrine thus: 
...when a state employs force in the territory of another state...or when it attempts by 
threats to restrain the freedom or action of another state within the territory of the latter, 
or that of the subjects of another state elsewhere than within its own territory… - the 
state so acting or threatening must find its justification in some other principle (other 
than its own sovereignty). The principle commonly put forward on such occasion is that 
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of self-preservation, which writers on international law often class among their 
fundamental, primitive, primary or absolute rights. 121 
For many years, self-defence was held to be synonymous with self-preservation, or as a specific 
instance of it.122 Alexandrov notes that during the 19th and early 20th centuries, statesmen used 
self-preservation, self-defence, necessity and necessity of self-defence as ‘more or less 
interchangeable terms’.123  However, the two concepts are considerably different. Self-
preservation represents a particularly broad reading of the right of self-defence, in which the 
States’ fundamental right to self-preservation supersedes their international obligations and the 
rights of any other State.  If the argument for a right of self-preservation was followed to its 
conclusion, any conduct deemed necessary by a State to ensure the preservation of its existence 
‘was bound to be considered juridically legitimate, even if it was undeniably contrary to an 
international obligation of that State.’124 Self-preservation can thus ‘cloak with an appearance 
of legality almost any unwarranted act of violence on the part of a state.’125 
In the 1837 Caroline incident, the British Ambassador to Washington justified British action 
by invoking ‘the necessity of self-defence and self-preservation’ when destroying the ‘piratical’ 
steamboat Caroline. 126 The Caroline incident is widely regarded as being the incident that 
changed self-defence ‘from a political excuse to a legal doctrine’, 127 with the U.S. Secretary 
of State’s formulation of the conditions of self-defence requiring the British Government to 
show: 
(i) The existence of “…necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving 
no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation…” 
(ii) “that the local authorities…did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act 
justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, and 
kept clearly within it”.128 
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Yet Jennings writes that ‘in arguing the Caroline case, the fundamental distinction between 
self-defence and self-preservation was not always appreciated’, 129 as can be seen through 
examples of earlier state practice against perceived or claimed threats and justified by self-
defence.130 Alexandrov references the United Kingdom’s shelling of Copenhagen and seizing 
of the Danish fleet after the Peace of Tilsit of 1807, following Denmark’s refusal to deliver its 
fleet up to the custody of the U.K. after the British Government demanded they do so, being 
cognisant of a secret clause of the treaty under which Denmark should, in certain 
circumstances, declare a war against the U.K. The U.K. justified the shelling and seizure of the 
fleet as a case of necessity in self-defence, stating that “when a state is unable of itself to prevent 
a hostile use being made of its territory or resources, it ought to allow proper measures” by the 
threatened State.131 The Virginius incident in 1873, in which a vessel under the U.S flag was 
seized by Spain on the high seas in 1873 while attempting to smuggle reinforcements to 
insurgents, provides another example of justification under self-defence. A number of U.S. and 
British nationals, who had been both crew members and passengers on the ship, were shot 
without trial. The U.K. did not protest against the seizure of British subjects on the high seas, 
but only about their executions, admitting that the latter was an act “under the expectation of 
instant damage in self-defence”. 132  
The Caroline incident, however, used the terms self-defence and self-preservation 
interchangeably. Despite this, in its attempts to define the limits of self-defence and to examine 
its legal content, the conception was “rescued from the Naturalist notions of an absolute 
primordial right of self-preservation”. 133 
The doctrine of self-preservation was then, and continues to be, particularly problematic for 
international law and possibly destructive to the entire legal order, as all duties of states were 
‘subordinated to the ‘right of self-preservation’. 134 As Bowett states, it is doubtful whether 
self-preservation can have any meaning as a legal concept – its appeal lying in the ‘realm of 
ideology rather than of law’. 135  
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The issue of self-preservation and what a state may resort to in its name has surfaced more 
recently. The matter of an existential threat to a state is central in the International Court of 
Justice’s Advisory Opinion of 1996 on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. 
In considering whether recourse to nuclear weapons would be illegal in all and any 
circumstances ‘owing to their inherent and total  incompatibility with the law applicable in 
armed conflict’, and despite the Court’s assertion that ‘the use of such weapons…seems 
scarcely reconcilable with respect for such requirements’ [the prohibition of methods and 
means of warfare which preclude any distinction between civilian and military targets or which 
would result in unnecessary suffering to combatants], paragraph 96 states: 
‘…the Court cannot lose sight of the fundamental right of every State to survival, and 
thus its right to resort to self-defence, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter, 
when its survival is at stake.’136 
The issue of an existential threat is raised again in paragraph 97: 
‘Accordingly, in view of the present state of international law viewed as a whole, as 
examined above by the Court, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court is 
led to observe that it cannot reach a definitive conclusion as to the legality or illegality 
of the use of nuclear weapons by a State in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in 
which its very survival would be at stake.’137 
Dinstein deems the last sentence ‘most troublesome’.138 The Court, to the detriment of the 
judgment, did not go any deeper into what an ‘extreme circumstance’ might amount to.139 
These paragraphs thus raise important questions for the relationship between self-preservation, 
self-defence, proportionality and necessity.  
Despite the Court’s stance on nuclear weapons as being ‘scarcely reconcilable’ with two of the 
most important, and indeed defining, elements of international humanitarian law - the 
prohibition on unnecessary suffering and the principle of distinction - the judgment still allows 
for a State to use such weapons in a situation in which its survival is at stake, effectively 
allowing the State to ignore the principle of proportionality.140 In this way, the judgment could 
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be seen as privileging the self-preservation of a state above all else, and possibly allows for the 
doctrine of Kriegsraison to come back into play, albeit in the most extreme of circumstances.141 
The earlier instances of state practice invoking self-defence, discussed previously, highlight 
the dangers inherent in an expansive approach to self-defence and self-preservation. This 
challenge continues apace, with the past fifteen years in particular providing numerous 
instances of state practice which have abused the special position of the right of self-defence 
as the sole exception to the prohibition on the use of force enshrined in the UN Charter in 
Article 2(4).  
Indeed, challenges to the interpretation of self-defence in the UN Charter have been voiced 
since the Charter came into being. Bowett, despite his assertion that the doctrine of self-
preservation was more ideological rather than legal, argued that: 
‘…it is believed that the right of self-defence, though chiefly relevant as an 
exception to the prohibition of force and as a reaction to a delictual use of force, 
cannot be and has not been by state practice confined to this context.’ 142 
Bowett held that an armed attack need not have occurred before a state could use force in self-
defence and believed that, for states, ‘the right to protect their rights by their own action is 
obvious’.143   
Despite early challenges to the modern conception of self-defence, it remains distinct from the 
doctrine of self-preservation. However, the challenges it currently faces risk the doctrine of 
self-preservation making a return, not only in parlance but also in practice. The following 
section looks at the principle of self-defence today, and those challenges.  
 
Self-defence 
Divorced from the doctrine of self-preservation, today self-defence, whether it be individual or 
collective, is recognised as an ‘inherent right’ in Article 51 of the UN Charter and is permitted 
only ‘if an armed attack occurs’. This reading of self-defence is upheld by the International 
Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case. 
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In the Nicaragua case (Nicaragua v USA) concerning military and paramilitary attacks in and 
against Nicaragua brought by Nicaragua against the United States, the Court supported a 
narrow interpretation of the right of self-defence. 144 Although it based its jurisdiction on 
customary international law, its discussion of a customary right of self-defence codified the 
law of self-defence as existing under the UN Charter as well as in customary law. 145  
The Court found that the right of individual or collective self-defence was ‘already a matter of 
customary international law’. 146 Regarding the characteristics governing the right of self-
defence, the Court held that ‘the exercise of this right is subject to the state concerned having 
been the victim of an armed attack’. 147  
This narrow interpretation of the right of self-defence represents that accepted by the majority 
of members of the international community. The narrow interpretation has, however, found 
itself increasingly under attack. Arguments for the continuation of a narrow interpretation of 
the right of self-defence, and arguments against, are discussed next.  
 
Support for a broad interpretation of the right of self-defence 
In the past fifteen years, public international law has come under increasing pressure from those 
supporting a broad interpretation of the right of self-defence. The support for a less restrictive 
approach is in evidence in both State rhetoric and State practice.  
As discussed earlier, the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on the Threat or Legality of the Use of 
Nuclear Weapons seems to allude to the doctrine of self-preservation in its judgment that the 
use of nuclear weapons may be justifiable should the life of a state be at stake. The Advisory 
Opinion is thus seen by some as contributing to the building of ‘a broad construction of the 
right of self-defence’148. The language of an ‘extreme circumstance’ threatening the life of a 
State has become a recurring feature of arguments seeking to make the right of self-defence 
less prohibitive, particularly for those States engaged in conflict with terrorist forces.  
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The main debates here lie in whether or not there exists a right to anticipatory self-defence and 
to pre-emptive self-defence. The right to anticipatory self-defence is examined below, before 
a discussion on pre-emptive self-defence. It should be noted that this author distinguishes 
between anticipatory self-defence and pre-emptive self-defence. An action in anticipatory self-
defence occurs when a State uses force against an attack that has yet to physically strike their 
territory but which is expected imminently. An action in pre-emptive self-defence occurs when 
a State uses force against a threat which has yet to come into palpable existence.  
 
Anticipatory self-defence 
Most arguments on the limits of the right of self-defence centre on the wording of Article 51 
of the UN Charter, which reads: 
‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until 
the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security.’149 
On first reading, Article 51 seems straightforward – a State may only resort to force in self-
defence if an armed attack has occurred. A ‘contextual’ reading of the Article does likewise, 
says Duffy, who notes that unlike other provisions of the Charter, Article 51 ‘omits any 
reference to “threat” of attack’.150 How, then, can a right of anticipatory self-defence be said to 
exist?  
Those in favour of a right of anticipatory self-defence argue that States should be allowed to 
defend themselves when an attack is imminent – they should not have to be ‘sitting ducks’, 
waiting for an attack to happen.151  Another argument contends that Article 51 of the UN 
Charter ‘failed to abrogate the broader pre-existing customary right of self-defence’, and thus 
a limited right of self-defence in the case of an imminent attack, as articulated in Caroline, 
continues to exist.152 This position is held, for example, by the United Kingdom, and is 
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illustrated by Lord Goldsmith, then Attorney General, during a House of Lords debate on 
international self-defence: 
‘…it has been the consistent position of successive United Kingdom Governments over 
many years that the right of self-defence under international law includes the right to 
use force where an armed attack is imminent. It is clear that the language of Article 51 
was not intended to create a new right of self-defence. Article 51 recognises the inherent 
right of self-defence that states enjoy under international law. That can be traced back 
to the "Caroline" incident in 1837… It is not a new invention. The charter did not 
therefore affect the scope of the right of self-defence existing at that time in customary 
international law, which included the right to use force in anticipation of an imminent 
armed attack.’153 
This is what Ruys calls the ‘pre-existing custom’ argument, which is just one of the arguments 
used by the ‘expansionists’ or ‘counter-restrictionists’. Further arguments state that a right of 
anticipatory self-defence was implicitly accepted by the Nuremberg and Tokyo Military 
Tribunals.154 
Anticipatory self-defence therefore occurs when a State uses force against an attack that has 
yet to physically strike their territory but which is expected imminently. How imminent an 
attack is, and how the word ‘imminent’ is defined by the State employing force in self-defence, 
is central when considering whether a case of anticipatory self-defence is justified. The threat 
of an attack is not enough to resort to force in self-defence. It should be noted that in the 
Nicaragua judgment, the Court did not express a view as to the lawfulness of the use of armed 
force in response to the imminent threat of armed attack, as it was not relevant to the case in 
question.155  
Alexandrov notes that anticipatory self-defence has been allowed ‘only in very few restrictive 
cases: when the attack is underway or is imminent and the use of force in self-defence is 
necessary to stop it’156. Similarly, Dinstein writes that: 
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‘The right to self-defence can be invoked in response to an armed attack as soon as it 
becomes evident to the Victim State…that the attack is in the process of being mounted. 
There is no need to wait for the bombs to fall – or for that matter, for fire to open – if it 
is morally certain that the armed attack is underway (however incipient the stage of the 
attack is). The Victim State can lawfully intercept the attack (under Article 51) with a 
view to blunting its edge.157 
A proclaimed right to anticipatory self-defence in practice has been rare. An example of such 
state practice includes the 1967 or Six-Day War Arab-Israeli war, in which Israel claimed a 
right to act in anticipatory self-defence as Egyptian and Syrian forces had been deployed, they 
argued, as part of an impending attack.158  However, as Alexandrov notes, Israel was the only 
State to examine the concept of anticipatory self-defence, with even those States supporting 
the Israeli action refraining from any discussion of it. The subsequent resolution adopted by 
the UN Security Council makes it clear, says Alexandrov, that ‘Israel’s claim of anticipatory 
self-defence found little support’.159 Similarly, Israel claimed to have acted in anticipatory self-
defence when it bombed the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq in 1981, another action which was 
condemned by the UN Security Council.160 
Since that time, the position of the international community has changed somewhat. For 
example, in relation to targeted killing, the 2010 report by Philip Alston, then-UN Special 
Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, supports the more permissive 
approach to self-defence in the case of an imminent attack, stating that the view ‘more 
accurately reflects State practice and the weight of scholarship’. However, he does write that 
this remains subject to the strictures articulated in Caroline.161 Alston’s position does seem to 
represent the broad consensus on the matter, which is that ‘if a right to anticipatory self-defence 
exists, it is limited’.162  
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Preventive self-defence 
What, then, is the difference between anticipatory and preventive self-defence? Preventive self-
defence reaches further than anticipatory self-defence in its expansive approach. It is defined 
by Reisman and Armstrong as: 
‘a claim to entitlement to use unilaterally, without prior international authorisation, high 
levels of violence to arrest an incipient development that is not yet operational or 
directly threatening, but that, if permitted to mature, could be seen by the potential pre-
emptor as susceptible to neutralisation only at a higher and possibly unacceptable cost 
to itself.’ 
In other words, it is a ‘military action against a potential adversary in advance of a suspected 
attack’.163 It is distinct from anticipatory self-defence, in that those contemplating anticipatory 
self-defence ‘can point to a palpable and imminent threat’164.  In the case of preventive self-
defence, a State believes that a threat exists or that a threat will exist and argues that it can use 
force in self-defence against that threat. Any preventive action taken is ‘deliberately future-
oriented’ and thus ‘loses its defensive character’.165 
Preventive self-defence found itself cast into the spotlight in 2002, having been articulated in 
the U.S. National Security Strategy of the same year. Also referred to as the ‘Bush doctrine’, 
the Strategy proclaimed a policy of preventive self-defence against threats to U.S. national 
security, ‘even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack’.166 Gray 
describes this message on the use of force as ‘stark and revolutionary’.167  
Again, if we can conclude that, as Piggott writes, ‘prior to the Bush doctrine, there was a widely 
accepted view that it is lawful for a state to resort to force in self-defense to preempt an armed 
attack that is “imminent,”’ what is different in the claims put forward by the U.S.? As stated in 
the previous section, states have been reluctant to rely on anticipatory self-defence as 
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justification for their actions.168 The scope of a right of preventive self-defence as claimed by 
the U.S. in the 2002 National Security Strategy was therefore unprecedented.  
The U.S. continues to hold this position today (though it is articulated with more subtle 
language).  It remains completely incompatible with Article 51 of the UN Charter and is not 
supported by state practice.169 Alexandrov states that ‘while there may be some uncertainty as 
to whether use of force against imminent attack may be justified as legitimate self-defence, 
practice has clearly illustrated that there is no right’ of preventive self-defence.’170 Alston 
writes that preventive self-defence is ‘deeply contested and lacks support under international 
law’.171 
Many counterterror operations performed today are founded on a belief in a right to preventive 
self-defence. Those in favour of a right to preventive self-defence argue that it is necessary for 
counterterrorism to succeed, as ‘self-defence in this environment is enormously 
complicated’.172  
 
State support for anticipatory and preventive self-defence 
Ruys writes that ‘there can be no doubt that (declared) support of anticipatory self-defence has 
increased in recent years’, noting that following the publication of the 2002 U.S. National 
Security Strategy, a number of States made statements supporting a right of anticipatory self-
defence.173 For example, following the December 2002 Bali bombing in which eighty 
Australian tourists were killed, the then-Prime Minister of Australia stated that the country 
should be ‘allowed to strike first at terrorist targets’.174 Similarly, Russia ‘asserted their right 
to undertake “pre-emptive” strikes against terrorist bases in neighbouring countries.’175 North 
Korea, Iran and India also stated their belief in a right to anticipatory action.176  Japan ‘stressed 
that the Charter allows “pre-emptive strikes” or “pre-emptive attacks” when a nation is faced 
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with an imminent threat; the German government, in 2004, acknowledged that Article 51 of 
the Charter also applied to an imminent attack. Likewise, prior to the 2005 World Summit, 
several states supported the position on Article 51 of the High Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change’s position in their report ‘A more secure world: Our shared 
responsibility’. The report, in the section entitled ‘Article 51 of the Charter of the United 
Nations and self-defence’ states: 
‘The language of this article is restrictive… However, a threatened state, according to 
long-established international law, can take military action as long as the threatened 
attack is imminent, no other means would deflect it, and the action is proportionate.’177 
It is also observed by Ruys that ‘several military doctrines and security strategies adopted after 
2002 appear to give greater recognition to “preventive deployment” and the like’, notably the 
2003 European Security Strategy, the French Loi de Programmation, and the Chief of Italian 
Defence Staff Strategic Concept.178  The French Loi de Programmation 2003-2008 stated that: 
‘We must be able to identify and prevent threats as soon as possible. Within this 
framework, possible pre-emptive action is not out of the question, where an explicit and 
confirmed threat has been recognised.’179  
It seems clear, then, that a right to anticipatory self-defence is, as Alston and Ruys say, now 
widely accepted by the wider international community. However, the same cannot be said of a 
right to preventive self-defence. There is little appetite amongst the international community 
for an interpretation of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter which allows for the use of force against 
a non-imminent threat, or for a reworking of the language of Article 51. For example, the 
‘Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation’, approved by President Putin in 
February 2013, states that Russia: 
‘regards Article 51 of the UN Charter as an adequate legal basis not liable to revision 
for the use of force in self-defense, including in the face of existing threats to peace and 
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security such as international terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction.’180 
Similarly, the Non-Aligned Movement has consistently reiterated their view that Article 51 ‘is 
restrictive and should not be re-written or re-interpreted’.181 These statements echo the 
sentiments of the majority of States when faced with arguments favouring a right to preventive 
self-defence.  
It does, therefore, seem safe to assert that Ruys is correct when he states: 
‘In light of the available evidence, it can be concluded that there has indeed been a shift 
in States’ opinio juris insofar as support for pre-emptive self-defence, fairly rare and 
muted prior to 2001, has become more widespread and explicit in recent years. At the 
same time, it seems a bridge too far to claim that there exists today widespread 
acceptance of the legality of self-defence against so-called ‘imminent’ threats.’182 
Tentative support for a less restrictive interpretation of Article 51 seems to have reached its 
zenith amongst the international community in the three-four years following the events of 
September 11th, 2001. However, the approach articulated by the U.S. in the 2002 National 
Security Strategy has continued apace under the second Bush administration and consecutive 
Obama administrations. Although the use of the terms ‘pre-emption’ and ‘pre-emptive’ has all 
but disappeared from U.S. rhetoric, the policy remains in existence and is particularly apparent 
in the construction of a particularly pliant formulation of the concept of imminence.  
The term ‘imminent’, and how it is defined, has become a central feature of any discussion on 
anticipatory and preventive self-defence.  How a State chooses to interpret the meaning of 
‘imminent’ can change an action from being one of anticipatory self-defence to one of 
preventive self-defence. It is, then, key that the U.S. and wider international position toward 
this concept be discussed in order for the difference between anticipatory and preventive self-
defence to be appreciated fully.   
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The importance of imminence 
The word ‘imminent’, important for cases of anticipatory self-defence, is even more central in 
cases of preventive self-defence. A large motivation behind the push from the U.S. (and indeed 
the U.K.) in the early 2000s for a right to preventive self-defence following 9/11 lay in the 
claim that Iraq was in possession of WMDs, some of which could be deployed within forty-
five minutes – a claim that was later proven to be unsubstantiated.183 It was argued by the U.S. 
that Iraq, with the possession of such weapons, presented a ‘grave and gathering danger’, and 
that a resort to force against Iraq would thus be lawful. However, no state involved in the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 other than the U.S. relied on this justification – the U.K. came the 
closest, and even then, the then-Prime Minister Tony Blair characterised the threat from Iraq 
as an immediate one (under the traditional conception of imminence), rather than a developing 
one.184 The apparent immediacy of the threat was underlined by the numerous references to the 
45 minute claim in the so-called ‘September dossier’, the British government’s assessment of 
‘Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction’. Blair referred to it in his foreword, stating that [Saddam 
Hussein’s] ‘military planning allows for some of the WMD to be ready within 45 minutes of 
an order to use them’.185 This claim is made another three times in the body of the report.186 
Thus, Piggott concludes: 
‘…to the extent that Prime Minister Blair sought to rely on Britain’s right of self-
defense as its legal justification for resorting to force in Iraq, he did so on the basis of 
the classical “imminent danger” test of the Caroline case rather than the nebulous 
“grave and gathering danger” test of the Bush Doctrine.’187 
As Piggott notes, the Bush doctrine set out in the 2002 National Security Strategy ‘self-
consciously set out to change’ the “imminence test”, from one of an ‘instant, overwhelming’ 
danger to a ‘grave and gathering’ danger. The difference, Piggott says, is profound.188 In this 
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way, the Bush doctrine ‘sought not so much to “adapt” the concept of imminent attack to the 
change circumstances of a post-9/11 world as to replace it altogether’.189  
The attempt by the U.S. to transform the concept of imminence, despite its failure to do so 
before the invasion of Iraq, continues today. Imminence acquires a unique flexibility for 
proponents of a right to preventive self-defence, particularly with the introduction of the 
concept of a ‘continuing imminent threat’.  The U.S. 2015 National Security Strategy illustrates 
the continuing attempts at redefinition, in the section on combatting terrorism: 
‘When there is a continuing, imminent threat, and when capture or other actions to 
disrupt the threat are not feasible, we will not hesitate to take decisive action’. 
The notion of a threat being both continuing and imminent allows a State to have recourse to 
force in self-defence at any time it sees fit. 
Ruys notes that even among those states supporting a broader interpretation of the right of self-
defence, ‘support for self-defence against non-imminent threats is virtually non-existent’.190 
Consider, for example, the position of France regarding self-defence against an imminent 
threat, which is set out in the French Armed Forces law of armed conflict manual. The manual 
states that an ‘imminent threat’ refers to a: 
‘…potential aggression, the accomplishment of which is likely but has not yet been 
realised. This notion corresponds to the Anglo-Saxon expression of ‘hostile intention’. 
Such a threat, in French law, does not justify recourse to individual self-defence, except 
if the realisation of the aggression has begun. This situation is generally provided and 
regulated for in the rules of engagement and behaviour based on the circumstances’. 191 
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Germany, too, along with states such as Lichtenstein, Japan, Singapore, Switzerland and 
Uganda, has ‘placed great weight on the imminence requirement’.192 Meanwhile, in response 
to the High-Level Panel’s Report on Threats, Challenges and Change, China stated that: 
‘…In case of self-defence against armed attacks, any use of force must have the 
authorization of the Security Council. Any “imminent threat” should be carefully 
judged and handled by the Security Council.’193 
Furthermore, whilst the Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 
accepts that there exists a right of self-defence where an attack is imminent, it goes on to ask: 
‘Can a State, without going to the Security Council, claim in these circumstances the 
right to act in anticipatory self-defence, not just pre-emptively (against an imminent or 
proximate threat) but preventively (against a non-imminent or non-proximate one)?194 
The High-Level Panel’s conclusion is that it cannot. It states that: 
‘…the answer must be that, in a world full of perceived potential threats, the risk to the 
global order and the norm of non-intervention on which it continues to be based is 
simply too great for the legality of unilateral preventive action, as distinct from 
collectively endorsed action, to be accepted. Allowing one to so act is to allow all.’195 
The British position on imminence seems to be somewhat contradictory. Whilst first stating: 
‘International law permits the use of force in self-defence against an imminent attack 
but does not authorise the use of force to mount a pre-emptive strike against a threat 
that is more remote’196 
Lord Goldsmith then goes on to state in the next paragraph that: 
‘It must be right that states are able to act in self-defence in circumstances where there 
is evidence of further imminent attacks by terrorist groups, even if there is no specific 
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evidence of where such an attack will take place or of the precise nature of the 
attack.’197 
So, whilst first stating that pre-emptive strikes should not be permitted against remote threats, 
Goldsmith then states that such strikes can be permitted even when there is no evidence of an 
attack.  
The position of the United States on the concept of imminence is strikingly different from that 
of other states, with the elasticity bestowed on the term being both unprecedented and 
unparalleled. The U.S.’ use of the term has been variously described as ‘[used] in a way that 
deprives the word of its ordinary meaning’, ‘woefully overbroad’ and as ‘expanding the 
concept…beyond recognition’.198  
A Department of Justice White Paper, entitled ‘Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed 
Against a U.S. Citizen Who is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qa’ida or an Associated 
Force’, was leaked by NBC news in February 2013. This memo details the legal rationale 
behind the Obama administration’s targeted killing policy, and is a prime example of attempts 
to redefine the meaning of ‘imminent’. The memo first details the three criteria which should 
be met before the targeting of U.S. citizen is considered lawful. These criteria read as follows: 
1. An informed, high-level official of the U.S. government has determined that the 
targeted individual poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United 
States; 
2. Capture is infeasible, and the United States continues to monitor whether capture 
becomes feasible; and 
3. The operation would be conducted in a manner consistent with the applicable law 
of war principles.199 
The memo then goes on to address the concept of imminence by stating: 
‘…the condition that an operational leader present an “imminent” threat of violent 
attack against the United States does not require the United States to have clear 
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evidence that a specific attack on U.S. persons and interests will take place in the 
immediate future. Given the nature of, for example, the terrorist attacks on September 
11, in which civilian airliners were hijacked to strike the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon, this definition of imminence, which would require the United States to 
refrain from action until preparations for an attack are concluded, would not allow the 
United States sufficient time to defend itself…’200 
The discussion on imminence is concluded with the following: 
‘By its nature, therefore, the threat posed by al-Qa’ida and its associated forces demands 
a broader concept of imminence in judging when a person continually planning terror 
attacks presents an imminent threat, making the use of force appropriate…Thus, a 
decision maker determining whether an al-Qa’ida operational leader presents an 
imminent threat of violent attack against the United States must take into account that 
certain members of al-Qa’ida (including any potential target of lethal force) are 
continually plotting attacks against the United States; that al-Qa’ida would engage in 
such attacks regularly were it able to do so; that the U.S. government may not be aware 
of all al-Qa’ida plots as they are developing and thus cannot be confident that none is 
about to occur; and that, in light of these predicates, the nation may have a limited 
window of opportunity within which to strike in a manner that both has a high 
likelihood of success and reduces the probability of American casualties.’201 
What this definition of imminence seems to boil down to is that it is possible to target a U.S. 
citizen almost any time, in any place, no matter whether an attack on U.S. ‘persons or interests’ 
is shortly to occur.  
Arguments in favour of preventive self-defence are particularly important for targeted killing. 
The vast majority of the targeted killings of which we are aware have been carried out by the 
U.S. in order to pre-empt supposed threats to U.S. national security. The consistent use of this 
counterterror strategy and the justifications enunciated for it have contributed significantly to 
a U.S.-led attempt at the expansion of the right of self-defence and a broader reading of the 
meaning of Article 51.    
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Conclusion 
What consequences do attempts to expand the right of self-defence and the concept of 
imminence, and statements regarding the military necessity of illegal actions due to extreme 
circumstances, hold for international law? Lt. Cdr Burke writes that ‘when the omnipotent are 
tempted to discard law, the lawyer must challenge them as to whether, when such power wanes, 
the law will again be needed’.202 Despite protestations from states that their actions are in line 
with public international law, we are experiencing a backlash against the humanitarianism 
inherent in international humanitarian law and a return to the time when Kriegsraison and self-
preservation offered themselves as justifications for sometimes irresponsible, often predatory, 
almost always unjustified state behaviour.  
The attempts to shift the precarious balance between military necessity and humanity to favour 
the former, and by extension the LOAC/utilitarian ‘vision’, along with the consistent bid to 
expand how we define imminence and when a state can have recourse to force, have combined 
to bring about the reappearance of Kriegsraison and self-preservation.  
While it is possible for a state to invoke Kriegsraison during an otherwise lawful conflict, 
where a state has justified their recourse to force to ensure the security and preservation of their 
nation, it is likely that Kriegsraison will occur. Both Kriegsraison and self-preservation 
emphasis the exceptional character of a conflict in order to breach the law, and both allow for 
any necessary means to be used in furtherance of their ultimate objective. Where there is 
believed to be an existential threat to a state – or where this is used as an excuse to justify the 
illegal use of force – military necessity will be taken to its most extreme expression, with little 
regard for international humanitarian law.  
It is unsurprising that attempts to shift the balance between military necessity and humanity to 
favour the former are occurring at the same time as the push to expand a state’s right to use 
force in self-defence. The widely-accepted interpretation of the right of self-defence as found 
in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter depends largely upon what we construe ‘imminent’ to mean. 
As ‘imminent’ grows to encapsulate even the vaguest of ‘threats’, so Article 51 will become 
meaningless.  Similarly, as the division between the LOAC and humanitarian views of the law 
of war expands, with states pushing for the primacy of the former, actions permitted in the 
name of military necessity will no doubt increase. Kriegsraison finds its expression today 
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through these overbroad invocations of Article 51, as manifested in the U.S. targeted killing 
programme. With an action justified as being made in ‘self-defence’, the U.S. believes that it 
can then use the maximum level of force it deems appropriate, regardless of the actual 
magnitude of the threat in question (if, in fact, a threat does exist). 
The United States targeted killing programme is currently the prime example of the expansion 
of ‘imminence’, of attempts to broaden the right of self-defence, and the granting of undue 
weight to the principle of military necessity. The second chapter of this thesis discusses the 
U.S. targeted killing programme, and assesses the predominant arguments put forward in 
favour of the programme and its accompanying use of armed drones.  
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Chapter Two: Targeted Killing and the Use of Armed Drones 
 
Targeted killing is a relatively new phrase in the lexicon of international law and is not defined 
therein, nor can it be located within a specific area of international law. The term came into 
frequent use following Israel’s public disclosure of a policy of ‘targeted killings’ during the 
second intifada in the Occupied Palestinian Territories in 2000.203 The term and the tactic pose 
a number of problems for international law and the international community. Beginning with 
a brief explanation of what targeted killing is, this section examines the United States targeted 
killing programme, its place in the ‘war on terror’, and its perceived advantages and 
disadvantages. 
Targeted killing is distinct from assassination and extrajudicial executions in that both are by 
definition illegal, whereas targeted killings are not always contrary to the law.204 An 
assassination in peacetime is the ‘murder of a private individual or public figure for political 
purposes’, whilst in wartime it is defined as ‘the specific targeting of an individual using 
treacherous means’.205 Extrajudicial executions are understood to be a term applicable to 
domestic contexts in which international human rights law is operating as the lex specialis and 
to refer to “the deliberate killing of suspects in lieu of arrest, in circumstances in which they 
do not pose an immediate threat”.’206 The term ‘targeted killing’ is neutral: it does not indicate 
any presumptions regarding the international lawfulness of the tactic, nor does it make 
restrictions as to means used or the motivation underlying a specific use of the tactic.207 
Whilst there is no official definition of the term in international law, the former UN Special 
Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions in his 2010 report defined 
targeted killing as: 
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…the use of lethal force attributable to a subject of international law with the intent, 
premeditation and deliberation to kill individually selected persons who are not in the 
physical custody of those targeting them.208  
And by Melzer as: 
‘the intentional, premeditated and deliberate use of force, by states or their 
agents, acting under colour of law, or by an organised armed group in armed 
conflict, against a specific individual who is not in the physical custody of the 
perpetrator.’209 
Targeted killings may be carried out during armed conflict and in peacetime, by subjects of 
international law such as governments or organised armed groups, using a variety of different 
means and methods, including drones, missiles and sniper fire.210 The U.S. targeted killing 
programme is primarily an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (drone) programme.  
The U.S. targeted killing programme is a major component of the ‘war on terror’. The 
programme, initiated in 2002, is seen as an ‘essential tactic’ in bringing to justice those 
responsible for the September 11th 2001 attacks, and others who may pose a threat to the 
security of the U.S.211 It was at first an exceptional tool used sparingly by the Bush 
administration. Under the Obama administration, targeted killing became a ‘routine instrument 
of counter-terrorism policy.’212 The targeted killing programme was for some time regarded as 
an ‘open secret’ as it did not officially exist.213 It was publicly acknowledged a number of times 
by President Obama, including for the first time by in January 2012 when President Obama 
admitted that the U.S. had carried out targeting through drone strikes in Pakistan,214 in May 
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2012 when he publicly acknowledged drone strikes in Somalia and Pakistan in a letter to 
Congress, 215 and in a major speech at the National Defense University in May 2013.  
 Despite successive administrations having previously condemned such practice by Israel,216 
the targeted killing programme was expanded under President Obama to the extent that, on his 
leaving office, it was the United States’ favoured method of combating terrorism. Described 
by former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, during his time as Director of the CIA, as ‘the only 
game in town’,217 the expansion of the programme has continued under President Trump.218 
 
Personality and signature strikes 
There are two types of targeted killing – ‘personality’ strikes and ‘signature’ strikes.   
‘Personality’ strikes involve identifying a high-value target, placing them on a ‘kill list’, and 
vetting him or her closely before striking. During the Obama administration, these lists were 
given to the president, who made the final decision as to whether a drone strike should go 
ahead. Under the Trump administration, executive oversight of such strikes is no longer 
required.219 The legality of personality strikes under international humanitarian law is 
discussed in Chapter 3, and under international human rights law in Chapter 4.  
Many of the targeted killings carried out by the CIA are not personality strikes, and are not 
‘targeted’ at all, in the sense that ‘targeted’ would generally be assumed to mean. The majority 
of drone strikes are what are known as ‘signature’ strikes. Signature strikes have never required 
administrative approval.220 Also referred to as ‘crowd kills’ or ‘terror attack disruption strikes’ 
(TADS), signature strikes are strikes conducted against individuals whose identity is not known 
but who are targeted ‘based on a pattern of activity’ – that is, those whose behaviour matches 
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a ‘pre-identified “signature” of behaviour that the U.S. links to militant activity’.221 Whilst what 
exactly constitutes this type of behaviour remains classified, it is believed to include such 
behaviour as ‘a gathering of men, teenaged to middle-aged, travelling in convoy or carrying 
weapons’222 or ‘loading a truck with what appears to be bomb-making material or even crossing 
a border multiple times in a short period.’223 Such a system is open to much error, particularly 
in countries such as Yemen, where ‘every Yemeni is armed,’ making it even harder to 
distinguish between civilians and those involved in terrorist activity.224 Apparently, there is a 
joke in the U.S. State department which says that when the CIA sees ‘three guys doing jumping 
jacks’, they decide it is a terrorist training camp.225 
In practice, this means that signature strikes: 
‘…in effect counts all military-age males in a strike zone as combatants, according to 
several administration officials, unless there is explicit intelligence posthumously 
proving them innocent.’ 226 
Under these criteria, according to Heller, the very first known CIA drone strike was in fact a 
signature strike.227 On February 4th 2002, a Predator drone operated by the CIA fired a Hellfire 
missile, which instantly killed three men standing in Zhawar Kili, an ‘abandoned mujahedeen 
complex’ near Khost in Afghanistan’s Paktia province.228 The CIA had apparently believed 
that the taller of the three men, whom the others were ‘acting reverently towards’, was Osama 
bin Laden.229 It later emerged that all three men were civilians gathering scrap metal, according 
to local reports.230  
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Signature strikes are the most practised and most controversial type of drone strike, and their 
legality under international humanitarian law and international human rights law is discussed 
at length and in detail in Chapters 3 and 4.  
The following section examines the effectiveness of signature strikes in achieving the U.S.’ 
stated counter-terror aims. It also includes an inspection of the arguments in favour and against 




‘Killing them faster than they can grow them’231 
Those in favour of the continuing employment of signature strikes employ a number of 
assertions about their usefulness. First amongst these is that signature strikes are both a 
conventional tactic and an effective way of disrupting, and indeed decimating, the al-Qaeda 
network and the networks of its affiliate forces. Advocates such as Kenneth Anderson assert 
that, far from the practice being indiscriminate or novel, the means by which a signature strike 
is undertaken – after an intelligence assessment that takes into account behavioural signatures 
‘such as organized groups of men carrying weapons, suggesting strongly that they are “hostile 
forces” -  are ‘the norm in conventional warfare’.232 Philip Mudd, states that ‘the impact of 
armed drones during the decade-plus of this intense global counter-terrorism campaign is hard 
to over-estimate’, particularly when one considers their effect on terror groups which have, he 
says, decayed into ‘locally focused threats’ or disappeared altogether. Mudd claims that 
signature strikes have accelerated the decline of terror groups for a number of reasons, 
primarily because they have: 
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‘…pulled out… lower-level threads of al Qaeda’s apparatus – and that of its global 
affiliates – rapidly enough that the deaths of top leaders are now more than matched by 
the destruction of the complex support structure below them.’233 
He goes on to argue that al-Qaeda and its affiliates are not hierarchical structures in the Western 
conception, but rather ‘conglomerations of militants, operating independently, with rough lines 
of communication and fuzzy networks that cross continents and groups’. Signature strikes, he 
argues: 
‘…take out whole swaths of these network sub-tiers rapidly – so rapidly that the groups 
cannot replicate lost players and their hard-won experience. The tempo of the strikes, 
in other words, adds sand to the gears of terror organizations, destroying their 
operational capability faster than the groups can recover.’ 234 
Likewise, Anderson writes that the U.S. targeted killing strategy has: 
‘…worked far better than anyone expected. It is effective, and has rightfully 
assumed an indispensable place on the list of strategic elements of U.S. 
counterterrorism-on-offense.’235 
He then states that the CIA disruption of al-Qaeda in Pakistan is a ‘remarkable success’ and 
states that drone warfare has a ‘clear utility in disrupting terrorist leadership.’236 Daniel Byman 
states that: 
‘drones have done their job remarkably well: by killing key leaders and denying 
terrorists sanctuaries in Pakistan, Yemen, and, to a lesser degree, Somalia, drones have 
devastated al-Qaeda and associated anti-American militant groups.’237 
Byman also writes that drones have hurt terrorist organisations by eliminating operatives who 
are ‘lower down the food chain but who boast special skills’ (such as passport forgers, bomb 
makers, recruiters and fundraisers), have ‘undercut terrorists’ ability to communicate and to 
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train new recruits’ and have ‘turned al-Qaeda’s command and training structures into a liability, 
forcing the group to choose between having no leaders and risking dead leaders’.238 
The Obama administration itself made these same arguments, most obviously in President 
Obama’s remarks at the National Defense University in 2013, during which, in a passage on 
drone strikes, he stated: 
‘…our actions are effective. Don’t take my word for it. In the intelligence gathered at 
Bin Laden’s compound, we found that he wrote, “We could lose the reserves to enemy’s 
air strikes. We cannot fight air strikes with explosives.” Other communications from al 
Qaeda operatives confirm this as well. Dozens of highly skilled al Qaeda commanders, 
trainers, bomb makers and operatives have been taken off the battlefield. Plots have 
been disrupted that would have targeted international aviation, U.S. transit systems, 
European cities and our troops in Afghanistan. Simply put, these strikes have saved 
lives.’239  
Mudd does acknowledge that there are problems with signature strikes, but these problems 
seem to centre around not if a signature strike should be carried out, but when. He writes: 
‘If we strike too soon, we risk alienating a local population and increasing its 
motivation to target New York. If we strike too late, a nascent group of violent 
extremists will become operational…’240 
Here, Mudd seems to believe that there exists a Goldilocks scenario, in which conditions for 
targeting are ‘just right’, wherein a strike will avoid any ire from local populations whilst at 
the same time killing a militant who would have become a leader or imminently carried out an 
attack. It seems unlikely that such a scenario exists.  
Despite the above assertions that drone strikes are effective, there are many who disagree. In 
January 2013, Michael Boyle, who had been a member of Obama’s counter-terrorism group 
prior to his 2008 election, wrote that drone effectiveness is a ‘myth’. He writes that: 
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‘the position of the American foreign policy establishment on drones – that they are an 
effective tool which minimizes civilian casualties – is based on a highly selective and 
partial reading of the evidence’.241 
Boyle writes that arguments for the effectiveness of drones can be divided into four separate 
claims, with numbers 2 and 3 being those claims presented above -  ‘that drones have been 
successful at killing so-called “high value targets” (HVTs)’ and ‘that the use of drones puts 
such pressure on terrorist organisations that it degrades their organisational capacity and ability 
to strike’.242 In response to the claim number 2, Boyle argues that ‘the actual record of drone 
strikes suggest that forces under his [President Obama’s] command have killed far more lower-
ranked operatives associated with other Islamist movements and civilians than HVTs from al-
Qaeda’, and quotes an estimate from CNN which states that by 2013, only 2% of drone strikes 
since 2004 had killed high-ranking militants.243 Regarding the third claim, Boyle writes that 
‘the evidence that drones inhibit the operation latitude of terrorist groups and push them 
towards collapse is more ambiguous…’ He argues that drone strikes ‘may have scattered al-
Qaeda militants, but it does not neutralize them’.244  A 2017 study by Abrahms and Mierau 
found that leadership decapitation has little effect on the quantity of terrorist attacks, but does 
lead to a reduction in the quality of attack,245 (with more civilians targeted after leadership 
decapitation), while Bolland and Lee Ludvigsen argue that drone strikes have failed to reduce 
AQ’s operational capacity.246 Yet, drone strikes retain their favour with the U.S. government. 
The next section investigates the benefits and drawbacks of the technology, and examines why 
armed drones are used instead of more traditional weapons systems or covert operations teams. 
 
The cost, ‘humanity’, and precision of armed drones 
As important as drone technology is, it must be remembered that drones do not make decisions.  
Drones are enablers and facilitators. Drones do not make the decisions as to who to strike, 
where to strike, or when to strike. The armed drones currently used by states are not 
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autonomous. It is at the human level that decisions are made. The role of the drone in targeted 
killing programmes should not be underestimated or dismissed as unimportant, but nor should 
it be fetishized. In their examination of drone warfare in the FATA region of Pakistan, Shaw 
and Akhter note: 
 
‘The primary relationship evoked in most discussions of drone warfare is between a 
drone and its battlefield of objectified targets, rather than the relationship between the 
team of technicians operating the drone as agents of American empire and the 
unsuspecting bodies surveilled and slaughtered on the ground in neo-colonial Pakistan. 
In other words, drone warfare is thought of as a relationship between things, rather than 
between people. And the supernatural element is never far away. As Colonel Theodore 
Osowski of the US Air Force reveals in his Biblical allegory on drones: “It’s kind of 
like having God overhead. And lightning comes down in the form of a Hellfire”.’247 
 
A focus on drone technology alone, then, masks and mystifies the human relationship with the 
object.248 The human role must be placed front and centre, as must the construction of the drone 
as an economical, precise and humane weapons platform. Arguments made by the United 
States around the cost-effectiveness and ‘humaneness’ of armed drones are largely specious 
and are each intricately linked with the core justification for armed drone use: precision. This 
section interrogates such claims in turn. 
 
Show me the money: the cost appeal of armed drones 
After a long and costly war in Iraq and with the continuing presence of troops in Afghanistan, 
there is very little appetite or public support in the U.S. for sending large numbers of troops 
abroad to combat terrorism, due to the heavy human and monetary costs of such conflicts. The 
economic effectiveness of armed drones is much lauded by proponents of the targeted killing 
programme. Drones are considered to be a cheaper and more efficient alternative to manned 
aircraft. Kaag and Kreps write that ‘drone use aligns with new attitudes favoring war at minimal 
cost. In the words of the Congressional Research Service, drones are “the poor man’s air 
force”’.249  
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It is often stated that the unit costs associated with drones tend to be lower than those of modern 
manned aircraft, and that maintenance is generally more cost-effective.250 In 2011, for example, 
the reported cost of a Predator drone was $5 million and the cost of a Reaper drone was $28.4 
million, compared to the $150 million price of a Lockheed Martin F-22 fighter.251 However, to 
say that the unit costs associated with drones are less than those of other airborne weapons 
systems is misleading. In order for a Reaper to operate, the ground components must be 
included. Considering that every Combat Air Patrol (CAP) includes four drones, the average 
unit procurement cost for a Reaper CAP is substantially more than the unit-cost estimate 
typically reported. For the fiscal year 2018, the average unit procurement cost for an MQ-9 
Reaper CAP was $86.82 million, excluding development and others costs.252 The Department 
of Defense’s 2014 Select Acquisition Report, which is the most recent report detailing 
acquisition costs for the MQ-9 Reaper, shows that when costs such as research, development, 
testing and evaluation, procurement, support, spares and military construction are included, the 
total cost comes to an estimated $11.8 billion 2008 dollars, equalling $14.5 billion 2018 
dollars.253 The 2014 Select Acquisition Report states an estimated number of 346 Reapers will 
be produced. This means that the true cost of each Reaper comes to an estimated $32 million 
dollars, with a CAP of four Reapers costs approximately $128 million dollars - very close to 
the price of a fighter jet.  
Furthermore, ‘as the systems have required more sophisticated sensors, costs of UAVs have 
begun to move toward parity with manned aircraft, making the economic case for drones far 
from obvious’.254  
Meanwhile, each Hellfire missile fired from a Reaper drone costs approximately $68,000 
apiece (the 2017 Under Secretary of Defense’s Comptroller report notes that Hellfire 
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production ‘continues at full-rate production’ and that ‘the factory will operate at the maximum 
rate of production’ for the coming year),255 and: 
‘the cost of fuelling, operating and maintaining drones is not fully known…But every 
hour a drone is up in the air is estimated to cost between $2,000 and $3,500, and the 
number of flight hours has skyrocketed.’256 
More personnel are also needed to operate drones than manned aircraft. Approximately 186 
people are required to operate every CAP of four drones. One in ten image analysts (or 
‘screeners’) are employed by private firms, rather than by the Pentagon, raising costs even 
more.257 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism has identified ten private-sector companies 
heavily involved in the operation of the U.S.’ surveillance and targeting networks.258 Hundreds 
of contractors have been hired to analyse the nearly half a million hours of video footage 
recorded by drones and other aircraft every year, costing the Department of Defense more than 
$260 million dollars.259 Procurement costs to cover further operations such as the managing of 
communications between drones and their bases in the U.S., the maintenance of data collection 
systems and servicing sensors, and the operation of smaller surveillance drones in Afghanistan, 
run into billions of dollars.260 These costs are likely to increase rather than decrease as the U.S. 
expands its drone flights from 65 a day to 90 a day by 2019, particularly considering that the 
Pentagon already lacks the requisite manpower to sift through the thousands upon thousands 
of hours of footage it already has.261  
Drones are also prone to crashing.262 In 2009, Air Force officials admitted that ‘more than a 
third of their unmanned Predator spy planes…have crashed, mostly in Iraq and Afghanistan’.263 
Another excerpt from the aforementioned Congressional Budget Office report states that 
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‘…excessively high losses of aircraft can negate cost advantages by requiring the services to 
purchase large numbers of replacement aircraft.’264 As is seen from the evidence presented 
above, the oft-expounded economic advantages of drones are not quite as straightforward as 
they are often made out to be. Yet even as the economic cost of drones edge upwards, they will 
likely remain the weapon of choice in the ‘war on terror’. This is because their economic cost 
is not their primary or only attraction; rather, it is their alleged reduction in the human cost of 
counter-terrorism that makes them so attractive. The force protection and ‘humanitarian’ aspect 
of drones, discussed in the next section, ‘will most likely outweigh the considerations of drones 
economic advantages’.265 
 
Drones: humane warfare? 
Armed drones are regularly presented as the one of the most humane weapons available for 
combatting terrorism. In his written testimony to the House of Representatives Subcommittee 
on National Security and Foreign Affairs in 2010, Anderson wrote that ‘drones are a major step 
forward…in humanitarian weapons technology’. Chamayou quotes a U.S. official who 
considers drones to be ‘the most refined, accurate and humane way’ to fight a war’.266 This 
language needs to be disputed and challenged. To present drones as ‘humane’ and 
‘humanitarian’ is to mask their inherently destructive nature. To understand why and how 
armed drones (or indeed any weapons) have come to be described as ‘humane’ - an association 
that can certainly be considered as oxymoronic - I first examine why states (particularly in the 
West) find it appealing, and indeed necessary, to label conflicts and the weapons used to fight 
them as ‘humanitarian’ and ‘humane’.  
As noted by Coker, and Carvin and Williams, modern Western society is increasingly risk-
averse. Warfare in the West is now preoccupied with risk management, and the pre-emption of 
threats both real and imagined. Noting that revolutions in military affairs (RMAs) historically 
occur to overcome a problem, Carvin and Williams suggest that ‘the RMA we are living 
through is one driven by the problem that, increasingly, Western societies do not want to fight 
wars (even if politicians do)’.267 In their assessment, the challenge facing Western militaries 
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today is social rather than military, with social drivers changing states’ approach toward threats 
and security problems ‘to a more disengaged approach centred on risk management where 
society expects technology, not people, to manage the risks.’268 Similarly, Coker writes that 
‘the West is becoming increasingly risk averse and less willing than ever to court the risks war 
entails.’  
It is not a coincidence that the turn toward ‘humanitarian’ warfare has occurred as populations 
become more reluctant to go to war. As Owens observes: 
‘…the very notion of ‘humanitarian’ war rests, in part, on the expectation that liberal 
state war is increasingly (or should be) almost death-free in principle, for both Western 
soldiers and civilians on the ground.’269 
As a result of this humanitarian turn, ‘the individual is now placed at the centre of the war’ - 
as citizen, as solider, and as the reason for going to war. Targeted killing itself individualises 
conflict to an unprecedented degree. Subsequently, with populations less willing to go to war, 
the state has to demonstrate that troops (and to a lesser extent, the civilians of the state in which 
the conflict occurs) are at little risk of death. This social change has been highly instrumental 
in the turn toward ‘humanitarian’ warfare and the labelling of armed drones as ‘humane’ 
weapons.  
With Western populations unwilling to risk death on behalf of their states, technology has 
stepped in to fill their combat boots. Ironically, an unexpected result of the Western attempt to 
create ‘humanitarian’ warfare has been its subsequent dehumanisation. The social RMA, along 
with technology, has resulted in the move toward unmanned warfare.270 Coker, writing before 
the ‘war on terror’ and the increasingly widespread use of drones, explains that: 
‘…humanity requires distance to be put between the soldiers and pilots and their targets. 
The style is one of containment and confinement and dissuasion. As battle is 
“unprudential” it is best avoided not because the outcome is necessarily in doubt but 
because in all battles the costs of success are unpredictable for the individual solider.’271 
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Armed drones are presented as saving American lives due to the fact that they are unmanned, 
since those operating them and firing the missiles are doing so remotely. President Obama 
noted of targeted killing that ‘there is a remoteness to it that makes it tempting to think that 
somehow we can, without any mess on our hands, solve vexing security problems.’272 
Chamayou deems this the ‘principle of vital self-preservation’, in which ‘preserving the lives 
of one’s own soldiers is regarded as a quasi-absolute state imperative.’273  
Chamayou describes the logic behind referring to drones as ‘humanitarian’ as follows: 
‘…the humanitarian imperative is to save lives. And the drone does indeed save our 
lives. It is therefore a humanitarian technology. QED.’274 
The idea of the drone as a ‘humane’ technology has been embraced by proponents of the 
targeted killing programme, and ‘drones save lives’ is one of their repeated refrains. As Kreps 
and Kaag note, ‘if we look at the rhetoric surrounding the development of combat drones, much 
of it turns on troop protection and the ability to project force without risk.’275 The ‘life saving’ 
aspect of drone strikes is consistently put forward in their support. The life-saving rhetoric 
tends to have two components: the first, that drones save the lives of American military 
personnel as there is no need to have ‘boots on the ground’ in the territory in which the strikes 
take place, and the second being that drone strikes spare more civilian lives relative to other 
forms of aerial bombing, such as bombings by F-16s or Tomahawk cruise missiles, due to their 
‘precision’. Regarding troop protection, former CIA deputy director Michael Morell has 
written that ‘hundreds of lives were saved’ due to drone strikes in Yemen.276 In May 2013, 
President Obama stated that ‘simply put, these strikes have saved lives’.  
On the protection of civilian lives when targeting militants, Anderson writes that ‘[drone 
warfare] …lends civilians in the path of hostilities vastly greater protection than does any other 
fighting tool…’.277 Other authors write that ‘drones kill a lower ratio of civilians to combatants 
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than we’ve seen in any recent war’, and state ‘…civilian casualties? That’s not an argument 
against drones. It’s the best thing about them’.278 
The drone, then, can be seen as a perfect ‘humanitarian’ and ‘humane’ technology, or, as Carvin 
and Williams describe it, the perfect ‘legal-scientific’ weapon: 
‘…they are precision-guided weapons which may be used to surgically strike at threats 
while promising to avoid excessive civilian casualties. Further, rather than requiring the 
deployment of military troops and the necessary infrastructure that accompanies them, 
and which can cause problems and resentment in host countries, drones require few, if 
any, boots on the ground. The risk to American soldiers is minimal.’279 
The rhetoric of drones as ‘life-saving’ and ‘humane’ has been consciously and consistently 
reified since the targeted killing programme became public knowledge. As noted earlier, to 
deem a weapon ‘humane’ seems oxymoronic. What does it mean to affix this word to a device? 
It is necessary, as Chamayou argues, to ‘elucidate the twisted logic that makes it possible to 
claim an instrument of death saves lives.’280 Seantel Anais, in a discussion on the framing of 
non-lethal weaponry as ‘humane’, is worth quoting here at some length. Anais explains: 
‘The term “humane” is a labile signifier of intent and practice. To claim that an object 
or approach is humane serves as a means of apportioning value to the human and non-
human actors captured by such a term. Thus, humanitarianism holds the possibility of 
physical and political violence just as much as do humanitarian interventions. The 
“humane” is distinguished by its inverse proportionality to risk, loss of life, destruction 
of property and bloodshed… To call a weapon humane is to imbue it with compassion 
and benevolence, to suggest that it involves the least possible infliction of pain. The 
imputation of humanity to the weapon itself loops around to invest its user with an air 
of civility.’281 
At the most basic level, an armed drone has been engineered to do the same thing as any other 
weapon or weapons platform - to cause harm. As Forge notes, ‘‘it is at the tactical and 
operational level, at the level of use, that any “humanity” and respect for the laws of war enters 
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into the picture, not at the technical level of weapons characteristics.’282 Or as Heather 
Linebaugh, a former member of the U.S. Air Force who worked as an imagery analyst and geo-
spatial analyst for the drone programmes in Iraq and Afghanistan, puts it: ‘the UAVs in the 
Middle East are used as a weapon, not as protection’.283 
It is not humanity, but inhumanity, that is an inherent characteristic of a weapon, whether that 
weapon is used for a ‘humane’ reason or not. Describing a weapon as ‘humane’ serves to make 
the state using it appear humane in their actions and decisions. While a drone strike might be 
considered ‘humane’ for U.S. troops in no danger of being the target of one, it is rather less 
humane if you are on the receiving end of a drone strike. The number of civilian dead resulting 
from U.S. drone strikes is either completely misrepresented - as with John O. Brennan’s 
statement that no civilians had been killed in drone strikes in 2011 - or dismissed.284 This calls 
to mind a comment by Gulf War Allied Commander Norman Schwartzkopf, who, when 
questioned in an interview about the number of dead on the Iraqi side, stated that the figure 
was ‘50,000 or 100,000 or whatever’.285 As Coker says, to the Commander the figure didn’t 
really matter, because ‘the right side won.’286 Deaths on the opposing side, whether civilian or 
otherwise - even in an asymmetrical conflict against al-Qaeda and affiliated forces in which 
the U.S. is not really fighting against another ‘side’ per se - don’t matter once your own forces 
are not in harm’s way, and you win. 
The above arguments on cost-efficiency and humanity are intimately connected with precision, 
which is the core justification used in support of drone strikes. Chamayou writes: 
‘One can claim that drones save not only “our lives” but “theirs”, thanks to increased 
precision…. Lives are saved. But saved from what? From oneself, from one’s own 
power of death. The violence could have been worse, and since one tried in good faith 
to limit its deadly effects, one acted morally.’287 
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 The fallacy of ‘precision’ 
The combination of acceptable ‘humanitarian’ warfare, fought with cost-effective and 
‘humane’ weapons lead Carvin and Williams to conclude that the U.S. (and other Western 
nations) may in future engage in what Martin Shaw calls ‘risk transfer militarism’, in which, 
in a bid to maintain their own security, the U.S. (and perhaps other nations): 
‘…wages a perpetual war to prevent the realisation of security risks in the homeland, 
all the while subjecting foreign populations to the collateral damage of American 
military strikes with drones.’288 
 
Technological precision and normative precision are deliberately conflated in the rhetoric 
surrounding drone strikes. Put simply, just because a weapon is more technologically precise 
does not mean the strategy surrounding it is sound, that it is precisely hitting its target, or that 
the ‘right’ people are being targeted and killed. Arguments of precision deliberately mask the 
fact that civilians are still killed in substantial numbers, whether by drone strikes or manned 
aerial bombing, yet air power, and in particular armed drones, are regularly presented as the 
optimum method of countering terrorism due to their ability to be precise in their targeting. 
Claims of precision are central to the representation of drone warfare as ethical and superior.289  
Former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta claimed that drones are ‘probably the most precise 
weapons in the history of warfare.’290 Byman writes that: 
‘…compared with a 500-pound bomb dropped by an F-16, the grenade-like warheads 
carried by most drones create smaller, more precise blast zones that decrease the risk 
of unexpected structural damage and casualties.’291 
In the same May 2013 speech referenced earlier, President Obama stated that ‘conventional 
airpower or missiles are far less precise than drones, and are likely to cause more civilian 
casualties and more local outrage’.292 Many of these assertions are misleading.  
Zehfuss argues that current ‘performance’ in military operations should be assessed not in 
comparison to earlier times or ‘dumb’ bombs, but ‘with respect to what would be possible 
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given the available technology.’293 Though armed drones are presented as being the most 
precise option available when viewed beside ‘any other comparable weapons platform’, often 
this is either wrong or like is not being compared with like.294 An armed drone carrying a ‘small 
smart weapon’ such as Lockheed Martin’s Shadow Hawk bomb is of course more precise than 
a ballistic missile fired from an F-16 or more precise than a carpet-bombing attack, but it is 
disingenuous and misleading to compare it with such systems when they are not the most 
similar options available today and when such ‘small smart weapons’ are not the weapons 
usually used by the drones carrying out strikes. The MQ-9 Reaper drone, the primary drone 
used for the targeted killing programme can be equipped with a payload of 3,750lbs.295 It can 
carry up to 16 AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, but usually carries four Hellfire missiles and two 
500lb GBU-38s.296 The recently retired MQ-1B Predator – the pioneer drone of the targeted 
killing programme – had a payload of a mere 450lb. Despite the invention of smaller, smarter 
weapons, drones are being engineered to carry higher payloads and heavier weapons: to 
become more lethal, rather than less.  
What, then, does it mean to call a weapon or weapons platform ‘precise’? Precision guided 
munitions or weapons are variously defined as weapons that can be ‘directed against a target 
using either external guidance or a guidance system of their own’;297 by the U.S. Air Force 
Weapons School as a weapon that impacts within a three-metre CEP as compared to an accurate 
weapon which impacts within a ten-metre CEP;298 and as ‘an array of advanced firepower 
projectiles that use precision guided technology to hit targets more precisely’.299 Lockheed 
Martin, the manufacturer of the AGM-114 Hellfire missile, provides a short and telling 
description of why they consider precision to be important: precision weapons, states their site, 
have ‘long standoff ranges to keep pilots and aircraft out of harm’s way’, and ‘dominate the 
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battlefield’.300 U.S. Air Force Major Jack Sine writes that ‘conventional wisdom considers a 
weapon “precise” if it possesses the capability to guide to a specific aim point’.301 This does 
not tell us anything about the effects of the weapon, how wide the blast radius is, or to what 
point a weapon should be accurate. Sine, writing in 2006, proposed a more holistic 
understanding of the term ‘precision weapon’, which would take into account not just a 
weapon’s guidance accuracy, but which would also include: 
‘…the context within which the weapon will be employed to include the target, its 
environment, the desired and undesired effects, and the rules of engagement. A weapon 
becomes a precision weapon when it provides the means of causing a specific, 
measurable tactical effect while minimizing undesired effects. Dependent on scenario, 
this effect must be quantifiable, assessable, and predictable’.302 
Sine believes such a definition would break ‘the direct relationship between guidance accuracy 
and precision’ and raise awareness that ‘PGMs and precision weapons are not synonymous’.303 
This definition does not yet appear to be forthcoming. Zehfuss explains that precision weapons 
are ‘inherently imprecise’, with the precision claimed for a weapon ‘normally achieved only 
ever other time’, even under test conditions.304 This is because the ‘precision of weapon 
delivery systems is typically expressed in terms of CEP’.305 CEP, or Circular Error Probable, 
is ‘the distance from the aim point within which 50 percent of the weapons will impact.’306 The 
blast radius also has an influence on the precision of the weapon. The blast radius from a 
Hellfire missile ‘can extend anywhere from 15-20 meters’, and ‘shrapnel may also be projected 
significant distances from the blast.’307 Anyone within 40 - 50 metres of the site of a Hellfire 
missile target has a 10% probability of physical incapacitation.308 The U.S. military classifies 
physical incapacitation as a soldier being ‘physically unable to function in an assault within a 
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5-minute period after an attack.’309 Despite this, we are led to believe that precision weapons 
and ‘precision warfare’ means that targets are killed, with little to no resulting collateral 
damage, and with the weapon finding its target almost every time. This is, quite simply, false.  
As stated above, the terms ‘precision guided munitions’ or ‘precise weapon’ mean only that 
the weapon in question is one that is expected, fifty-percent of the time, to hit within three 
metres of the aim point.310 Precision has no meaning other than this. ‘Precise’ and ‘precision’ 
do not indicate that the correct person or group has been targeted. The meaning of ‘precision’ 
has been deliberately conflated with the idea that because the weapon is precise, it is also killing 
the ‘right’ people. Reese posits that precision firepower blurs:  
‘…the distinction between the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. This 
blurring encourages thinkers to equate the ability to destroy something with the purpose 
behind destroying it – to equate the means and ways of strategy with its end’.311 
In this way, terms like ‘targeted’ and ‘precise’ conceal more than they explain.312 As  Van der 
Linden argues, ‘the very fact that drone technology has accurate capabilities in terms of 
identifying its target and then striking the target does not mean that due care is taken to avoid 
civilian casualties.’313 Nor is the identified target always the correct one - as Van der Linden 
points out, ‘precision in finding and hitting the target does not imply that there is precision in 
the selection of the target.’314 Despite this, conflicts are increasingly referred to as being some 
of the most precise ever fought. As of July 2015, the campaign against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, 
‘Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve’, had carried out some 3,800 
airstrikes, with more than 875 of these carried out by drones.315 Lt Gen John Hesterman, the 
coalition’s lead commander, described the campaign as ‘the most precise and disciplined in the 
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history of aerial warfare.’316 At of the beginning of August 2015, approximately 452 civilians, 
including 100 children, had been killed in only 52 strikes.317 In Afghanistan, a study by U.S. 
military advisor Larry Lewis found that between mid-2010 and mid-2011, drone strikes caused 
ten times more civilian casualties than strikes by manned aircraft.318  
As Zehfuss notes, ‘smart’ bombs and PGMs are seen to enable Western militaries to reliably 
hit ever smaller targets.319 This has led to a widespread expectation that fighting with such 
weapons both reduces the extent of destruction and increases the possibility of protecting non-
combatants during war.320 Zehfuss notes that such claims of precision serve to produce Western 
warfare as ethical, and that claims of precision do not say anything about the ability to identify 
a target and determine its location.321 Precise weapons have led Western populations to 
perceive modern warfare as being akin to ‘laser surgery’.322 With the expectation that war will 
be precise comes the expectation that there will be fewer civilian casualties. In this way, ‘high-
technology weapons seem to offer a technical fix for an ethico-political predicament’, allowing 
states to go to war and protect non-combatants at the same time.323 Zehfuss observes that a 
reduction in non-combatant deaths through the use of precision weapons is therefore crucial to 
Western claims about increasingly humane and ethical high-tech warfare.324 Precision is 
produced as central to the alleged ethicality of precision bombing, but as Zehfuss points out, 
non-combatant protection is not the central, or indeed the only, ethical standard in play. If non-
combatant immunity was indeed the central concern in modern conflict, we would likely see 
an increased use of Special Forces. 325 However, force protection tends to take precedence over 
non-combatant protection, to the extent that most commanders in the theatre of conflict are 
now ‘reluctant to send a convoy down a road without an armed drone watching over it.’326  
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Lee observes that ‘precision’ is also a political choice. In as much as armed drones and other 
platforms carrying air-to-surface missiles are capable of being very ‘precise’ at a technical 
level, when it comes to targeting decisions it is politicians who set the rules of engagement.327 
A devastating example of this can be seen in the procedures surrounding the use of the AC-130 
gunship. An AC-130 gunship was responsible for striking, over the course of an hour, a 
Médicins Sans Frontières (MSF) hospital in the besieged city of Kunduz in Afghanistan on 
October 3, 2015, the only working trauma hospital in the city.328 The air strikes killed at least 
22 people, including 10 patients (3 of whom were children) and twelve members of staff.329 
Carrying a wide-range of weaponry, including 25-millimetre and 40-millimetre canons, and a 
105-millimetre howitzer, the AC-130 is ‘supposed to be more accurate than other 
warplanes’.330 The risk of physical incapacitation from a 105-mm howitzer stands at 10% if 
one is within 90 metres of the targeted site.331 This is almost double the risk estimate distance 
of a Hellfire missile, and yet the howitzer is still classed as ‘precise’. The AC-130 is described 
by the U.S. Air Force as having ‘sophisticated sensor, navigation and fire control systems to 
provide surgical firepower or area saturation during extended loiter periods, at night and in 
adverse weather.’332 Its precision guided lethal weapons are said to ‘moderate destructiveness 
by highly accurate delivery means’.333 However, the rules of engagement relating to AC-130s 
are not quite as ‘precise’. The crew of an AC-130 do not have to complete a CDE (collateral 
damage estimation) prior to engaging their weapons. A CDE is ‘essentially a flowchart that 
requires an air controller to figure out where civilians are in proximity to enemy targets, and to 
ask whether an attack on the enemy using a particular weapon might also harm civilians’.334 
Weapons less than 105 millimetres do not require a CDE, due to ‘operational practicality’ and 
because ‘the risk of collateral damage from these weapon systems is presented by the 
distribution of munitions in the target area and not from the explosive effects of the warhead’.335 
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Aside from highlighting the political choices informing precision, this incident also 
demonstrates one of the dangers inherent in ‘precision weapons’: whilst precision weapons 
may be more accurate at striking the correct target, they will also be more accurate in striking 
the wrong target. Forge discusses this briefly, noting that: 
‘…while it is true that if the mission is to strike at a safe house of an enemy insurgent 
commander that is near a school, a guided munition weapon will be more likely to hit 
the house than a ‘dumb’ iron bomb and so collateral damage will be minimised, it is 
also true that if the aim is to hit the school and maximise civilian deaths, a precision 
weapon will be more likely to succeed.’336 
When strikes are given the go-ahead, both armed forces and politicians are aware that civilian 
deaths are a distinct possibility. Strikes are ‘okayed’ anyway. To then frame any ensuing non-
combatant deaths as accidental rather than incidental absolves those in political power of 
having to take any political responsibility for the action in question. As Zehfuss has 
highlighted:  
‘if you choose to bomb, even with precision weapons, you always already choose to 
kill “innocents”. Indeterminacy is…built into the system because the “precision” as 
expressed in CEP… is only expected to be reached every other time. The killing of 
innocents is a structural possibility; it is not an aberration….’337 
This is not to dismiss the Kunduz attack and the ensuing civilian deaths as ‘incidental’, 
particularly as it is possible that the attack may have constituted a war crime. Rather, the attack 
on the MSF hospital in Kunduz by a gunship equipped with extremely ‘precise’ weaponry 
perfectly exposes both the limits of technological and normative precision, the danger in 
conflating the two, and the trend toward avoiding responsibility for military actions which kill 
and/or injure civilians by deeming them ‘tragic incidents’ or ‘accidents’, as is discussed in the 
next section. 
The lax attitude towards civilian deaths and the lack of interest in knowing who exactly is 
targeted or killed in a strike - and particularly in a drone strike - is a symptom of the belief that 
‘precision’ means that every strike hits the correct target, and only the correct target, every 
time. For example, it is notoriously difficult to ascertain the number of civilian non-Western 
                                                           
336 Forge (n269) 172. 
337 Zehfuss (n276) 557. 
  84 
deaths arising from drone strikes. The reason that the deaths of the Italian and U.S. hostages, 
and the killings of militants who were also U.K. and U.S. citizens, have received much more 
attention politically and from the media is due to the fact that all were Western. If drone strikes 
were to take place in the West, it is nigh on inconceivable that we would not have a precise 
count of the civilian dead. Zehfuss draws attention to Butler’s work on the difference between 
the deaths of Westerners and non-Westerners, which appears to be particularly significant in 
cases such as this.338 Butler writes ‘it is not just that a death is poorly marked, but that it is 
unmarkable’.339 Indeed, it has also been mooted that one of the reasons the media continued to 
pay attention to the Kunduz strike, days after the fact, is because MSF is ‘run by western-based 
physicians and other medical care professionals’ who are ‘not so easily ignored’, particularly 
because MSF staff can give ‘compelling, articulate interviews in English to U.S. media 
outlets’.340 Despite the rhetoric of humane drones and other weapons platforms ‘saving lives’ 
and non-combatants being increasingly protected due to precision, those that are killed are 
often disregarded, their lives and deaths being considered as unremarkable and unworthy of 
grief.  
 
Accidents and responsibility 
The diffusion of responsibility, resulting simultaneously from the ‘unmanned’ capability of 
drones and the ‘hyper manned’ aspect of the 186-strong team involved in their operation makes 
it extremely difficult to pinpoint who, if anyone, could or should be responsible for a wrongful 
or unlawful act. As noted earlier, U.S. drones are flown in teams of four, with each team known 
as a ‘combat air patrol’ (CAP), with each CAP requiring approximately 186 people. This 
includes the drone pilot and the sensor (camera) operator, both of whom are seated together in 
an air force base like Creech in Nevada, or Cannon in New Mexico. This is the central ‘mission-
control element’. The ‘launch and recovery’ element work from bases in countries such as 
Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan. This team physically deploys the drones and brings them back 
to base (much of this work is also outsourced to companies such as Raytheon).341 There are 
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then a substantial number of imagery and intelligence analysts (also known as ‘screeners’) who 
watch and analyse the footage coming in from drones on patrol. These analysts are located at 
a number of different bases around the U.S. Furthermore, there is the flight operations 
supervisor and the mission intelligence coordinator who are in charge of the pilot and the 
sensor. They report to a joint air force and space component commander. There are also ‘safety’ 
observers and judge advocate generals (JAGs) who are supposed to ensure that any decision to 
strike or launch a missile, whether it be from an armed drone or another armed platform, 
complies with the ROE. They are usually situated in a base in Qatar.342 A fully staffed CAP 
should include 59 people in the field working on launch and recovery, 45 working on mission 
control, and 82 analysing the gathered data.343  
Each individual drone’s live feed is watched by three image analysts. One watches the screen 
consistently, alerting her two partners to possible threats. These two ‘screeners’ pass alerts to 
the drone pilot controlling the drone’s missiles, or to a team in the field if the drone is unarmed 
(a helicopter or AC-130 gunship crew, for example) via a computer chat room channel known 
as mIRC, and take screenshots of the most important images.344 The screeners observations are 
seen by both the drone pilot and the sensor operator, and by the mission intelligence 
coordinator, who ensures that the pilot and sensor operator don’t miss any important 
information in the mIRC.345 Because there is a slight delay between the pilot and sensor 
operator receiving the drone’s live feed and the analysis crew getting it, according to one 
screener, ‘in a situation where it gets high-paced they’ll [the military operators] cut the screener 
out entirely’.346 According to this screener, once an observation has been typed into mIRC, it 
is hard to revise, as it has already influenced the mindset of the drone pilot. Everything the 
screeners say is ‘interpreted in the most hostile way’, and according to this image analyst, ‘it 
could be argued that I was responsible, but I’m not the one shooting’.347 This convoluted 
decision-making chain highlights how easy it is for the United States to evade responsibility 
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for strikes in which the wrong people are targeted, or in which there are substantial civilian 
casualties.  
Such a diffusion of responsibility, aside from having repercussions at the political level, also 
has repercussions for responsibility at the legal level.  As Heller notes in his examination of 
whether unlawful signature strikes could be considered war crimes, ‘the real issue in a 
prosecution of either crime’ [a drone strike based on a legally inadequate signature or a legally 
adequate signature supported by insufficient evidence] ‘would be proof of mens rea’. Heller 
then describes how a ‘drone operator’ could be proven guilty of such a war crime: 
‘For murder, the prosecution would have to prove that the drone operator intended to 
engage in the conduct that caused the victim’s death; either intended to cause the 
victim’s death or was at least aware that the victim would die ‘in the ordinary course of 
events’; and was aware that the victim qualified as a civilian. For an intentional attack, 
the prosecution would have to prove only that the drone operator intended to engage 
in an attack on a population or individual and was aware that the population or 
individual qualified as civilian.’348 
As has been shown, the chain of decision-making at the immediate tactical level is quite 
convoluted (not to mention the chain of decision-making at the political level). Is the ‘drone 
operator’ discussed by Heller the drone pilot? Should the mission intelligence coordinator or 
‘screener’ be held to account if the information passed to the drone pilot is inaccurate? The 
secrecy surrounding how exactly targeting decisions are made make questions such as these 
difficult to answer. 
 
‘Accidental’ civilian deaths 
Another trend which has arisen from the phenomenon of ‘humanitarian’ and ‘humane’ warfare 
is that those civilian deaths which are acknowledged by the U.S. are regularly referred to as 
‘accidents’.349 Owens, writing in 2003, states: 
‘Political and military leaders have sought to ensure that all non-combatants who die in 
the course of these so-called ‘humanitarian wars’ are portrayed as doing so 
‘accidentally’. Because specific non-combatant deaths were not wilfully intended as 
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unique events, they should be classed as ‘accidents’; the United States and its allies 
cannot be held responsible (or even criticised). Alongside the basic laws of war which 
allow for ‘collateral’ or unintended damage, and the over-selling of precision 
technology, such claims are supported by widespread assumptions that the conduct of 
war for the West is becoming more ‘humane’.’350 
Following the deaths in early 2015 of the American and Italian aid workers who had been held 
hostage in Pakistan, President Obama called their deaths a ‘mistake’ and a ‘tragic incident’,351 
whilst the Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi referred to the U.S. strike as a ‘tragic and fatal 
error’.352 Similarly, media reports in the U.S. and elsewhere widely deemed the incident an 
‘accident’.353 For example, CNN’s headline on the story stated that ‘U.S. drone strike 
accidentally killed two hostages’,354 the Wall Street Journal wrote that the deaths of Weinstein 
and Lo Porto were ‘inadvertent’,355 and the website of Pakistani newspaper Dawn ran an 
editorial entitled ‘America’s drone accident’.356 This incident received widespread attention 
due to the fact that the dead civilians were hostages from Western nations. Owens suggests that 
‘civilian deaths are made permissible, not impermissible, when constructed as “accidents”’, 
and this certainly fits well with the ‘war on terror’.357 Owens observes that: 
‘While the number of “accidents” involving civilian death may increasingly be known 
and the potential of high-tech warfare to produce disaster may also be recognised, 
‘accidental’ small massacres of civilian populations are…becoming normalised as part 
of the post-9/11 order of the pre-emptive war.’358  
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Portraying civilian deaths as ‘accidents’ is an integral part of ‘humane’ warfare: 
The ‘humanitarian’ rationale for force makes it more difficult to defend violence both 
logically and politically if great harm is caused to civilians. Bearing this calculation in 
mind, describing civilian casualties as ‘accidents’ forms an integral part of justifying 
war.359  
In this way, whilst drone strikes have caused a high number of civilian casualties, the 
description of drones as ‘humane’ weapons and of civilian deaths as ‘accidents’ collude to 
make drone strikes not just more acceptable, but more palatable.  
The effect of the consistent treatment of all civilian deaths as ‘accidents’ is also symptomatic 
of the ‘dehumanisation’ of ‘humane’ warfare which contributes to an evasion of responsibility 
on the part of a State involved in a wrongful act. Owens writes: 
…in a world of seemingly autonomous machines fighting ‘digital-age’ war, blaming 
humans, holding anyone responsible, seems even less plausible…the notion that the 
machine itself might ultimately be behind any given accident or wrongdoing 
substantially diminishes the legitimacy of attributing responsibility to anyone. Civilian 
death and the evasion of responsibility seem further to collide with near autonomous 
machines.360 
 
The importance of intelligence 
A strike will not be precise if the intelligence guiding it is not precise. In his 2010 report, special 
rapporteur Philip Alston wrote that ‘the precision, accuracy and legality of a drone strike 
depend on the human intelligence upon which the targeting decision is based’. Byman has also 
acknowledged this, writing that: 
‘To reduce casualties, superb intelligence is necessary. Operators must know not only 
where the terrorists are, but also who is with them and who might be within the blast 
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radius. This level of surveillance may often be lacking, and terrorists’ deliberate use of 
children and other civilians as shields make civilian deaths even more likely.’361 
Quite often, intelligence fails, leading to less than precise strikes. An analysis of available data 
by the charity Reprieve, published in 2014, found that even when the U.S is engaging in a 
personality strike rather than a signature strike, in which they know exactly who they are 
targeting, they often ‘kill vastly more people than their targets.’362 Reprieve found that attempts 
to kill 41 specific individuals resulted in the deaths of some 1,147 people as of November 2014, 
with drone operators often needing to strike multiple times before hitting their target.363 
According to confidential slides obtained by The Intercept, in one five-month period of the 
targeted killing programme, 90% of those killed in strikes were not the intended targets.364 
Whilst this doesn’t mean that all those ‘accidentally’ killed were civilians, it certainly belies 
claims of precision. 
‘Precision’ is only as good as the quality of the available intelligence allows it to be. Drones 
have been heralded as the ideal surveillance and intelligence tool. Their ability to follow targets 
or hover over an area for prolonged periods of time means hours of video footage and thousands 
of images can be captured and analysed. Margolis describes drones as ‘the ultimate intelligence 
platform’, noting that they have replaced satellites and manned aircraft as the favoured platform 
for intelligence collection.365 Drones can collect a number of different kinds of intelligence. 
Among these are Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), which is the interception and decoding of 
foreign electronic communications; Measurement and Signature intelligence (MASINT), 
which is described as a “compendium of techniques rather than an identifiable collection 
method”, including ‘the advanced processing and use of data gathered from overhead and 
airborne IMINT and SIGINT collection systems’; and geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), 
which is ‘information about any object - natural or man-made - that can be observed or 
referenced to the Earth, and has national security implications’, and which is produced with 
radar imagery or by electro-optical systems.366 These capabilities, combined with the number 
of drone patrols now being flown, results in the production of a staggering volume of video 
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footage and images, which must be analysed in extremely short amounts of time. As David 
Deptula, a retired three-star general who oversaw the air force’s ISR expansion in 2006, has 
said ‘we’re drowning in data.’367 For example, Predator and Reaper drones flew 10,499 
missions between 2007 and 2008 in Afghanistan and Iraq. They were also conducting 34 
surveillance missions a day. These missions amassed about 16,000 hours of video footage each 
month. Footage of this kind has increased in the past number of years due to the addition of  
the Increment 2 ‘wide-area airborne surveillance pods’, also known as the ‘Gorgon stare’, to 
drones such as the Reaper, which has expanded the quantity of surveillance feeds military 
commanders can use tenfold, and because the number of  drone patrols have nearly doubled.368 
An overreliance on SIGINT and MASINT has led to a number of ‘mistakes’ and ‘tragic 
incidents’ of the kind discussed above. A startling account of one 2011 strike in Afghanistan 
details how poor-quality visual intelligence and no HUMINT led to the deaths of between 16 
and 23 individuals.369 The Afghan civilians – men, women, and children -  were travelling in 
two vehicles early in the morning, and were mistakenly identified as a threat, after the drone 
crew decided that the convoy probably carried a high-level Taliban commander.370 Uncertainty 
regarding such video footage and other intelligence is not unusual. Personality strikes are 
carried out using all available forms of intelligence, including HUMINT. The HUMINT is 
necessary for personality strikes in order to identify the targets, usually a specific person at the 
top tier leadership of the terrorist organization.371 However, signature strikes are conducted on 
the basis of MASINT alone.372 MASINT is used to determine ‘signatures’ that suggest 
involvement in terror plots or militant activity. There is no corroborating HUMINT to confirm 
identifies or to confirm that targeted individuals are terrorists. A number of classified slides on 
the targeted killing programme, obtained by The Intercept, show that even in personality 
strikes: 
‘…the US military has become over-reliant on…SIGINT, to identify and ultimately 
hunt down and kill people. The documents acknowledge that using metadata from 
phones and computers, as well as communications intercepts, is an inferior method of 
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finding and finishing targeted people. They described SIGINT capabilities in these 
unconventional battlefields as “poor” and “limited.” Yet such collection, much of it 
provided by foreign partners, accounted for more than half the intelligence used to track 
potential kills in Yemen and Somalia. The ISR study characterized these failings as a 
technical hindrance to efficient operations, omitting the fact that faulty intelligence has 
led to the killing of innocent people, including U.S. citizens, in drone strikes.’373 
 
The quality of available intelligence also aids in the evasion of responsibility. Lee-Morrison 
notes that, in the case of the 2011 Afghanistan strike, the footage and the distance ‘which made 
it possible to comprehend an anticipated threat also became the position from which the 
screeners and drone personnel could be held unaccountable.’374 The lack of reliable intelligence 
is extremely worrying and makes claims of ‘precision’ and ‘accuracy’ almost laughable. 
Increased precision and accuracy aren’t undesirable per se. However, unqualified claims of 
precision and accuracy work directly with notions of weapons and weapons platforms as 
‘humane’ to make uses of force more legitimate and justifiable, and to make resort to war both 
more politically acceptable and politically viable. For targeted killing, the concepts of 
precision, humanity, and cost-effectiveness work in concert to reify the idea of the armed drone 
as an ‘exceptional’ weapon. This is despite serious doubt as to the actual effectiveness of 
signature strikes and the wider targeted killing programme in combatting the terrorist threat, as 
discussed at the beginning of this chapter.  
 
Conclusion 
 If the ‘war on terror’ is exceptional in its nature, then an exceptional weapon or weapons 
system should - or indeed must - be used to fight it. Descriptions of armed drones regularly 
include the word ‘exceptional’, for example: ‘exceptional proficiency’;375 ’exceptional 
accuracy’;376 ‘exceptional ability to accurately identify and attack targets’;377 ‘exceptionally 
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precise, exceptionally surgical and exceptionally targeted’.378 In a discussion on drones and the 
FATA province of Pakistan, Shah notes that the positing of drones as ‘exceptional technology’ 
and of FATA as ‘exceptional territory’ has ‘allowed the uncomfortable marriage of drones with 
the region of FATA’.379 This idea of ‘exception’ permeates almost every facet of the targeted 
killing programme and the wider ‘war on terror’. The conflict is said to be exceptional in its 
very nature and the weapons used are exceptional in their technical abilities. The civilians killed 
are killed in ‘tragic incidents’, representing exceptions to the norm, and despite the sheer 
number of targeted killings carried out, each individual targeted is deemed to present an 
exceptional threat. The ‘exceptional’ practice of targeted killing is now routine, and firmly 
embedded in U.S. military practice. This chapter demonstrates that the principle justifications 
presented in favour of the targeted killing programme by the U.S. government and numerous 
commentators are often misleading, and quite frequently false.  
Such widespread use of targeted killing by the U.S., in numerous countries and conflict 
situations, demands legal analysis.  The following chapter therefore presents an examination 
of the United States’ proffered legal justifications for the targeted killing programme and 
assesses the targeted killing programme under the body of law applicable to armed conflict, 
namely, the rules of international humanitarian law. 
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Chapter Three: Situating the Targeted Killing Programme in International 
Law, and Targeted Killing Under the Rules of International Humanitarian 
Law 
 
Targeted killing operates in a fraught, and at times fluid, legal context. Situating targeted killing 
within a specific body of law presents myriad problems. The United States has issued 
contradictory statements on what it believes to be the applicable legal regime on numerous 
occasions. Academic debate on the issue tends to agree that targeted killing is covered either 
by international humanitarian law in all situations, or by international humanitarian law in some 
contexts, and by international human rights law in others.  
The U.S. itself argues that it is engaged in a non-international armed conflict with al-Qaeda 
and affiliated forces, thus giving it the right to target individuals, and it further argues that the 
targeting of individuals is acceptable under its inherent right of self-defence.380 Speaking to the 
American Society of International Law in 2010, Harold Koh, in his role as then-Legal Advisor 
at the U.S. Department of State, said that ‘a state that is engaged in armed conflict or in 
legitimate self-defence is not required to provide targets with legal process before the state may 
use armed force’.381  As Alston noted at the time, the law of armed conflict and the rules 
governing the right to self-defence of a state are two sets of rules that are ‘radically different’.382  
In his 2010 report, Alston writes that while Koh’s statement was ‘an important starting point’, 
it fails to address: 
some of the most central legal issues including: the scope of the armed conflict in which  
the US asserts it is engaged, the criteria for individuals who may be targeted and killed, 
the existence of any substantive or procedural safeguards to ensure the legality and 
accuracy of killings, and the existence of accountability mechanisms.383 
In his 2013 speech at the National Defense University, President Obama again put forward the 
U.S. position that targeted killing takes place within an armed conflict under the U.S.’ inherent 
right of self-defence, stating: 
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…America's actions are legal. We were attacked on 9/11. Within a week, Congress 
overwhelmingly authorized the use of force. Under domestic law, and international law, 
the United States is at war with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and their associated forces. We 
are at war with an organization that right now would kill as many Americans as they 
could if we did not stop them first. So this is a just war – a war waged proportionally, 
in last resort, and in self-defense.384 
The most detailed document on the legal position taken by the U.S. available thus far is the 
Department of Justice’s White Paper, ‘Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a 
U.S. Citizen Who is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qa’ida or An Associated Force’, leaked 
by NBC News in 2013. The paper states that the United States is in an armed conflict with al-
Qaeda and its associated forces, and that aside from the authority arising from the 2001 AUMF 
(which is examined in a later chapter discussing the U.S. domestic context for the targeted 
killing programme), the targeted killing programme is lawful under ‘the inherent right to 
national self-defence recognized in international law’. It further states that the use of force 
‘against a senior operational leader of al’Qa’ida or its associated forces…’ would be justified 
as an act of national self-defence, and that additionally, the U.S. is engaged in a non-
international armed conflict with al-Qaeda and its associated forces. The paper also maintains 
that ‘any such lethal operation by the United States would comply with the four fundamental 
law-of-war principles governing the use of force…’385   
Sixteen years after the U.S. first employed targeted killing, the status of the tactic under 
international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL) remains 
controversial and complex. Given the complicated environments in which targeted killings are 
performed, and the varying types of situation in which they are allegedly carried out (e.g. 
international armed conflict, non-international armed conflict), targeted killings often appear 
to defy categorisation. As discussed, targeted killings have largely been justified in terms of 
military necessity and self-defence. Yet the fact remains that however justified an act in self-
defence or otherwise might be, and however exceptional the threat faced, all targeted killings 
must comply with the rules of either international humanitarian law (IHL) or international 
human rights law (IHRL). In ascertaining whether targeted killings are governed by IHL or by 
IHRL, the legal context in which such operations occur must be discussed.  
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While the U.S. maintains that targeted killings in Pakistan, Somalia, Libya, Niger and Yemen 
take place within the same legal context – that of a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) - 
this is a dubious claim. This chapter analyses which rules of IHL govern targeted killings, and 
whether this is the case in the varying jurisdictions in which they take place. 
As Solis points out, in order for a targeted killing to be classified as such – and not as a 
homicide, assassination, or domestic crime – an international or non-international armed 
conflict must be in progress. Contesting the view that an armed conflict is ongoing means that 
‘the lawfulness of any targeted killing is necessarily contested as well. It is the predicate armed 
conflict that raises the right to kill an enemy’.386 If we are to accept the United States’ 
contention that it is involved in a non-international armed conflict with al-Qaeda and associated 
forces, then those targeted killings carried out in Yemen, Pakistan, Somalia, and other States 
are, like targeted killings in Afghanistan, governed by the relevant international humanitarian 
law rules applicable to a non-international armed conflict. However, if the United States is held 
not to be involved in a non-international armed conflict (aside from in Afghanistan), and is 
similarly held not to be in an international armed conflict, then those targeted killings carried 
out outside the immediate zone of hostilities in Afghanistan are subject to international human 
rights law.  
The United States has consistently argued that those targeted killings which take place outside 
an armed conflict situation ‘do not need to be justified under HRL as long as they represent 
legitimate acts of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter’.387 Both Harold Koh, in his 
position as Legal Adviser at the U.S. Department of State, and John O. Brennan, in his capacity 
as Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, illustrated this 
position. The former remarked that lethal drone strikes did not qualify as extrajudicial killing 
as ‘a state that is engaged in an armed conflict or in legitimate self-defense is not required to 
provide targets with legal process before the state may use lethal force’, while the latter claimed 
that ‘as a matter of international law, the United States is in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, 
the Taliban, and associated forces, in response to the 9/11 attacks, and we may also use force 
consistent with our inherent right of national self-defense’.388   
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Yet, if an act is performed in self-defence, this does not preclude that act from having to be 
justified under either IHL (if the targeted killing is performed within an armed conflict) or 
IHRL (if the targeted killing is performed outside of an armed conflict situation).389 While 
Article 21 of the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts states that ‘the wrongfulness of an act of a State is precluded 
if the act constitutes a lawful measure of self-defence taken in conformity with the Charter of 
the United Nations’, the commentary to Article 21 maintains that: 
‘…this is not to say that self-defence precludes the wrongfulness of conduct in all cases 
or with respect to all obligations… As to obligations under international humanitarian 
law and in relation to non-derogable human rights provisions, self-defence does not 
preclude the wrongfulness of conduct’.390 
The consistent invocation of the right of self-defence by the United States represents a 
deliberate attempt to confuse the applicable legal regime – whether IHL or IHRL – with the jus 
ad bellum. The following section discusses the categorisation of armed conflict and why such 
categorisation remains important, particularly for the situation in question.   
 
Why is the categorisation of conflict important for targeted killing? 
Categorising conflict is often a difficult task. Despite the shrinking gap in the rules applying to 
international armed conflict and non-international armed conflict, categorisation remains 
necessary, particularly for cases pertaining to targeted killing. Depending on whether a conflict 
is of an international or non-international nature, different rules apply to the targeting of 
individuals.  How are we to determine whether international humanitarian law or human rights 
law applies to U.S. targeted killings? To begin with, we must determine whether an armed 
conflict exists, and if so, what category of armed conflict we are dealing with. While it is now 
nearly two decades since the U.S. first employed targeted killing, the status of the tactic under 
international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL) remains 
controversial and complex. Given the complicated environments in which targeted killings are 
performed, targeted killing often seems to defy categorisation. As previously discussed, 
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targeted killings have largely been justified in terms of military necessity and self-defence. Yet 
the fact remains that however justified an act in self-defence or otherwise might be, and 
however exceptional the threat faced, all targeted killings must comply with the rules of either 
IHL or IHRL. In order to ascertain whether targeted killings are governed by IHL or by IHRL, 
the legal context in which they take place must be discussed. While the U.S. maintains that 
targeted killings in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen take place within the same legal 
context, this is a dubious claim. Similarly, targeted killings performed in Iraq and Syria take 
place within a different legal setting. This section thus analyses whether it is IHL or IHRL that 
governs targeted killings in the different jurisdictions in which they are carried out. 
The next section addresses the question as to whether the U.S. targeted killing programme takes 
place within an armed conflict situation. In doing so, it first examines the categories of armed 
conflict under international humanitarian law, before addressing the U.S. conflict with al-
Qaeda and affiliated forces specifically.  
 
International armed conflict and non-international armed conflict 
How do we know when international humanitarian law applies? It is not, as might be expected, 
quite so simple as merely stating ‘an armed conflict exists, and therefore international 
humanitarian law applies.’ Solis summarises some of the complexities involved in the 
classification of armed conflicts: 
‘If two or more Geneva Convention High Contracting Parties are fighting, it may be a 
common Article 2 interstate conflict, in which all of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and 
Additional Protocol I apply. Depending on whether they are fighting each other or both 
are fighting an armed opposition group, it could be a common Article 3 intrastate 
conflict – a non-international armed conflict in which common Article 3 and, perhaps, 
Additional Protocol II apply. It may be a non-international armed conflict in which 
domestic law applies, and the Geneva Conventions and the Protocols do not figure at 
all. If a nonstate armed opposition group is fighting a High Contracting Party, the 
situation may be more difficult to unravel. As Yoram Dinstein says, “drawing the line 
of demarcation between inter-State and intra-State armed conflicts may be a 
complicated task…”’391 
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First, it is necessary to define the term ‘armed conflict’ – something for which no clear 
definition exists in the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The International Committee for the Red 
Cross (ICRC) notes in its opinion paper of 2008 ‘How is the term “Armed Conflict” defined in 
International Humanitarian Law?’ that international humanitarian law: ‘distinguishes two types 
of armed conflicts:  
• International armed conflicts (IACs), opposing two or more States, and  
• Non-international armed conflicts, between governmental forces and non-
governmental armed groups, or between such groups only.  IHL treaty law also 
establishes a distinction between non-international armed conflicts in the 
meaning of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and non-
international armed conflicts falling within the definition provided in Art. 1 of 
Additional Protocol II.’392 
 
As the ICRC paper states, ‘no other type of armed conflict exists’, though it is ‘nevertheless 
important to underline that a situation can evolve from one type of armed conflict to another, 
depending on the facts prevailing at a certain moment.’393 As Darcy observes, an armed conflict 
may be a factual determination, but the existence of one carries ‘significant legal implications’, 
particularly given that different rules apply to the different categories of armed conflict.394 
The differences between the treaty law applicable to international armed conflicts and non-
international armed conflicts are, as Akande says, vast.395 The Geneva Conventions of 1949, 
the Hague Conventions which preceded them and API of 1977 all apply to international armed 
conflicts. The treaty rules applicable to non-international armed conflicts are, on the other hand, 
severely limited – only Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, in some cases APII of 
1977, and Article 8 (2) (c) and (e) of the Rome Statute apply. Common Article 3 merely 
describes the basic protections of those who do not, or who no longer, take part in hostilities 
and has no rules regulating the conduct of hostilities. APII has fewer than twenty provisions, 
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and the Rome Statute provisions dealing with non-international armed conflicts somewhat 
extend the rules relating to the protection of victims of armed conflict and introduce ‘modest’ 
rules relating to the conduct of hostilities, ‘but fall far short of establishing a regime of 
international humanitarian law close to that established for international armed conflicts’.396 
Akande points out, however, that the distinction between international armed conflicts and non-
international armed conflicts is being eroded ‘such that there is now greater, though by no 
means complete, unity in the law applicable to those two forms of conflict’.397 This gap is 
bridged firstly by a number of treaties which apply to all armed conflicts, primarily those 
concerning the means and methods of warfare, for example the Biological Weapons 
Convention 1972, the Convention Prohibiting Anti-Personnel Land Mines 1997, and the 2001 
amendment which extends the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its protocols to non-
international armed conflicts. More important for non-international armed conflicts is the 
application of customary international law, which is filling many of the gaps left by treaty law, 
leading to the filling of the ‘dichotomy’ between international and non-international armed 
conflicts.398 Akande draws attention to the position taken on this distinction by the Appeals 
Chamber of the ICTY in Tadic: 
Notwithstanding…limitations, it cannot be denied that customary rules have developed 
to govern internal strife. These rules…cover such areas as protection of civilians from 
hostilities, in particular from indiscriminate attacks, protection of civilian objects, in 
particular cultural property, protection of all those who do not (or no longer) take active 
part in hostilities, as well as prohibition of means of warfare proscribed in international 
armed conflicts and ban of certain methods of conducting hostilities.399 
Furthermore, the ICTY held: 
What is inhumane, and consequently proscribed, in international wars, cannot but be 
inhumane and inadmissible in civil strife.400 
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The ICRC’s Study of customary international law supported this approach, and found that 
‘nearly all’ the rules identified in the Study applied to both kinds of conflict.401 The Study 
stated: 
This study provides evidence that many rules of customary international law apply in 
both international and non-international armed conflicts and show the extent to which 
State practice has gone beyond existing treaty law and expanded the rules applicable to 
non-international armed conflicts. In particular, the gaps in the regulations of the 
conduct of hostilities in Additional Protocol II have largely been filled through State 
practice, which has led to the creation of rules parallel to those in Additional Protocol 
I, but applicable as customary law to non-international armed conflicts.402 
While the ICRC’s study remains somewhat contentious, Akande writes that there does seem to 
be an acknowledgement by States that customary international law now provides more 
elaborate rules for non-international armed conflicts than the rules found in Common Article 3 
and APII.403 However, Akande also points out that the ICC Statute, adopted after the Tadic 
decision, does not include some of the customary rules (e.g. the prohibition of attacks on 
civilian objects) identified by the ICTY and the ICRC in the Statute’s war crimes provisions. 
The Statute also includes a substantially longer list of war crimes in international than in non-
international armed conflicts. In Akande’s opinion, while the distinction between the law 
applicable in international and non-international armed conflicts is certainly blurring, States 
have not seized opportunities to abolish the distinction when they have had the opportunity to 
do.404 Particularly important for this examination of the context in which targeted killings take 
place is also the fact that two crucial parts of international humanitarian law – the law relating 
to the status of fighters and the rules relating to detention of combatants and civilians – differ 
depending on the status of the armed conflicts. The 2016 Commentary to the Geneva 
Conventions also holds that the distinction between international armed conflict and non-
international armed conflict is of ‘continuing relevance’, noting that: 
‘…there are still important elements of humanitarian law governing international 
armed conflicts that have no counterpart in the law applicable to non-international 
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armed conflicts, despite the considerable development of conventional and customary 
international humanitarian law applicable to non-international armed conflicts since 
1949’.405 
In this regard, the 2016 Commentary specifically mentions the lack of prisoner-of-war status 
in the humanitarian law governing non-international armed conflicts, and the lack of an 
occupation law regime.406 Therefore, the categorisation and classification of armed conflicts 
for the applicability of international humanitarian law remains important.  
The following section will first consider the necessary criteria for an international armed 
conflict to exist, before examining the relevant criteria for a non-international armed conflict. 
 
International Armed Conflict (IAC) 
As noted earlier, the term ‘armed conflict’ is not defined in the 1949 Geneva Conventions, or 
its subsequent Protocols. According to common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 
international armed conflicts are those which oppose ‘high contracting parties’, i.e. States. An 
international armed conflict, then, occurs when one or more states have recourse to armed force 
against another state, ‘regardless of the reasons or the intensity of the confrontation.’ The 2016 
Commentary to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, meanwhile, quite simply states ‘any difference 
between two States and leading to the intervention of members of the armed forces’ is an 
international armed conflict.407 A 2008 ICRC opinion paper on the subject observes that the 
existence of an IAC, and thus the possibility of applying IHL, ‘depends on what actually 
happens on the ground. It is based on factual conditions.’408 Furthermore, the 2016 
Commentary to the 1949 Geneva Conventions confirms that: 
‘any difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of armed 
forces is an armed conflict within the meaning of Article 2, even if one of the Parties 
denies the existence of a state of war. It makes no difference how long the conflict lasts, 
or how much slaughter takes place.’409  
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Additional Protocol 1 extends the definition of international armed conflict to further include 
‘armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination, alien occupation or 
racist regimes in the exercise of their right to self-determination (wars of national 
liberation).’410 Once an armed conflict of an international character is determined to exist, the 
1949 Geneva Conventions apply, except for Common Article 3, which explicitly covers non-
international armed conflicts.411  
Perhaps the most important definition of armed conflict, which also discusses the applicability 
of international humanitarian law to armed conflicts, is that provided by the ICTY Appeals 
Chamber in the Tadic case, since adopted by other international bodies:412 
An armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or 
protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed 
groups or between such groups within a State. International humanitarian law applies 
from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of 
hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal 
conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until that moment, international 
humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of the warring States or, in 
the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party, whether 
or not actual combat takes place there.413  
The 2016 Commentary to the Geneva Conventions states that the Tadic definition of armed 
conflict ‘is generally considered the contemporary reference for any interpretation of the notion 
of armed conflict under humanitarian law’. 
Another important definition of armed conflict, and the applicability of international 
humanitarian law to armed conflicts, is that provided by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the 
Tadic case, since adopted by other international bodies:414 
An armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or 
protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed 
groups or between such groups within a State. International humanitarian law applies 
                                                           
410 ICRC (n395). 
411 Ibid. 
412 Jelena Pejic, ‘Extraterritorial targeting by means of armed drones: Some legal implications’ International Review of the 
Red Cross 2014 96 (893) 10. 
413 Darcy (n381) 87. 
414 Pejic (n399) 10. 
  103 
from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of 
hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal 
conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until that moment, international 
humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of the warring States or, in 
the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party, whether 
or not actual combat takes place there.415  
Pejic notes that in the decades since the adoption of the Geneva Conventions, the duration or 
intensity of hostilities had ‘generally not been considered to be constitutive elements for the 
existence of an IAC’,  though this approach has recently been called into question: 
‘by suggestions that hostilities must reach a certain level of intensity to qualify as an 
armed conflict, the implication being that the fulfilment of an intensity criterion is 
necessary before an inter-State use of force may be classified as an IAC. Pursuant to 
this view, a number of isolated or sporadic inter-State uses of armed force that may be 
described as “incidents”, “border clashes”, and others do not qualify as IACs because 
of the low intensity of violence involved.’416 
Such ‘incidents’ are often described as ‘armed conflicts short of war’. Solis writes that a ‘key 
indicia’ of whether an incident is actually an armed conflict is whether the incident is 
protracted, i.e. ‘the longer an incident continues, the more difficult it is to describe it as merely 
an incident’.417 Therefore, ‘generally speaking, an armed incident, even when between two 
states, is not sufficient to constitute an armed conflict in the sense of common Article 2.’418 
Akande takes issue with this reading, and writes: 
‘to import an intensity requirement into the definition of international armed conflicts 
is effectively to assert that no law governs the conduct of military operations below that 
level of intensity, including the opening phase of hostilities’.419 
Such a position also seems to contradict the ICTY’s finding in Tadic that an armed conflict 
exists ‘whenever’ there is a resort to armed force between States, which suggests that the 
threshold of an international armed conflict is very low, ‘except perhaps in cases where the use 
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of force is unintended (for example arising out of error)’.  This position is further supported by 
the 2016 Commentary, and is quite different from the position in non-international armed 
conflicts, where domestic law and international human rights law governs tensions and internal 
disturbances that ‘fall below the intensity of armed conflict’.  
The position generally taken is that international humanitarian law applies to an armed conflict 
even if neither party recognizes a state of war. Rather, what is important today is ‘the fact of 
an armed conflict, rather than the formal status of war’.420 There are no modern examples of a 
formal declaration of war.  
 
Non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC) 
The majority of conflicts today are non-international armed conflicts, but this does not make 
non-international armed conflicts any easier to classify or define. As mentioned earlier, the law 
applying to non-international armed conflicts is limited to Common Article 3 in all cases, and 
Additional Protocol II and Rome Statute Article 8 (2) (c) (f) in some cases.  
Non-international armed conflicts are classified under Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions, and Article 1 of Additional Protocol 2. Common Article 3 applies ‘in the case of 
an armed conflict not of an international character occurring  in the territory of one of the High 
Contracting Parties’, including armed conflicts in which one or more non-governmental armed 
groups are involved. The 2008 ICRC Opinion Paper notes that NIACs in the meaning of 
Common Article 3 are distinguished from less serious forms of violence, such as internal 
disturbances and tensions, riots or acts of banditry, by a ‘certain threshold of confrontation’.421 
The hostilities ‘must reach a minimum level of intensity’, and ‘non-governmental groups 
involved in the conflict must be considered as “parties to the conflict”, meaning that they 
possess organized armed forces.’422 Such organised armed forces must be under a certain 
command structure, and must have the capacity to sustain military operations.  
In the meaning of Article 1 of Additional Protocol 2, the definition of NIAC is more restrictive. 
Here, NIACs are those: 
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‘which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces 
and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible 
command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry 
out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol’.423 
This more restrictive definition is ‘relevant for the application of Protocol 2 only, but does not 
extend to the law of NIAC in general’.424 The ICRC’s opinion paper also notes that judgments 
and decisions of the ICTY also shed light on the definition of NIAC, with the ICTY 
determining that an NIAC exists ‘whenever there is …protracted armed violence between 
governmental authorities and organised armed groups or between such groups within a State’, 
confirming ‘that the definition of NIAC in the sense of common article 3 encompasses 
situations where “several factions [confront] each other without involvement of the 
government’s armed forces.’425 
Regarding the judicial consideration of the concept of NIACS, Darcy writes that it ‘has 
included attempts to provide a definition, flesh out indicative criteria, and arguably to 
circumvent the threshold of Additional Protocol II’.426  He adds that the ICTY Appeal’s 
Chamber’s 1995 definition of armed conflict, which held that an NIAC exists where there is 
‘protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups 
within a State’, was able to ‘cut through the uncertainty and debate concerning the meaning of 
armed conflict that had persisted since the 1949 Geneva Conventions were being negotiated’. 
Intensity and organisation have, says Darcy, since ‘become accepted in the jurisprudence as 
the main determinants of the existence of a non-international armed conflict covered by 
common article 3’.427 Solis also discusses the Tadic judgment, which stated: 
The test applied by the Appeals Chamber to the existence of an armed conflict for the 
purposes of the rules contained in Common Article 3 focuses on two aspects of a 
conflict; the intensity of the conflict and the organization of the parties to the conflict. 
In an armed conflict of an internal….character, these closely related criteria are used 
solely for the purpose, as a minimum, of distinguishing an armed conflict from banditry, 
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unorganized and short-lived insurrections, or terrorist activities, which are not subject 
to international humanitarian law.’428 
ICTY jurisprudence has also provided ‘detailed and useful’ guidance on the meaning of 
intensity and organisation’, with the Trial Chamber in Limaj explaining that intensity could be 
assessed ‘by looking at the seriousness and number of attacks, the geographical and temporal 
spread of clashes, the mobilisation of government forces, the distribution of weapons, and 
whether the conflict is before the United Nations Security Council’.429  Solis notes that while 
the law of armed conflict ‘has virtually no application in a common Article 3 conflict’, with 
the Parties to a common Article 3 conflict only bound to observe common Article 3, IHL and 
other elements of the law of armed conflict are making their way into common Article 3 
conflicts ‘to an ever greater degree’.430 
 
Common Article 3 armed conflicts 
Common Article 3 applies ‘in the case of an armed conflict not of an international character 
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties’, including armed conflicts in 
which one or more non-governmental armed groups are involved. The article does not, 
however, specify precisely when it applies – as Akande says, whether or not an ‘armed conflict 
not of an international character’ is taking place is determined by criteria which have been 
‘fleshed out’ by customary international law.431 The 2016 Commentary to the Geneva 
Conventions describes non-international armed conflict as a ‘situation in which organized 
Parties confront one another with violence of a certain degree of intensity, which is determined 
based on the facts’.432 In the Tadic case, the ICTY Appeals Chamber described non-
international armed conflicts as a situation of ‘protracted armed violence between 
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State’, 
with the same test being adopted in article 8 (2) (f) of the Rome Statute.433  
The 2008 ICRC Opinion Paper notes that non-international armed conflicts in the meaning of 
Common Article 3 are distinguished from less serious forms of violence, such as internal 
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disturbances and tensions, riots or acts of banditry, by a ‘certain threshold of confrontation’.434 
This is also indicated by the Rome Statute, which states that non-international armed conflict 
excludes ‘situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic 
acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature’. The 2016 Commentary to the Geneva 
Conventions, meanwhile, notes that the qualifications of occurrences listed as ‘not being armed 
conflicts’ in Article 1 of Additional Protocol II should also be considered accurate for Common 
Article 3.435 
Common Article 3 non-international armed conflicts may be between a State and a non-state 
group, or a conflict between non-state groups only. In all non-international armed conflicts, ‘at 
least one side must be considered a non-state group and international humanitarian law 
provides the rules for determining when such a group may be regarded as a party to an armed 
conflict’.436 To be considered a party to an armed conflict, the non-state group must be under 
a certain command structure and must have the capacity to sustain military operations – in other 
words, they must have a certain level of organisation, or in the words of the Appeals Chamber 
in Tadic, must be an ‘organized armed group’.437 A number of factors determine whether an 
armed group is sufficiently organised, but as Akande emphasises, these are not minimum 
factors that must be present, but are indicators of organisation.438 Such factors include: the 
existence of a command structure and disciplinary rules and mechanisms within the group; the 
existence of a headquarters; the fact that the group controls a certain territory; the ability of the 
group to gain access to weapons, other military equipment, recruits and military training; its 
ability to plan, coordinate and carry out military operations, including troop movements and 
logistics; its ability to define a unified military strategy and use military tactics; and its ability 
to speak with one voice and negotiate and conclude agreements such as ceasefire or peace 
accords.439 
The level of violence between an organised armed group and a State, or between organised 
armed groups, must also reach a certain degree of intensity before it can be considered a non-
international armed conflict. In Tadic, the Appeals Chamber said that an NIAC exists whenever 
there is ‘protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organised armed 
                                                           
434 ICRC (n395). 
435 ICRC (n391). 
436 Akande (n382) 201. 
437 Tadic (n420). 
438 Akande (n382) 202. 
439 Tadic (n4320). 
  108 
groups or between such groups within a State’ – while ‘protracted’ is usually taken to relate to 
the time over which an armed conflict takes place, Akande explains that here, it has come to 
be accepted that the key requirement is the intensity of the force.440 The intensity requirement 
‘indicates that the threshold of violence that is required for the application of international 
humanitarian law in non-international armed conflicts is higher than the case of international 
armed conflicts’. The situation with respect to non-international armed conflict is ‘more fluid’, 
because the violence often ‘pre-dates the establishment of a non-international armed conflict 
and the application of international humanitarian law’.441 The ICTY, in Prosecutor v Ramush 
Haradinaj et al (arising out of the conflict in Kosovo between the authorities of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Liberation Army) relied on a range of factors for 
assessing the criteria of ‘intensity’ and the ‘organization of armed groups’.442 Regarding 
intensity, the relevant factors include: the number, duration and intensity of individual 
confrontations; the type of weapons and other military equipment used; the number and calibre 
of munitions fired; the number of persons and type of forces partaking in the fighting; the 
number of casualties; the extent of material destruction; and the number of civilians fleeing 
combat zones. Akande also notes that the involvement of the UN Security Council may also 
reflect the intensity of a conflict.443 The ICTY Trial Chamber in Limaj  has also provided 
‘detailed and useful’ guidance on the meaning of intensity and organisation’, explaining that 
intensity could be assessed ‘by looking at the seriousness and number of attacks, the 
geographical and temporal spread of clashes, the mobilisation of government forces, the 
distribution of weapons, and whether the conflict is before the United Nations Security 
Council’.444 According to Akande, these criteria may ‘clearly’ point in different directions, so 
a complete assessment of an overall situation has to be made – there is no particular formula 
that can be applied determining what weight should be given to each of the different factors.445  
 
Additional Protocol II 
In the meaning of Article 1 of Additional Protocol 2, the definition of NIAC is more restrictive. 
Here, NIACs are those conflicts: 
                                                           
440 Akande (n382) 203. 
441 Ibid.  
442 Ibid 204. 
443 Akande (n382) 205. 
444 Darcy (n381) 106. 
445 Akande (n382) 205. 
  109 
‘which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces 
and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible 
command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry 
out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol’. 
This more restrictive definition is ‘relevant for the application of Protocol II only, but does not 
extend to the law of NIAC in general’. Addition Protocol II applies only to those armed 
conflicts which take place on the territory of a party ‘between its armed forces and dissident 
armed forces or other organised armed groups’. There are a number of ways in which the 
Protocol is more rigorous in its test for non-international armed conflicts than Common Article 
3: conflicts taking place between organised armed groups are not covered by APII, and the 
organised armed group involved in conflict with the State must exercise control over territory. 
Further, as APII applies only to armed conflicts taking place in the territory of a party between 
‘its armed forces’ and organised groups, this means that the Protocol is limited in its application 
to internationalised non-international armed conflicts.  
Regarding the judicial consideration of the concept of non-international armed conflict, Darcy 
writes that it ‘has included attempts to provide a definition, flesh out indicative criteria, and 
arguably to circumvent the threshold of Additional Protocol II’.446  He adds that the ICTY 
Appeal’s Chamber’s 1995 definition of armed conflict, which held that an NIAC exists where 
there is ‘protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed 
groups within a State’, was able to ‘cut through the uncertainty and debate concerning the 
meaning of armed conflict that had persisted since the 1949 Geneva Conventions were being 
negotiated’. Intensity and organisation have, says Darcy, since ‘become accepted in the 
jurisprudence as the main determinants of the existence of a non-international armed conflict 
covered by common article 3’.447 Solis also discusses the Tadic Judgment, which stated: 
The test applied by the Appeals Chamber to the existence of an armed conflict for the 
purposes of the rules contained in Common Article 3 focuses on two aspects of a 
conflict; the intensity of the conflict and the organization of the parties to the conflict. 
In an armed conflict of an internal….character, these closely related criteria are used 
solely for the purpose, as a minimum, of distinguishing an armed conflict from banditry, 
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unorganized and short-lived insurrections, or terrorist activities, which are not subject 
to international humanitarian law.’448 
Solis also notes that while the law of armed conflict ‘has virtually no application in a common 
Article 3 conflict’, with the Parties to a common Article 3 conflict only bound to observe 
common Article 3, IHL and other elements of the law of armed conflict are ‘making their way’ 
into common Article 3 conflicts ‘to an ever greater degree’.  
 
Categorising the U.S. conflict with al-Qaeda and affiliated forces 
It is almost immediately obvious that the United States’ fight against al-Qaeda and affiliated 
forces does not fit neatly into the aforementioned categories of armed conflict. The U.S. is not 
involved in a conflict with another state, and therefore it would seem reasonable to assume that 
the conflict cannot be categorised as an international armed conflict. Yet, there are those who 
argue that in certain situations, this is not the case. Opinion is also divided as to whether the 
conflict can be categorised as a non-international armed conflict. In the following sections I 
briefly examine the arguments made for classifying the United States conflict with al-Qaeda 
and affiliated forces as a non-international armed conflict, before discussing those arguments 
made in favour of classifying it as an international armed conflict. I then discuss the laws of 
armed conflict applicable to the targeting of individuals in each scenario.  
 
A non-international armed conflict? 
The United States maintains that it is involved in a non-international armed conflict with al-
Qaeda and affiliated forces. As previously mentioned, this position is plainly stated in the DOJ 
White Paper, on page three: 
‘The United States is currently in a non-international armed conflict with al-Qa’ida and 
its associated forces… Any U.S. operation would be part of this non-international 
armed conflict, even if it were to take place away from the zone of active hostilities.’449  
The DOJ supports this position with reference to the Supreme Court’s judgment in Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, in which the Court, discussing Common Article 3, stated that the term ‘conflict not 
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of an international character’ is used ‘in contradistinction to a conflict between nations’.450 The 
Court further stated that the commentaries to the Geneva Conventions ‘make clear “that the 
scope of application of the Article must be as wide as possible,”’ finding that Common Article 
3 was applicable to the case in question, and to the U.S. conflict with al-Qaeda and affiliated 
forces.451 
More recently, the former U.S. State Department Legal Adviser Brian Egan, in an address to 
the American Society of International Law, referred to U.S. hostilities with al-Qaeda as ‘our 
non-international armed conflict against al-Qa’ida and its associated forces.’452 As to the 
applicable law in this situation, Egan said:  
‘…the applicable international legal regime governing our military operations is the 
law of armed conflict covering NIACs, most importantly Common Article 3 of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions and other treaty and customary international law rules governing 
the conduct of hostilities in non-international armed conflicts.’453 
Numerous concerns have, however, been raised regarding the classification of the situation 
with al-Qaeda and affiliated forces as a non-international armed conflict. Chief amongst these 
concerns are whether al-Qaeda and affiliated forces are organised enough to be considered an 
‘organised armed group’, and whether the level of violence reaches the necessary threshold of 
intensity.  
Regarding the first issue, Lubell notes that ‘there are serious concerns about describing al-
Qaeda as a distinct and organized armed group, rather than a network of loosely affiliated 
groups sometimes reduced to little more than similar ideologies’.454 This issue, he writes, is 
linked to the second: 
‘The threshold of violence and the identity of the party to the conflict are linked: if 
numerous incidents round the world classified as terrorism could be attributed to the 
same entity then one could argue that the threshold for conflict has been crossed; if 
however these incidents are perpetrated by separate groups with no unified and 
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organized command and control structure, it becomes difficult to add them all up 
together as evidence of an existing conflict… There would need to be a connection 
between the militant groups that fulfils the organizational requirements, such as a 
unified command and control structure and hierarchy. Even within Pakistan there 
appears to be a lack of clarity as to whether the targets of the strike can all be said to 
belong to one organized group, and based on existing reports it appears that the drone 
strikes are targeting a number of different militant groups.’455 
Anderson further examines the concerns regarding requirements around the threshold of 
intensity, noting that: 
…‘any particular instance of targeted killing will most often aim at minimum violence 
to kill a particular individual. It does so using means, such as drones, that do not satisfy 
those requirements in any single targeted killing operation. Moreover, each of those 
operations is planned and executed in ways that, if the operation goes as intended, will 
never reach the level of any of those criteria.’456 
He goes on to say: 
‘If you believe that individual instances of targeted killing are not already part of an 
armed conflict under way, then the failure to engage in enough violence through 
targeted killing means that this act of violence is not, all things equal, protected under 
the law of armed conflict and that those engaging in it have no combatant’s privilege 
for their acts of violence under international law. If captured (and even if not), they are 
liable for crimes under the domestic law of the place where the killing takes place, for 
example. Importantly, too, the targeted killing itself then turns into an extrajudicial 
killing under international human rights law, among other adverse legal 
consequences.’457 
Others dismiss such arguments regarding the failure of the U.S. conflict with al-Qaeda and 
affiliated forces to reach the necessary level of violence. Notable amongst these is Ohlin, who 
virulently argues that those who are critical of drone strikes and supportive of the ‘hot 
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battlefield’ stance ‘make factual assertions that undermine the legal foundations of their 
arguments’. He writes: 
‘…it is sometimes asserted that the United States is operating drones in areas where 
there is no armed conflict because the scope and intensity of fighting is too low. Then 
the critics decry the number of civilian casualties caused by the strikes, suggesting that 
thousands of innocent civilians are being killed on a regular basis by the aerial 
strikes.’458 
This ‘politically powerful’ and factual claim, Ohlin argues, ‘undermines the legal argument, 
because it belies the claim that the scope and intensity of fighting is too low.’459 He then makes 
a dubious assertion:  
‘the relevant scope of violence is not the fighting performed by the enemy; it is the total 
amount of fighting in the area. Consequently, the U.S. deployment of drones in the area 
and the killings that result from them actually support the legal conclusion that the 
United States is engaged in an armed conflict in that area.’460 
This is a worrying contention regarding the existence of an armed conflict, in which Ohlin 
suggests that simply because drones strikes are deployed in an area in countries such as Niger 
which are not regarded as ‘hot battlefields’, and because civilian and other casualties result 
from these strikes, an armed conflict exists. 
Targeting in such areas, which are not located in a ‘hot battlefield’ or an ‘area of active 
hostilities’, such as that in Afghanistan -  but which the U.S. contends are included in a non-
international armed conflict – are, according to the U.S., subject to the criteria set out in the 
2013 Presidential Policy Guidance, entitled ‘U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the Use 
of Counterterrorism Operations Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities’, 
known as ‘the PPG’.461 This short document seems to support Ohlin’s stance regarding the 
spread of the non-international armed conflict. The document sets out a number of 
preconditions which should be met before lethal force is used ‘outside areas of active 
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hostilities’ (the PPG will be discussed in more detail in the next section on the rules related to 
targeting).  As Hernández points out, the geographic scope of the PPG is not at all clear: 
‘The principles are said to apply ‘outside the United States and areas of active 
hostilities’, but does that include Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia? If not, is the 
international law of armed conflict exhaustive? It is true that the US Supreme Court 
maintained in Hamdan v Rumsfeld that the war on terror is a non-international armed 
conflict; even if that is the case, however the PPG seemingly applies beyond areas of 
active hostilities, in some sort of penumbral wider zone where international 
humanitarian law may not apply.462 
Echoing the U.S. position,  Ohlin dismisses any claims that there are geographical constraints 
on non-international armed conflict and argues forcefully that the U.S. is involved in a non-
international armed conflict in Yemen and in Afghanistan, in Pakistan and Somalia, and 
anywhere else where militants of al-Qaeda and affiliated forces are located and found to 
represent an imminent threat.463 
Ohlin’s reasoning for this is twofold: in the first place, he claims that the ICTY, in the Tadic 
case, ‘rejected the hot battlefield argument’ because: 
‘In arguing that the law of war applied in a much broader area, the court concluded that 
the “geographical and temporal frame of reference for international armed conflicts is 
similarly broad…[because Common Article 3 applies] outside the narrow geographical 
context of the actual theatre of combat operations”’.464 
In fact, non-international armed conflicts do not, for Ohlin, hold any geographical limitations. 
Ohlin agrees with the conclusion of the Court in Hamden v. Rumsfeld that non-international 
armed conflicts ‘include all armed conflicts that do not fall into the category international 
armed conflicts, regardless of whether they are geographically limited to government territory’. 
Ohlin further contests that those supporting a ‘restricted geography of armed conflict’ do so 
under a ‘mistaken reading’ of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. This ‘mistaken’ 
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reading assumes that Common Article 3 was ‘trying to define non-international armed 
conflicts’. 465 
While Ohlin accepts the U.S. contention that it is engaged in a non-international armed conflict 
with al-Qaeda and affiliated forces, he goes so far as to deny that Common Article 3 applies to 
this conflict at all. Ohlin contends that Common Article 3 was merely an attempt to regulate 
certain non-international armed conflicts – i.e. internal conflicts which take place ‘solely on 
the territory of a contracting party and to which the Geneva protections then apply’. He 
maintains that for other non-international armed conflicts, including the armed conflict against 
al-Qaeda and affiliated forces, ‘the customary norms of the law of war apply’ only.466 
Regarding the ‘internationalisation’ of a non-international armed conflict, Akande argues that 
in extraterritorial conflicts with non-state armed groups, in the case where the State on whose 
territory the non-state armed group is operating (the ‘territorial State’) has consented to the use 
of force by the foreign state, a non-international armed conflict takes place, as ‘the consent of 
the territorial state has the effect that there are not two opposing states involved in the 
conflict’.467 However, in the event that the territorial state has not consented to the foreign 
State’s use of force on its territory, an international armed conflict occurs. This is so because 
any use of force by the foreign state on the territory of the territorial state without the latter’s 
consent is: 
‘a use of force against the territorial state. This is so even if the use of force is not 
directed against the governmental structures of the territorial state, or the purpose of the 
use of force is not to coerce the territorial state in any particular way.’468 
This position is, according to Akande, supported both by state practice and the jurisprudence 
of international tribunals, in particular by the International Court of Justice in the Armed 
Activities case, specifically in the following paragraph: 
“The Court considers that the obligations arising under the principles of non-use of 
force and non-intervention were violated by Uganda even if the objectives of Uganda 
were not to overthrow President Kabila, and were directed to securing towns and 
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airports for reason of its perceived security needs, and in support of the parallel activity 
of those engaged in civil war.”469 
Akande further argues that article 2 (4) of the UN Charter prohibits the use of force ‘against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of other States’, and writes that, given that 
States routinely invoke Article 51 of the UN Charter when using force abroad, ‘even against 
non-state armed groups’, this indicates ‘an acceptance that article 2 (4) is engaged and that 
absent Article 51, the use of force would be against the territorial integrity of another State’.470 
According to Akande, then, any use of force by one state on the territory of another, without 
the consent of the latter, gives rise to an international armed conflict. He believes that it does 
not matter whether the territorial state responds forcefully to the foreign state’s use of force,  
because, as Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions says, the Conventions apply even if 
only one of the parties recognises a state of war. As to whether two different categories of 
armed conflict could, in such a situation, run parallel to each other – i.e. a non-international 
armed conflict between the foreign state and the non-state group, and an international armed 
conflict between the foreign state and the territorial state, Akande rejects this possibility, 
writing: 
‘…the important point here is that the conflict with the non-state group will be so bound 
up with the international armed conflict between the two States that it will be impossible 
to separate the two conflicts. With respect to the conduct of hostilities and targeting in 
general, every act of targeting by the foreign State will not only be an attempt to target 
the non-state group (or members thereof) but will also at one and the same time be a 
use of armed force against the territorial State because it is a use of force over that 
State’s territory without its consent. This means that every act of targeting or opening 
fire must comply with the law of international armed conflicts.’471 
This position is supported by Milanovic, who agrees that a lack of consent from the territorial 
states ‘internationalizes’ a conflict.472 Lubell, however, argues that the two different categories 
of armed conflict can indeed exist alongside each other, dismissing the importance that Akande 
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places on the consent of the territorial state to the use of force by the foreign state.473 Lubell 
writes that the question of classification of a conflict rests not on the issue of consent, but rather 
on a ‘factual determination of hostilities’, and states that the position taken by Akande – that 
any use of force by a State on the territory of another without the consent of the territorial state 
results in an international armed conflict – ‘unnecessarily mixes the jus ad bellum and the jus 
in bello’, which can ‘lead to problematic results’, reiterating that ‘the underlying question for 
classification must be that of identifying the parties to the conflict, rather than consent’.474 This 
removes somewhat the issue arising in classification in cases where the existence of the consent 
of the ‘territorial’ State is either not known, or where contradictory statements have been 
communicated, such as in the case of Pakistan.  
Given the lack of agreement regarding the classification of the conflict with al-Qaeda and 
affiliated forces, we must examine the law relating to targeting under the international 
humanitarian law applicable to non-international armed conflicts. 
 
Targeting in Non-International Armed Conflicts 
‘Lawful targeting begins with lawful targets’.475 This simple statement belies the many 
difficulties in ascertaining who, or what, is a lawful target. Targeting in non-international 
armed conflicts, already onerous pre-2001, is an increasingly complicated matter. As the 
United States maintains that it is involved in a non-international armed conflict with al-Qaeda 
and affiliated forces, I examine targeting rules under the international humanitarian law 
applying to NIACs, paying particular attention to the International Committee of the Red 
Cross’s 2009  Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under 
International Humanitarian Law, as well as the U.S. Department of Defense Law of War 
Manual, published in 2015. This examination proceeds in two parts, beginning with a 
discussion of the ‘continuous combat function’ criteria set out in the Interpretive Guidance, 
followed by a review of the rules related to civilian direct participation in hostilities. I then 
assess the United States’ targeted killing programme under these rules.  
In a non-international armed conflict, two categories of targetable persons – aside from those 
in state armed forces - are generally identified: members of organised armed groups, and 
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civilians directly participating in hostilities. Yet the U.S. Department of Defense’s ‘Report on 
Process for Determining Targets of Lethal or Capture Operations (U)’ states the following: 
‘Another operational requirement is near certainty that non-combatants will not be 
injured or killed. Non-combatants are understood to be individuals who may not be 
made the object of attack under the law of armed conflict. The term “non-combatant” 
does not include an individual who is targetable as part of a belligerent party to an 
armed conflict, an individual who is taking a direct part in hostilities, or an individual 
who is targetable in the exercise of national self-defense.’476 
An individual ‘targetable in the exercise of national self-defence’ is not a category of persons 
that exists under international humanitarian law. Under international humanitarian law, two 
broad categories of individual exist: combatants, and civilians. Civilian cannot be targeted 
unless they are directly participating in hostilities. As numerous commentators have pointed 
out, the creation of such category of persons is indicative of the confusion of the ‘jus in bello 
with the jus ad bellum’,477 suggests ‘the elongation of the category of “indirect participants” in 
hostilities’,478 and is ‘rather more expansive’ than the continuous combat function standard 
envisioned by the ICRC in its Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities, discussed in the next section.479 As this criterion has no basis under international 
humanitarian law, individuals targeted in the course of a non-international armed conflict must 
be assumed to fall into the category of member of a non-organised armed group, or the category 
of civilian directly participating in hostilities.  
 
Organised armed groups and Continuous Combat Function (CCF) 
The first category, ‘members of organised armed groups’, can be difficult to clarify in 
traditional situations of non-international armed conflict. In non-international armed conflict, 
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members of organised armed groups are a distinct and separate category from civilians. Article 
51 (3) of AP1, dealing with Direct Participation in Hostilities, states: 
‘Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, unless and for such time 
as they take a direct part in hostilities.’480 
While Article 13 of Additional Protocol II states: 
‘Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Part, unless and for such time as 
they take a direct part in hostilities.’481 
Traditionally, members of organised armed groups were often identifiable through the very 
characteristics that allowed the group to be classified as an organised armed group, as discussed 
in the previous section on classification of conflicts, in that members of the group may have 
worn a uniform or other distinctive emblem, and clearly followed orders in a hierarchical 
manner. Yet ascertaining membership of organised armed groups often still proved difficult. 
The waters become muddier still in cases concerning non-state armed groups, and particularly 
the transnational terrorists groups dealt with here. Such non-state armed groups tend not to 
distinguish themselves from the general population through the wearing of uniforms or 
emblems. Regarding organisation, and as noted in the previous section,  many of these non-
state ‘organised’ armed groups are not at all ‘organised’ in the sense usually understood, with 
the groups often ‘appearing to be amorphous groups of like-minded individuals rather than a 
well-organized structure’.482 As such, membership is often ‘informal and fluid’ and lacking 
any external identifying characteristics, making it particularly difficult to distinguish between 
members of non-state armed groups and the general civilian population.483 Grant and Huntley 
deem this issue to be ‘one of, if not the most, significant challenges on the modern 
battlefield’.484  
Such organisation, or identifiable lack thereof, also poses challenges for purposes of 
proportionality assessments. How can we identify the relative value of targets in the absence 
of clear, hierarchical structures? The Obama administration attempted to deal with this issue 
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by requiring that all individuals targeted (whether in personality or signature strikes) were high-
level militants, posing a continuing, imminent threat to the national security of the United 
States of America.485 Under the Trump administration, the continuing, imminent threat 
requirement has allegedly been rescinded, and strikes can target ‘low-level foot soldiers.’486 
 
Direct Participation in Hostilities and Membership of Non-State Armed Groups 
The character of many existing conflicts today, for example in Yemen, in Libya, and in Syria, 
has made the question of identifying which individuals are citizens directly participating in 
hostilities, and which individuals are members of non-state armed groups, increasingly 
complex. The ICRC’s 2009 Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law (hereafter ‘the Interpretive Guidance’) thus 
attempts to address many of the issues faced when dealing with direct participation in hostilities 
and membership in non-state armed groups in the current context. There has been, as will be 
shown, some disagreement over a number of the finer points in the text, but the Interpretive 
Guidance remains one of the most important guiding documents on direct participation in 
hostilities in recent years. As is noted in the title of this document, it is an ‘interpretive 
guidance’ only, and as such can be regarded as ‘soft law’ – it is not a binding interpretation of 
the relevant rules.  
Regarding membership in non-state armed groups, the Interpretive Guidance states: 
‘For the practical purposes of the principle of distinction… membership in such groups 
cannot depend on abstract affiliation, family ties, or other criteria prone to error, 
arbitrariness or abuse. Instead, membership must depend on whether the continuous 
function assumed by an individual corresponds to that collectively exercised by the 
group as a whole, namely the conduct of hostilities on behalf of a non-State party to the 
conflict. Consequently, under IHL, the decisive criterion for individual membership in 
an organized armed group is whether a person assumes a continuous function for the 
group involving his or her direct participation in hostilities’.487 
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The Interpretive Guidance later states categorically that: 
‘In non-international armed conflict, organized armed groups constitute the armed 
forces of a non-State party to the conflict and consists only of individuals whose 
continuous function it is to take a direct part in hostilities (“continuous combat 
function”). 488 
This relatively new term, in fact first introduced in the Interpretive Guidance, is known as the 
‘continuous combat function’ (CCF) standard, a somewhat controversial category in an already 
controversial document.489 Such a category does not exist in any treaty or multilateral 
convention, but is now ‘widely considered to be emblematic of an emerging norm of customary 
international law’.490  This test separates members of organised armed groups directly 
participating in hostilities from civilians who directly participate in hostilities on a ‘merely 
spontaneous, sporadic or unorganized basis’.491 
Of course, a CCF standard comes with its own problems, primarily as to how a ‘continuous’ 
combat function should be defined. According to the Interpretive Guidance, continuous combat 
function ‘requires lasting integration into an organized armed group acting as the armed forces 
of a non-State party to an armed conflict.’ Thus: 
…individuals whose continuous function involves the preparation, execution, or 
command of acts or operations amounting to direct participation in hostilities are 
assuming a continuous combat functions. An individual recruited, trained and equipped 
by such a group to continuously and directly participate in hostilities on its behalf can 
be considered to assume a continuous combat function even before he or she first carries 
out a hostile act…’.492 
The Interpretive Guidance also sets out those individuals who may be associated with, or who 
‘continuously accompany or support an organized armed group’, but who should not be 
considered members of that group and whose function ‘does not involve direct participation in 
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hostilities’. Such individuals include ‘recruiters, trainers, financiers and propagandists’. Whilst 
their activities may ‘continuously contribute to the general war effort of a non-State party’, 
they ‘remain civilians assuming support functions, similar to private contractors and civilian 
employees accompanying State armed forces’.493 
How far this ‘continuous combat function’ can be stretched is a matter of some debate. As 
noted by Pejic, there has been some criticism of the idea of ‘continuous combat function’ by 
those who believe that the category is ‘based on status rather than behaviour as the basis for 
targeting’.494 Alston, in his role as Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary 
executions, wrote in his 2010 study on targeted killings that: 
‘…the creation of CCF category is, de facto, a status determination that is questionable 
given the specific treaty language that limits direct participation to “for such time as” 
as opposed to “all the time”.’495 
Alston also believes that the CCF category ‘raises the risk of erroneous targeting of someone 
who, for example, may have disengaged from their function.’ As such, ‘if States are to accept 
this category, the onus will be on them to show that the evidentiary basis is strong.’496 Pejic 
considers Alston’s critique to be misplaced, ‘as the Guidance does not – and could not – 
introduce combatant status into non-international armed conflict.’ She writes that, ‘on the 
contrary, as the very term indicates, membership in an armed group is linked to the continuous 
combat function a person carries out.’497   
Much of the criticism surrounding the continuous combat function criteria revolves around the 
Interpretive Guidance’s statement that those who ‘continuously support or accompany’ an 
armed group, including recruiters, trainers and financiers, are not legitimate targets.498 The 
United States believes that the CCF standard ‘creates a disparity because it does not set the 
same standard for members of regular armed forces and those of organised armed groups, who 
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should not merit greater protections.’499 Ohlin puts forward a similar argument, using the 
example of whether an ‘al-Qaeda cook’ could be targeted under the CCF criteria, noting that: 
‘In one sense, a cook does not intuitively sound like the type of occupation that should 
be considered as a continuous combat function. However, if the underlying principle is 
one of symmetry, it should be noted that uniformed cooks in the U.S. Army are subject 
to lawful attack at any moment in time’.500 
Here, both the United States and Ohlin wilfully misunderstand the point of the continuous 
combat function idea. The underlying principle of the continuous combat function standard is 
not one of symmetry; it is intended to ensure the protection of civilians who directly participate 
in hostilities on a sporadic basis, rather than on a continuous basis as a member of an organized 
armed group. The continuous combat function standard should be tightly construed. It is not a 
military status designation. The disparity between members of regular armed forces and those 
of organised armed groups must exist because members of organised armed groups can regain 
their civilian status. As Crawford explains: 
‘The idea of “continuous combat function” was adopted to exclude certain types of 
participation in a non-international armed conflict from falling within the scope of 
DPH. The concern raised by the ICRC – and a number of the experts – was the 
possibility of equating membership in an organized armed group with direct 
participation, that is to say, membership in an organized armed group, in and of itself, 
should not per se constitute DPH. The result of such an approach might be that an overly 
broad definition of membership in an armed group could result in vast portions of the 
population being considered as taking a direct part in hostilities. Concerns were also 
raised that such an extension of the concept of DPH beyond the commission of hostile 
acts would blur the distinction in IHL made between “loss of protection based on 
conduct (civilians) and on status or function ( members of armed forces of organised 
armed groups.’501 
Schmitt, in a criticism similar to Ohlin’s, which harks back to my earlier discussion on the 
balance between military necessity and humanity, holds that application of the continuous 
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combat function ‘badly distorts the military necessity – humanitarian balance of IHL.’ 
Schmitt’s argument here is similar to Ohlin’s example of an al-Qaeda cook: 
‘A requirement of continuous combat function precludes attack on members of an 
organized armed group even in the fact of absolute certainty as to membership. In 
contrast, membership alone in a state’s military suffices, even when there is absolute 
certainty that the individual to be attacked performs no functions that would amount to 
the equivalent of direct participation.’ 502  
Despite the similar criticisms put forward by both Ohlin and Schmitt, they each find a different 
result forthcoming. Ohlin contends that the continuous combat function exception ‘constitutes 
wide support for the U.S. program of targeted killings against al-Qa’ida militants’.503 Schmitt, 
however, finds the continuous combat function exception much more restraining, writing that 
‘it makes no sense to treat an individual who joins a group that has the express purpose of 
conducting hostilities a civilian than it would to distinguish between lawful combatants’.504 
 
The Continuous Combat Function standard in U.S. courts and administrative interpretation 
The U.S. courts and administration have not embraced the CCF standard, notes Ohlin, but 
rather have invoked the concept of ‘functional membership’ in an attempt to provide further 
clarification as to who the U.S. may or may not target in relation to non-state armed groups.505 
Functional membership criteria looks to ‘whether the individual is part of a chain of command 
and participates in the giving or taking of orders, thus establishing that he is a functional 
member of a non-state organization’s military wing’, which, in application ‘allows a court to 
determine whether someone is a continuous combat fighter in a non-state military organization 
by determining whether the individual is part of that military organization’s chain of 
command.’506 The concept of ‘functional membership’ is somewhat wider than that put forward 
in the Interpretive Guidance’s continuous combat function concept. Two of the U.S. court cases 
dealing with the detention of suspected Taliban and al-Qaeda members elaborate on this 
‘functional membership’ test. In Gherebi v. Obama, the court stated that: 
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‘The key question is whether an individual “receive[s] and execute[s] orders” from the 
enemy force’s combat apparatus, not whether he is an al-Qaeda fighter. Thus, an al-
Qaeda member tasked with housing, feeding or transporting al-Qaeda fighters could be 
detained as part of the enemy armed forces notwithstanding his lack of involvement in 
the actual fighting itself, but an al-Qaeda doctor or cleric, or the father of an al-Qaeda 
fighter who shelters his son out of familial loyalty, could not be detained assuming such 
individuals had no independent role in al-Qaeda’s chain of command.’ 
It further stated: 
‘With these non-exclusive limiting principles in mind, the Court agrees with the 
government that “[i]t is neither possible nor advisable to define the precise nature and 
degree of ‘substantial support’, or the precise characteristics of ‘associated forces,’ that 
are or would be sufficient to bring persons and organizations” within the government’s 
proposed standard for detention.507  
In Hamlily v. Obama, the Court said: 
‘With respect to the criteria to be used in determining whether someone was “part of” 
the “Taliban or al Qaida or associated forces”… this Court will, by necessity, employ 
an approach that is more functional than formal, as there are no settled criteria for 
determining who is a “part of” an organization such as al Qaeda…The key inquiry, 
then, is not necessarily whether one self-identifies as a member of the organization 
(although this could be relevant in some cases), but whether the individual functions or 
participates within or under the command structure of the organization i.e., whether he 
receives and executes orders or directions.’508 
Under the United States ‘functional membership’ test, then, it seems correct to assert that if an 
al-Qaeda cook can be detained ‘as part of the enemy forces’, then he or she could certainly also 
be targeted.  
In 2010, Koh, in his former capacity as Legal Adviser to the U.S. Department of State, 
commented on the administration’s ‘functional’ membership test, noting that the federal courts 
had endorsed it. He also, however, stated that the administration disagreed with the 
International Committee of the Red Cross ‘on some of the particulars’, before adding that it is 
                                                           
507 Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.C. 2009) 69. 
508 Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.C. 2009) 77. 
  126 
still ‘consistent with the approach taken in the targeting context by the ICRC in its recent study 
on Direct Participation in Hostilities’ (i.e. the Interpretive Guidance).509  
The continuous combat function standard put forward by the Interpretive Guidance is currently 
the most practical approach to take when ascertaining who is or who is not a member of a non-
state organised armed group involved in a non-international armed conflict. While not ideal, it 
appears to be the most realistic interpretation of membership of non-state armed groups that 
currently available, with the caveat that, as Alston says, there should be a heavy onus on States 
accepting the CCF standard to prove that there is a strong evidentiary basis for identifying an 
individual as having a continuous combat function.  
The functional membership test put forward by the U.S., however, is overbroad. As Akande 
notes, with the Interpretive Guidance’s continuous combat function criteria, the ICRC has 
‘taken a narrow view of the scope of direct participation’, akin to that ‘suggested by the text 
and structure of the provisions which deal with direct participation in hostilities’:  
‘The text of the relevant provisions speak not of participation in armed conflict but of 
participation in hostilities, something narrower than being involved in the conflict in 
general. Participation in hostilities suggests participation in military operations. 
Furthermore, participation must be ‘direct’. So not all participation in military 
operations means loss of protection from attack.’510 
The functional membership test ignores this, seemingly assuming that being involved in the 
conflict in general is akin to participation in hostilities. This raises doubts as to the United 
States compliance with the principle of distinction – for if anyone within the organisation who 
‘receives and executes orders or directions’ is assumed to have functional membership, the 
logical conclusion is that any member of al-Qaeda or affiliated forces, regardless of their role 
within their organisation, can be targeted. Indeed, the U.S. maintains that there is ‘no such thing 
as civilian membership’ of organisations such as al-Qaeda, meaning of course that the U.S. 
government ‘has not to evaluate when, if ever, any “civilian” members of al-Qaeda may be 
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targeted.’511 Such claims necessitate an examination of when civilians can be said to be 
‘directly participating’ in hostilities, and thus become lawful targets. 
 
Civilians and Direct Participation in Hostilities 
Regarding those civilians who participate directly in hostilities but are not considered to be 
members of non-state organised armed groups, the Interpretive Guidance sets out the following 
criteria which a specific act must cumulatively meet in order to qualify as direct participation 
in hostilities: 
1. the act must be likely to adversely affect the military operations or military capacity of 
a party to an armed conflict or, alternatively, to inflict death, injury, or destruction on 
persons or objects protected against direct attack (threshold of harm), and 
2. there must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm likely to result either 
from that act, or from a coordinated military operation of which that act constitutes an 
integral part (direct causation), and 
3. the act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required threshold of harm in 
support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another (belligerent nexus). 512 
 
Akande writes that this narrow view ‘is also suggested by the purpose of the rule limiting the 
targeting of civilians to those who take a direct part in hostilities’, arguing that: 
‘There is a distinction to be made between acts of participation in hostilities and acts 
which generally sustain the war effort. This is a crucial distinction as it may be the case 
that much activity in a state in armed conflict may go towards sustaining the war effort. 
To permit anyone who is involved in the war sustaining effort to be a target of lethal 
weapons is to allow for unrestricted warfare – practically everyone could be a target. 
This would be a regressive move.’513 
This of course begs the question as to when direct participation in hostilities begins and ends. 
According to the Interpretive Guidance, direct participation commences with ‘measures 
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preparatory to execution of a specific act of direct participation in hostilities’, and continues 
with the deployment to and from the location of the execution of that specific act, where these 
actions ‘constitute an integral part of such a specific act or operation.’514 Preparatory measures 
includes those measures of a specifically military nature, aiming to carry out a specific hostile 
act. Preparatory measures aiming to establish the general capacity to carry out unspecified 
hostile acts do not amount to direct participation in hostilities.515  
The issue of temporality in direct participation is a fraught one, and has been so for a long 
time.516 Schmitt notes that in the 2006 Targeted Killings Case, the Israeli government argued 
that the phrase “for such time” did not reflect customary international law, ‘but rather was 
simply a treaty restriction that limited only states party to the relevant instruments (principally 
the Additional Protocols).’ However, the Israeli Supreme Court ‘rejected this contention by 
correctly noting that the issue was not whether the “for such time” limitation was customary 
but rather how to interpret it.’517 Consensus was not reached by the experts involved in the 
Interpretive Guidance as to the specifics of when direct participation begins and ends. While 
all were agreed that the “for such time” standard was customary in nature, there was no 
agreement as to what constitutes ‘preparatory measures’ or ‘deployment’.518 
The Interpretive Guidance also indirectly addresses the concept of a ‘continuing imminent’ 
threat, one of the targeted killing programme’s most criticised constructs. It states: 
‘In operational reality, it would be impossible to determine with a sufficient degree of 
reliability whether civilians not currently preparing or executing a hostile act have 
previously done so on a persistently recurring basis and whether they have the 
continued intent to do so again. Basing continuous loss of protection on such 
speculative criteria would inevitably result in erroneous or arbitrary attacks against 
civilians, thus undermining their protection which is at the heart of IHL’.519 
The U.S. itself defines ‘direct participation’ in somewhat broader terms. This is probably best 
demonstrated in the U.S. Department of Defense’ Law of War Manual (hereafter ‘the Manual’), 
published, following decades of work, in 2015. The Manual states that it is lawful to target 
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civilians who ‘effectively and substantially contribute to an adversary’s ability to conduct or 
sustain combat operations.’520 It further asserts that the lawfulness of attacking a civilian may 
depend on ‘whether the [civilian’s] act is of comparable or greater value to a party’s war effort 
than acts that are commonly regarded as taking a direct part in hostilities.’521 As Haque 
correctly points out, no matter how valuable a civilians contribution to the war effort might be, 
it ‘is not legally equivalent to direct participation in hostilities’.522 The Manual’s stance on this 
also raises questions regarding the principle of proportionality, which I will discuss further into 
this section.  
The Manual does not adopt the Interpretive Guidance’s three-part test for direct participation, 
but instead ‘lays out a range of activities relevant to the DPH determination’.523 In this range 
of activities, we find, on the one hand ‘actions that are, by their nature and purpose, intended 
to cause actual harm to the enemy’ and on the other hand, actions that constitute ‘general 
support that members of the civilian population provide to their State’s war effort’. Santicola 
notes that the Manual thus differs from the Interpretive Guidance in two important respects. 
Firstly, and as stated earlier, while the Interpretive Guidance ‘limits the DPH evaluation of 
harm caused by the civilian’s actions to the detriment caused to the opponent’, the DoD Manual 
‘calls also for consideration of the benefit provided to the group being supported.’524 Secondly, 
while the guidance: 
‘…specifically excludes “indirect” support to combat operations from its definition of 
DPH, the manual leaves room for extension to what may be, arguably, labelled indirect 
activities insofar as it calls for consideration of “the degree to which the act contributes 
to a party’s military action against the opposing party”.’525 
This overbroad reading propounded in the Manual has since found support amongst numerous 
commentators. Bracknell, for instance, argues that civilians driving ISIL oil trucks (many of 
whom, he notes, have been forced or coerced into doing so) which are being moved ‘to generate 
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economic benefits for ISIL and not to directly enable combat operations’ are targetable, 
because: 
‘While the nexus and causation are slightly more attenuated, they warrant the 
determination that civilian drivers are directly supporting ISIL combat activity and can, 
therefore, be targeted…targeting oil tankers transporting fuel to generate revenue is 
virtually identical to targeting those moving fuel to ISIL on the battlefield.’526 
This analysis is, says Bracknell, ‘consistent with the U.S. view, as expressed in Paragraph 5.9 
of the DoD Law of War Manual’.527 As Santicola has demonstrated, Bracknell’s assessment is 
correct if we agree with the Manual’s interpretation. It is incorrect, however, if we agree with 
the Interpretive Guidance.  
 
Proportionality and distinction 
Regardless of the views taken in the above debate, all targeting decisions must also comply 
with the principles of proportionality and distinction. The principle of proportionality is 
codified in Articles 51 (5) (b) and 57 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. 
Article 51 (5) (b) prohibits: 
‘an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.’528 
As the ICRC notes, state practice ‘establishes proportionality as a norm of customary 
international law applicable in both international and non-international armed conflict.’529 
The U.S. Department of Defense Law of War Manual states that ‘proportionality may be 
defined as the principle that even where one is justified in acting, one must not act in a way 
that is unreasonable or excessive.’530 It further explains:  
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‘Proportionality most often refers to the jus in bello standard applicable to persons 
conducting attacks. Proportionality considerations, however, may also be understood 
to apply to the party subject to attack, which must take feasible precautions to reduce 
the risk of incidental harm.’531 
The interpretations of proportionality presented in the Manual are, however, quite worrying. In 
two separate pieces on the Manual’s treatment of the concept, Hathaway and Lederman state 
that the Manual ‘threatens to upend proportionality’ and ‘threatens to unravel the 
proportionality rule through the back door’, respectively.532 This is due to two principles in the 
Manual which the above authors identify and discuss. First, section 5.5.3.2 asserts that ‘under 
customary international law, no legal presumption of civilian status exists for persons or 
objects’. Secondly, the Manual repeatedly proposes that: 
‘when civilians – or other “protected” persons who cannot themselves be targeted – 
are in or near lawful military targets, they have in some sense “accepted the risk” of 
death or further injury due to their proximity to military operations, and that therefore 
any foreseeable harm to those civilians and other protected persons need not be taken 
into account in assessing whether an attack would comply with the principle of 
proportionality.’533 
Furthermore, Lederman notes that section 5.3.1 ‘goes so far as to suggest that the laws of war 
impose an affirmative obligation upon such persons to avoid becoming collateral damage’, 
stating: 
‘Civilians also may share in the responsibility to take precautions for their own 
protection.’534 
Such an ‘assumption of risk’ argument is not supported in either international law or state 
practice. As Hathaway writes: 
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‘if assumption of risk is sufficient to disqualify a civilian from consideration in a 
proportionality analysis, then any civilian in the vicinity of a military object no longer 
counts for purposes of a proportionality analysis.’ 
This assessment of the proportionality principle, combined with the U.S.’ expansive approach 
to the targeting of war-sustaining objects, as discussed earlier, combine to form a ‘toxic brew.’ 
Ultimately, under the Manual’s interpretation, if an action is deemed to be in the United States’ 
anticipated concrete and direct military advantage, despite the presence of a disproportionate 
number of civilians, the action could go ahead anyway because civilians in the vicinity of the 
area would have ‘assumed the risk’. This makes the principle of proportionality almost 
meaningless.  
The principle of distinction, meanwhile, is codified in Article 48 of Additional Protocol I, 
which states: ‘The Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian 
population and combatants.’535 It, too, is a norm of customary international law applicable in 
both international and non-international armed conflicts.536 On this subject, the Manual states:  
‘Distinction may be understood as encompassing two sets of reinforcing duties. Parties 
to a conflict must apply a framework of legal classes for persons and objects, by: (1) 
discriminating in conducting attacks against the enemy; and (2) distinguishing a party’s 
own persons and objects.’537 
The principle of distinction is probably the most important principle in international 
humanitarian law; indeed, Schmitt says that the distinction between civilians and combatants 
is ‘one of the seminal purposes of the law’, while Solis describes it as ‘the most significant 
battlefield concept a combatant must observe.’538 Aside from distinguishing between 
combatants and non-combatants, parties to the conflict must also distinguish between civilian 
objects and military objectives.  
As noted earlier, distinguishing lawful targets – that is, members of organised armed groups 
and civilians directly participating in hostilities – is particularly difficult in the context of non-
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international armed conflicts. Distinguishing military objectives from civilian objects also 
presents further challenges in the context of non-international armed conflict. However, 
difficulty does not mean responsibility can be shirked. There is an onus on the State party to 
the conflict to ‘take reasonable steps to determine whether or not a person or object is a 
legitimate target.’539 The principle of distinction is of particular importance in the targeted 
killing programme.  
 
The targeted killing programme and targeting: personality and signature strikes 
If we accept that the United States is in a non-international armed conflict with al-Qaeda and 
associated forces, do their targeting decisions stand up to scrutiny? Two main types of targeted 
killing take place in the targeted killing programme. These are known as ‘personality’ strikes 
and ‘signature’ strikes. ‘Personality’ strikes involve identifying a high-value target, placing the 
individual on a ‘kill list’, and vetting him or her closely before striking. These lists are presented 
to President Obama, who makes the final decision as to whether a drone strike should go ahead, 
unlike signature strikes which do not require his personal approval.540  
Many of the targeted killings carried out by the CIA are not personality strikes, and are not 
‘targeted’ at all, in the sense that ‘targeted’ is generally taken to mean. In fact, the majority of 
drone strikes are what are known as ‘signature’ strikes. Signature strikes, also referred to as 
‘crowd kills’ or ‘terror attack disruption strikes’ (TADS) are strikes conducted against 
individuals whose identity is not known but who are targeted ‘based on a pattern of activity’ – 
that is, those whose behaviour matches a ‘pre-identified “signature” of behaviour that the U.S. 
links to militant activity’. Whilst what exactly constitutes this type of behaviour remains 
classified, it is believed to include such behaviour as ‘a gathering of men, teenaged to middle-
aged, travelling in convoy or carrying weapons’541  or ‘loading a truck with what appears to be 
bomb-making material or even crossing a border multiple times in a short period.’542 Such a 
system is open to much error, particularly in countries such as Yemen, where ‘every Yemeni 
is armed,’ making it even harder to distinguish between civilians and those involved in terrorist 
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activity.543 Apparently, there is a joke in the U.S. State department which says that when the 
CIA sees ‘three guys doing jumping jacks’, they decide it is a terrorist training camp.544 In 
practice, this means that signature strikes: 
‘…in effect counts all military-age males in a strike zone as combatants, according to 
several administration officials, unless there is explicit intelligence posthumously 
proving them innocent.’ 545 
This section aims to clarify the legality or otherwise of both personality strikes and signature 
strikes under the international humanitarian law applying to non-international armed conflicts.  
Whether personality strikes or signature strikes satisfy these rules and the principles of 
proportionality and distinction must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. In this area, too, the 
lack of transparency surrounding the targeted killing programme makes such a determination 
very difficult. The Obama administration has repeatedly stated that the U.S. adheres to the 
principles of distinction and proportionality in every case in which the U.S. takes military 
action, whether in or outside an area of active hostilities.546 It has also specifically affirmed 
that ‘targeted strikes conform to the principle of necessity… Targeted strikes conform to the 
principles of distinction. Targeted strikes conform to the principle of proportionality.’547 Yet 
without specific information regarding individual strikes, how are we to determine whether 
strikes do actually satisfy the principles of proportionality and distinction? For the moment, we 
must rely solely on anecdotal evidence and the reportage of figures surrounding civilian deaths 
provided by organisations such as The Bureau of Investigative Journalism and Reprieve. As 
Bachmann correctly concludes, the lack of transparency is itself a violation of international 
law’ because, as Alston explains: 
‘Assertions by Obama administration officials, as well as by many scholars, that these 
operations comply with international standards are undermined by the total absence of 
any forms of credible transparency or verifiable accountability… This in turn means 
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that the United States cannot possibly satisfy its obligations under international law to 
ensure accountability for its use of lethal force, either under IHRL or IHL.’548 
 
Personality strikes 
If we assume the existence of a non-international armed conflict and accept the continuous 
combat function test, targeting is relatively unproblematic once the individual or individuals 
targeted have been established as carrying out a continuous combat function. A strike against 
a known individual or group of individuals will comply with international humanitarian law 
once it adheres to the principles of proportionality and distinction. Hence, personality strikes 
are not generally considered to be an issue in this context. It is when personality strikes 
disregard the principles of proportionality and distinction, or where they have incorrectly 
identified the individual to be targeted, that problems arise. For example, personality strikes 
have raised issues around proportionality – notably, the charity Reprieve has alleged that some 
1,147 people were killed in attempts to target 41 specifically named individuals.549 
Yet personality strikes should not be taken as entirely unproblematic in the context of the war 
on terror. As Bachman pointed out, ‘who is on the Obama administration’s kill list is classified, 
as is the criteria for being placed on it.’550 The same applies to personality strikes carried out 
under the Trump administration. 
 Furthermore: 
‘…once added, these individuals will have no knowledge of it or any way to challenge 
it. Therefore, it remains possible that particular personality strikes may violate the 
principle of distinction by targeting and killing individuals who were wrongfully added 
to the kill list.’551   
 
Signature strikes 
Signature strikes are more problematic, for a number of reasons. As previously stated, signature 
strikes target individuals whose identity is not known but who are assumed to be functional 
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members of al-Qaeda or an affiliated force due to ‘pattern of life’ analysis. Given the 
difficulties inherent in positively identifying unknown individuals using data which may often 
be lacking or indeed, which may simply be incorrect, signature strikes may (and apparently 
often do) erroneously target individuals who are not involved in the armed conflict, and who 
do not have a continuous combat function, fulfil the U.S. functional membership test, or be 
civilians directly participating in hostilities – they may just be individuals who happen to be in 
the wrong place, at the wrong time. Signatures strikes are extremely concerning considering 
the importance of the principle of distinction, and many have voiced their worries about the 
tactic. Rogers and Hill write that ‘the U.S. turn to assessing “patterns of life” as a way to 
distinguish between enemies and non-combatants fails to meet even the most basic tests’, while 
Heyns and Knuckey describe them as ‘troubling.’552 Meanwhile, Solis contends that: 
‘When invoking the state’s targeted killing apparatus to kill a human target whose name 
is unknown, without signals intelligence or human intelligence to independently 
confirm the target’s status as an enemy fighter before he is killed, or the ability to make 
on-the-ground after-action assessments, or confirm the reliability of the signature 
targeting process, the basic requirement of distinction cannot be satisfied.’553 
Signature strikes are not in and of themselves categorically contrary to international 
humanitarian law, and should not be considered as such. As Pejic notes: 
‘The concept of signature strikes is not a legal term of art and risks creating confusion 
by suggesting the possible introduction of a new (legal) notion. The way in which this 
concept is used – i.e., in distinction to “personality” strikes – also erroneously implies 
that targeting under IHL will only be lawful if the identity of the person targeted is 
known. This requirement is not an element of the principle of distinction and would for 
the most part not be possible to fulfil in the reality of armed conflict. What is required 
is a determination that a person constitutes a lawful target, either because of a 
continuous combat function or because he or she is a civilian who is taking a direct part 
in hostilities, and sufficient evidence of either one or the other.’554 
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The next section assesses the legality of specific signatures.  
 
Assessing the legality of signatures 
Almost two decades after their first use, signature strikes remain problematic for legal analysis, 
primarily because we do not know what exactly the ‘signatures’ are that the United States use. 
In Heyns’ assessment: 
‘…the legality of such strikes depends on what the signatures are…The legal test 
remains whether there is sufficient evidence that a person is targetable under 
international humanitarian law…by virtue of having a continuous combat function or 
directly participating in hostilities…’555 
As such, the lack of transparency surrounding U.S. signature strikes is a major impediment to 
assessing the legality of these strikes.556 Heller estimates that there are ‘at least 14 distinct 
signatures’ which the U.S. believes ‘are sufficient to establish that a drone attack complies with 
the principle of distinction.’557 He asserts that establishing the legality of a signature strike 
under IHL requires answering ‘two interrelated questions’:  
‘First, was the particular signature legally sufficient to establish that the victim of the 
strike was targetable? Secondly, was the evidence sufficient to determine that the 
targeted individual was engaged in the signature behaviour?’558 
In attempting to answer the first of these questions, Heller undertakes a lengthy analysis of the 
legality of such strikes. He considers signatures such as planning attacks, transporting weapons, 
handling explosives, evidence of an al-Qaeda compound, and evidence of an al-Qaeda training 
camp as ‘always legally adequate’, while operating an AQ training camp and training to join 
AQ are ‘possibly legally adequate’. Signatures which cannot be considered as legally adequate 
are the targeting of ‘military-age males’, ‘consorting with known militants’, ‘armed men 
travelling in trucks’, and a ‘“suspicious” compound in an AQ-controlled area’.559  
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In the context of an NIAC, a strike against unknown individuals planning attacks satisfies the 
relevant requirements of direct participation in hostilities,560 while ‘both weapons and the 
means of transporting weapons, such as a truck, are legitimate military objectives’.561 Strikes 
against al-Qaeda compounds and training are similarly unproblematic, given that they would 
also be considered legitimate military targets. 562 
While Heller is correct in his assertion that the deaths of those transporting weapons would be 
‘permissible collateral damage’, he fails to note that when targeting weapons transportation, 
the transporting should be ‘an integral part of a specific military operation.’ As the Interpretive 
Guidance notes: 
‘…Individual conduct that merely builds up or maintains the capacity of a party 
to harm its adversary, or which otherwise only indirectly causes harm, is 
excluded from the concept of direct participation in hostilities… examples of 
indirect participation include scientific research and design, as well as 
production and transport of weapons and equipment unless carried out as an 
integral part of a specific military operation designed to directly cause the 
required threshold of harm.’563 
Heller’s assessment is also contentious due to the fact that the U.S. appears to be expanding its 
definition of ‘legitimate military objective’. This is exemplified in the debate, discussed earlier, 
around the targeting of ISIL oil trucks in Syria and Iraq.  Although the targeting of weapons 
and the means of transporting those weapons are legitimate military objectives, the legitimacy 
of targeting other objects – such as oil trucks, oil wells or ‘bulk cash stockpiles’ remains 
dubious.564  
On the handling of explosives, Heller suggests that strikes against individuals involved in 
bomb-making or unloading explosives are ‘clearly’ legal, ‘because the bombs and explosives 
would qualify as legitimate military objectives’.565 ‘Moreover’, he writes, ‘the location where 
the bombs were being made or the explosives stored would itself be targetable…’. 566Again, 
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this is a matter of some contention. An individual making a bomb, who does not have a 
continuous combat function but who is rather a civilian directly participating in hostilities, may 
never use the bomb – is that civilian targetable anyway? Are civilians working in munitions 
factories targetable? This is a question which the Interpretive Guidance tried to tackle. As noted 
above, the production of weapons and equipment are examples of indirect participation in 
hostilities, unless carried out as an integral part of a specific military operation. Footnote 123 
of the guidance also notes that during the expert meetings: 
‘…there was general agreement that civilian workers in an ammunitions factory are 
merely building up the capacity of a party to a conflict to harm its adversary, but do not 
directly cause harm themselves. Therefore, unlike civilians actually using the produced 
ammunition to cause harm to the adversary, such factory workers cannot be regarded 
as directly participating in hostilities.’567 
However, as Lewis and Crawford note, the experts involved in the Interpretive Guidance were 
divided on this issue, with some asserting that some bomb makers may be targetable ‘as 
continuous combat functionaries if they are providing a military capacity otherwise unavailable 
to their armed group.’568 
On the two signatures which may be legally adequate, regarding the training of fighters, as 
stated earlier, the Interpretive Guidance states that: 
‘an individual recruited, trained and equipped by such a group to continuously and 
directly participate in hostilities on its behalf can be considered to assume a CCF even 
before he or she first carries out a hostile act.’ 569 
Heller points out, however, that when targeting al-Qaeda trainees outside of a training camp, 
the U.S.: 
‘…must have evidence that the trainee is not simply a reservist, such as evidence that 
the training is for a specific military operation (not simply ‘possible operations’) or that 
the trainee has previously directly participated in hostilities.’570 
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Pothelet, in a discussion centring around the targeting of individuals by France in ISIL training 
camps aimed at training recruits for attacks in Europe, examines this issue and concludes that 
under the Interpretive Guidance, new recruits to ISIL are unlikely to qualify as assuming a 
CCF, and if considered as civilians, their training wouldn’t amount to an act of DPH, due to 
the fact that if trained for suicide missions, they will not have a continuous combat function, 
and nor will they immediately be directly participating in hostilities.571 Dunlap, however, 
disagrees, asserting that ‘there does not seem to be any state practice to establish or reinforce a 
norm that would require any distinction between ISIL trainees in a training camp based on their 
future objectives.’572 Such discussion is also relevant to U.S. targeting of al-Qaeda and other 
training camps, such as the targeting of an al-Shabab training camp in Somalia in March 
2016.573  
Each of the four signatures considered to never be legally adequate are ‘plainly inconsistent 
with the principle of distinction’.574 The ‘military-age male’ signature, for example, is ‘not 
simply brutal. It is also unlawful’.575 And while ‘consorting with known militants’ could be 
considered as ‘sympathizing’ or ‘collaborating’ with an organised armed group, ‘neither 
activity makes an individual a lawful target’.576 
Three further signatures which may be legally adequate, depending on how the U.S. interprets 
them, are also identified -  with some possible interpretations justifying a signature strike, and 
others not. These include ‘groups of armed men travelling towards conflict’,  individuals who 
‘facilitate terrorist activity’, and  ‘rest areas’. ‘Travelling towards a combat zone’ may be 
adequate ‘depending on the circumstances of the signature strike in question’. If the U.S. has 
evidence that the men are travelling to the combat zone for a specific hostile purpose, they do 
not have to wait until they reach their destination, or start fighting, to target them. Some 
examples of ‘facilitating’ activity certainly qualify as DPH: gathering military intelligence in 
enemy territory, providing ammunition to fighters during hostilities, and acting as a guide. 
However most other ‘facilitating acts’ qualify simply as ‘war-sustaining’ activities, rather than 
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DPH.577 Meanwhile, if a ‘rest area’ is already a legitimate military objective (such as a 
barracks), it is targetable, but is not targetable if the ‘rest area’ is considered to be a civilian 
house ‘that occasionally provide lodging to fighters.’578 
 
Conclusion 
Even when operating under the assumption that the United States is involved in a non-
international armed conflict with al-Qaeda and associated forces, the targeted killing 
programme remains extremely legally problematic. In many cases, it appears that targeting 
decisions fail to meet the principles of proportionality and the principles of distinction. 
Furthermore, given the United States’ overbroad ‘functional membership’ test, in many cases 
it is targeting individuals whose identity is unknown, and whose duties within an armed group 
do not equate to having a continuous combat function. The legality of signatures strikes in 
particular remains dubious, and as Heller notes, it is unlikely that the U.S. even attempts to 
make the distinction between members of organised armed groups and civilians who DPH. Nor 
has the U.S. publicly identified any temporal limits on the targetability of such individuals, 
suggesting that ‘it does not limit membership in an armed group to those who assume a CCF 
in it.’579 Solis describes signature strikes as ‘treading close to the outer edge of distinction’.  
There have been many assurances from the United States that its actions are lawful, but in the 
case of the targeted killing programme, we must remain circumspect. It is not difficult to see 
the shadow of Kriegsraison lurking in the Manual’s interpretation of proportionality, in the 
targeted killing programme’s disregard for the principle of distinction and successive 
administration’s broader targeting of war-sustaining objects. Such interpretations of 
international humanitarian law highlight the United States’ push to prioritise the principle of 
military necessity above all other aspects of the law.  
These legal interpretations become all the more problematic when examined through the lens 
of international human rights law. Despite the United States’ assertion that it is involved in an 
internationalised armed conflict with al-Qaeda and affiliated forces, it is possible that in many 
contexts, the law applicable to numerous instances of targeted killing is not international 
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humanitarian law, but international human rights law. As such, the next chapter examines the 
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Chapter Four: International Human Rights Law: Extraterritoriality, 
Armed Conflict, and the Targeted Killing Programme 
 
Having assessed the legality of the targeted killing programme in relation to the international 
humanitarian law applicable to international and non-international armed conflicts, this chapter 
examines the question of the application of international human rights law to the targeted 
killing programme. The U.S. contends it is involved in a transnational non-international armed 
conflict with al-Qaeda and affiliated forces to which international humanitarian law, and 
international humanitarian law only, applies.580 This is despite much agreement that, during 
armed conflict, international human rights law continues to apply.581 Of course, the United 
States’ reasoning regarding its apparent involvement in a non-international armed conflict with 
a transnational character is erroneous, as was discussed in detail in the previous chapter. In 
many (indeed, the majority) of cases in which targeted killings have been used, the level of 
violence simply does not cross the threshold of intensity relevant to create an armed conflict. 
Furthermore, and as has also already been established, al-Qaeda and the affiliated and/or 
associated forces to which the United States refers are not sufficiently organised or connected 
to be categorised as one ‘organised armed group.’ It is therefore reasonable to assert that the 
majority of targeted killings do not take place within the nexus of a non-international armed 
conflict. As such, the legality or otherwise of these targeted killings should not be assed under 
the rubric of international humanitarian law, but under the international human rights law 
framework.  
Before this legality can be assessed, a number of issues must be tackled. One of the principle 
issues here is whether international human rights law applies extraterritorially. This issue is 
examined first, before assessing how international human rights law applies in armed conflict 
and its relationship in such instances with international humanitarian law. The final section 
then examines the targeted killing programme itself under international human rights law. 
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Does international human rights law apply extraterritorially? The U.S. position 
As stated in previous chapters, the United States maintains that it is involved in a non-
international armed conflict with al-Qaeda and affiliated forces. As such, the only body of law 
which the United States recognises as applying to targeted killings is the law of armed conflict 
as it applies to non-international armed conflicts (in Yemen, Pakistan and Somalia) and the law 
of armed conflict as it applies to international armed conflicts (in Afghanistan). However, this 
is a position that we must take umbrage with. While it is not disputed that the law of armed 
conflict applies to the United States’ operations in Afghanistan, it is dubious as to whether it is 
the sole body of law which applies in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia – or whether it even applies 
at all. This chapter therefore examines the role of international human rights law in targeted 
killing operations.  
Whether or not international human rights law, and more specifically the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), applies extraterritorially has been a matter of 
contention within the international community for many years, and the issue continues to arise 
today.582 This section focuses primarily on U.S. arguments against the extraterritorial 
application of the ICCPR, as it is the treaty most relevant to U.S. targeted killings abroad.  
The extraterritorial application of human rights treaties is a particularly pertinent issue; 
perhaps, as Milanovic argues, due to the synergy of globalization and the increasing emphasis 
on individual human rights.583 This is likely to remain the case, as ‘States are increasingly 
asserting their power abroad in ways that affect the rights of individuals beyond national 
borders.’584 The extraterritoriality of human rights is also a key factor in assessing the legality 
or otherwise of targeted killings, and international human rights law also raises some concerns 
around the use of drones themselves. 
The U.S. has ‘long held’ the position that international human rights law, including the ICCPR, 
does not apply extraterritorially in any circumstances.585 In the view of the United States: 
‘arguments for the extraterritorial application of the Covenant are not supported by the 
text, objectives and drafting history of the Covenant; ignore the primacy of 
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humanitarian law; lead to legal and operational confusion; and increase the gap between 
legal theory (which supports the extra-territorial application of human rights law in 
armed conflict) and state practice (which points towards the contrary)’.586 
This position has been described by commentators as ‘increasingly out of step’,587 and, by the 
State Department’s then Legal Advisor Harold Koh in 2010,  as ‘no longer tenable’ and 
standing ‘in significant tension with the treaty’s object and purpose.’588 
The United States’ strict anti-extraterritorial ICCPR application position was first articulated 
in 1995 by Conrad Harper, in his position as Legal Adviser to the State Department, in response 
to an oral question from the UN Human Rights Committee on the U.S. position on 
extraterritoriality. Harper stated that: 
‘…the Covenant was not regarded as having extraterritorial application. In general, 
where the scope of application of a treaty was not specified, it was presumed to apply 
only within a party’s territory. Article 2 of the Covenant expressly stated that each State 
party undertook to respect and ensure the rights recognized “to all individuals within 
its territory and subject to its jurisdiction.” That dual requirement restricted the scope 
of the Covenant to persons under United States jurisdiction and within United States 
territory. During the negotiating history, the words “within its territory” had been 
debated and were added by vote, with the clear understanding that such wording would 
limit the obligations to within a Party’s territory.’589 
The United States most recently reaffirmed its unyielding stance on the extraterritorial 
application of the ICCPR in 2014 and 2015, in its response to the UN Human Rights 
Committee’s 2014 Priority Recommendations on the implementation of the ICCPR.590 Then 
acting-Legal Advisor in the State Department, Mary McLeod, stated that: 
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‘The United States continues to believe that its interpretation – that the covenant applies 
only to individuals both within its territory and within its jurisdiction – is the most 
consistent with the covenant’s language and negotiating history.’591  
This position was underscored by the U.S. in its 2015 written response to the UNHRC’s 2014 
Priority Recommendations on the implementation of the ICCPR,  in which the U.S. notes three 
times that it is ‘the longstanding position of the United States that obligations under the 
Covenant apply only with respect to individuals who are both within the territory of a State 
Party and within its jurisdiction.’592  
This uncompromising position holds, despite belief that the Obama administration would 
soften the U.S. position, particularly given the content of two lengthy memos by Harold Koh, 
former Legal Advisor at the Department of State, in 2010 and 2013, which offered an opinion 
on the extraterritoriality of human rights treaties contrary to the 1995 position.593 The 2010 
memo, which deals with the ICCPR, states that Koh no longer believes the 1995 interpretation 
to be the ‘best reading of the treaty’, as ‘the protections afforded by the Covenant do not in all 
cases stop at the water’s edge’594. The memo argues: 
‘On examination, the 1995 Interpretation asserts three propositions: (1) that unless 
otherwise specified, treaties were presumed to apply only within a party’s territory; (2) 
that the “and” in Article 2(1) operated conjunctively, not disjunctively; and (3) that 
“within its territory” was added to limit the Covenant’s obligations to a Party’s territory. 
But despite extensive examination, we have not been able to locate any underlying legal 
analysis conclusively establishing any of these three elements of the 1995 position.’595 
Koh’s position with regard to the ICCPR was supported by Michael Posner, former assistant 
secretary for human rights.596 Both of Koh’s legal opinions highlight the United States’ 
exceptional and aberrant position with regards to the extraterritorial application of multilateral 
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human rights treaties, in particular the ICCPR. The release of these legal opinions shortly 
before the U.S. was due to appear before the UN Human Rights Committee in 2014 prompted 
Milanovic to comment that he could not think of a similar situation  ‘in which the disclosure 
of internal legal advice and the timing of that disclosure have so fatally compromised a state’s 
public legal position on a matter of comparable importance…’.597  
Indeed, as these leaked opinions show, the U.S. position on the extraterritorial application of 
the ICCPR, rather than being an actual legal position, is actually a ‘strategic policy choice to 
endeavour to evade scrutiny of its extraterritorial exploits...’598 
It is now almost universally accepted that the ICCPR applies extraterritorially. The position 
that the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights and human rights in general is 
not applicable extraterritorially, or in an armed conflict situation, is ‘generally discredited’ 
today.599 Human rights law is not entirely ‘displaced’ by international humanitarian law, and 
‘can at times be directly applied in armed conflict situations’; as Lubell notes, those who resist 
such a position are ‘fighting a losing battle.’600 Numerous commentators point out that this is 
a question that has broadly been settled for some time. Ramsden writes that ‘weighty 
international support says yes’ to the question of whether international human rights law 
applies extraterritorially,601 while Oberleitner notes that however fervently the U.S. argues its 
case, this case rests on extremely fragile grounds.602 Rather than such grounds even being 
extremely fragile, the grounds do not exist – the U.S. position on the extraterritorial application 
of the ICCPR lies in an abyss, with those fragile grounds that may have once existed collapsing 
a long time ago. The UN Human Rights Committee has repeatedly noted that the U.S. continues 
to maintain its position on this important subject ‘despite the interpretation to the contrary of 
article 2, paragraph 1, supported by the Committee’s established jurisprudence, the 
jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice and State practice.’603  
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The U.S. relies heavily upon the drafting comments of the ICCPR to justify its strictly territorial 
approach to the extraterritorial application question; however, as Lubell points out, on closer 
inspection the drafting actually uncovers support for the extraterritorial application of human 
rights.604 As such the more pertinent question to ask is not whether human rights law applies 
outside the territory of the U.S., but rather how, and to whom, it applies. 
 
Extraterritorial jurisdiction 
Article 2 (1) of the ICCPR, which deals with the application of the treaty, reads: 
‘Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and ensure to all individuals 
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, 
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.’605  
The phrase ‘within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction’ raises the most issues for the 
ICCPR when dealing with its extraterritorial application.  
First, it should be noted that jurisdiction of the kind expressed in human rights treaties differs 
greatly from that expressed in general international law. Oberleitner, for example, writes that 
jurisdiction is an ‘ambiguous term with multiple meanings and no treaty-based definition.’606 
Unlike domestic jurisdiction, jurisdiction under international human rights law differs in that 
it is: 
‘not about a state’s ability to legislate and enforce law abroad, but may describe the 
factual exercise of power or control or authority over territory and/or persons. It is also 
about the extent of duties owed towards an individual, and it delimits a state’s obligation 
to respect, protect and fulfil human rights.’607 
Meanwhile, Milanovic writes that: 
‘the…classical doctrine of jurisdiction in general international law refers to the state 
regulation of the conduct of persons, natural or legal, and the consequences of their 
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actions under domestic law. In other words, it delimits the municipal legal orders of 
states, which can and do overlap…’.608 
In sum, the notion of jurisdiction in human rights treaties:  
‘relates essentially to a question of fact, of actual authority and control that a state has 
over a given territory or persons. ‘Jurisdiction’, in this context, simply means actual 
power, whether exercised lawfully or not – nothing more, nothing less.’609 
Of course, this interpretation of jurisdiction leaves us to grapple with the terms ‘effective 
control’ and ‘power’, both of which have different meanings in the different models of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction – territorial and personal - discussed in the succeeding sections. 
 
Extraterritorial jurisdiction: what does jurisprudence say? 
What can existing jurisprudence tell us about how far extraterritorial jurisdiction can reach? 
The  little jurisprudence that exists on this subject is far from consistent. As Oberleitner writes: 
‘ …the jurisprudence of human rights bodies and courts is only partly helpful in 
delineating the contours of the extra-territorial application of human rights treaty law. 
It supports, as a matter of principle, the idea that such extra-territorial application of 
human rights… is possible, but the human rights bodies differ in the way they 
understand jurisdiction as control over territory and/or persons.’610  
As such, there is no one coherent or over-arching approach to the extraterritorial application of 
human rights. Van Shaack deems jurisprudence in the area to have evolved ‘rather haphazardly 
in the face of idiosyncratic fact patterns that have come before different human rights treaty 
bodies and international tribunals in a range of conflict and non-conflict situations’,611 and 
Milanovic writes that the question of extraterritoriality has never been approached in a 
‘methodical way’.612 
As noted above, existing jurisprudence points toward two different models of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction: the territorial or spatial model, and the individual or personal model. For the 
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purposes of this assessment of extraterritorial jurisdiction, this section focuses on the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee (UNHRC), the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the 
relevant jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice.  
The spatial or territorial model of extraterritorial jurisdiction is that most supported by the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the jurisprudence of the 
ICJ. The individual or personal model finds its support in the jurisprudence of the UNHRC and 
the Inter-American Commission.  
Why discuss the ECHR and the ECtHR’s decisions at all, given that the U.S. is not a State 
Party to the ECHR and is not under its jurisdiction? As Van Shaack notes, the ECtHR’s 
decisions have been ‘highly salient’ in the extraterritorial application of human rights debate, 
and as such its jurisprudence should be scrutinised ‘in so far as it impacts and is consistent with 
the direction the law has moved.’613 The ECtHR’s jurisprudence also receives the most 
attention in the field of human rights itself.614 
 
Extraterritorial jurisdiction: the territorial model 
The spatial model conceives of jurisdiction as effective overall control of an area, which, as 
Milanovic notes, is ‘undoubtedly the model with the most textual support’ and that which ‘fits 
best with the current state of jurisprudence.’615 Yet, while the spatial model of jurisdiction is 
the most supported model in existing jurisprudence, it is not couched in the strictly territorial 
terms advocated by the United States. The most pertinent decisions of the relevant bodies 
relating to the spatial model of jurisdiction include, from the ECtHR, the Lozidou, Cyprus v 
Turkey, and Bankovic decisions; and, from the ICJ, the Wall and Congo decisions.  As the ICJ’s 
Wall and Congo decisions deal only briefly with the extraterritorial jurisdiction of human rights 
treaties, these are discussed first.  
The International Court of Justice, in its decisions in the Wall and Congo cases, has stated that 
extraterritorial jurisdiction does exist. In the Wall case, the Court stated that ‘The Court would 
observe that, while the jurisdiction of States is primarily territorial, it may sometimes be 
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exercised outside the national territory’ and further stated that: 
‘…the Court considers that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is 
applicable in respect of acts done by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its 
own territory.’616  
The European Court of Human Rights, in its decision in Lozidou v. Turkey, held that: 
‘the responsibility of Contracting States can be involved by acts and omissions of their 
authorities which produce effects outside their own territory. Of particular significance 
to the present case the Court held, in conformity with the relevant principles of 
international law governing State responsibility, that the responsibility of a Contracting 
Party could also arise when as a consequence of military action - whether lawful or 
unlawful - it exercises effective control of an area outside its national territory. The 
obligation to secure, in such an area, the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention, 
derives from the fact of such control whether it be exercised directly, through its armed 
forces, or through a subordinate local administration.’617 
This is the ‘effective control’ standard, which is similarly referenced in the Court’s decision in 
Cyprus v. Turkey.618 
In the controversial and much-criticised Bankovic decision, the Court found that jurisdiction is 
primarily territorial, and that any recognition of extraterritorial jurisdiction by a Contracting 
State is exceptional, occurring only when: 
‘the respondent State, through the effective control of the relevant territory and its 
inhabitants abroad as a consequence of military occupation or through the consent, 
invitation or acquiescence of the Government of that territory, exercises all or some of 
the public powers normally to be exercised by that Government.’619 
It further stated that those rights in the European Convention on Human Rights cannot be 
divided and tailored; that is, certain rights can’t be taken into account and others ignored due 
to the particular circumstances of an extraterritorial act. Finally, the Court said that the 
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Convention operates in an ‘essentially regional context and notably in the legal space (espace 
juridique) of the Contracting States.’620  According to the Court, the FRY ‘clearly’ did not fall 
within that legal space. As such, the Court stated: 
‘The Convention was not designed to be applied throughout the world, even in respect 
of the conduct of Contracting States.’621 
Although the Court recognised that this could lead to a ‘gap or vacuum in human rights’ 
protection’, it continued that the Court had previously avoided this gap by ‘establishing 
jurisdiction only when the territory in question was one that, but for the specific circumstances, 
would normally be covered by the Convention.’622 
In sum, the Court’s decision in Bankovic found that extraterritorial jurisdiction exists only in 
those cases where a Contracting State has effective control of an area or territory to the extent 
that it exercises some or all of the public powers normally exercised by the Government of that 
area, where the Contracting State can secure the entire range of substantive rights to those 
within its jurisdiction, and where that area or territory is within the regional legal space ‘espace 
juridique’ of the Convention, i.e. the territories of the member states of the Council of 
Europe.623 This of course would mean that extraterritorial application of the ECHR would 
occur only in very specific and limited circumstances.  
What are the positives of the spatial model? It can be argued that it: 
‘seems to reconcile the normative demands of universality and the factual demands of 
effectiveness, as extraterritorial application would happen when it is realistically 
possible, in the circumstances of state control over territory.’624 
 Yet, as Milanovic and numerous other commentators recognise, the spatial model presents a 
number of problems.625 What is an area? What is effective control? As discussed above, the 
U.S. adopts a strictly territorial interpretation of jurisdiction (which, when positioned alongside 
an exclusivist understanding of lex specialis during armed conflict, leaves no space for human 
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rights in armed conflict beyond a state’s territory, as will be discussed later).626 Adopting a 
strictly spatial position means that the U.S. could harm people abroad in ‘ways that would be 
prohibited at home’ – a position that Van Schaak describes as ‘untenable and perverse.’627 
Milanovic also recognises this tension, writing that a strict adherence to the spatial model:  
‘…would lead to numerous morally intolerable situations – intolerable from the 
standpoint of universality – in which a state acts extraterritorially but the relevant 
human rights treaty would not apply.’628 
This rather narrow conception of extraterritorial jurisdiction is at odds with the model 
propounded by the United Nations Human Rights Committee and the Inter-American 
Commission. It is also somewhat mitigated by the European Court’s decision in Al-Skeini, all 
of which are discussed below.  
 
The individual model of jurisdiction 
The personal model of jurisdiction assesses the power or effective control of a state over an 
individual. A number of bodies increasingly favour this personal model, including the UN 
Human Rights Committee and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. The 
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights take a somewhat contradictory approach, in 
terms of its pre- and post-Bankovic decisions. Those that do apply to the U.S. – namely the 
ICCPR and the Inter-American Commission – consistently argue in favour of this personal or 
individual model of jurisdiction.  
The UNHCR, which is the treaty body which deals with the ICCPR, first dealt with the issue 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction in the Lopez-Burgos v. Uruguay and in Casariego v. Uruguay 
cases. Here, the Committee found that: 
‘Article 2 (1) of the Covenant places an obligation upon a State party to respect and to 
ensure rights "to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction”, but 
this does not imply that the State party concerned cannot be held accountable for 
violations of rights under the Covenant which its agents commit upon the territory of 
                                                           
626 Oberleitner (n572) 145. 
627 Van Shaack (n571) 24. 
628 Milanovic (n569) 128. 
  154 
another State, whether with the acquiescence of the Government of that State or in 
opposition to it. According to article 5 (1) of the Covenant: 
"Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State, group 
or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction 
of any of the rights and freedoms recognized herein or at their limitation to a greater 
extent than is provided for in the present Covenant." 
In line with this, it would be unconscionable to so interpret the responsibility under 
article 2 of the Covenant as to permit a State party to perpetrate violations of the 
Covenant on the territory of another State, which violations it could not perpetrate on 
its own territory.’629 
In General Comment No.31, the Committee stated: 
‘States Parties are required by article 2, paragraph 1, to respect and to ensure the 
Covenant rights to all persons who may be within their territory and to all persons 
subject to their jurisdiction. This means that a State party must respect and ensure the 
rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that 
State Party, even if not situated within the territory of the State Party.’630 
As such, this position: 
‘espouses the so-called disjunctive-conjunctive interpretation of the jurisdiction clause 
of Article 2(1) ICCPR… by saying that the words ‘within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction’ mean that ICCPR rights must be respected and ensured to all persons who 
may be within the state’s territory and to all persons subject to its jurisdiction.’631 
The Committee has explicated on this further and extended the reach of human rights treaties, 
when it found in Munaf that a State party to the ICCPR may be responsible for extraterritorial 
violations of the Covenant ‘if it is a link in the causal chain that would make possible violations 
in another jurisdiction.’632 
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For the UNHCR, then, extraterritorial jurisdiction exists where a Contracting State has power 
or effective control over any individual, whether or not that individual is situated within the 
Contracting State’s territory. This jurisdiction now extends even to cases in which a State is a 
link in the causal chain that made a Covenant violation possible, where that violation was a 
‘necessary and foreseeable consequence’ of the Contracting State’s action.633  
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has likewise consistently found in favour 
of the personal model of extraterritorial jurisdiction, and has done so for some time. In its 2002 
Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, the Commission stated: 
‘…a state’s human rights obligations are not dependent upon a person’s nationality or 
presence within a particular geographic area, but rather extend to all persons subject to 
that state’s authority and control. This basic precept in turn is based upon the 
fundamental premise that human rights protections are derived from the attributes of an 
individual’s personality and by virtue of the fact that he or she is a human being, and 
not because he or she is the citizen of a particular state.’634 
The Inter-American Commission first asserted this standard of ‘authority and control’ in the 
Coard case in 1999, and has consistently applied this standard in subsequent cases in which 
the issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction over an individual has been an issue.635   
This formulation of the personal model by the UNHRC and the Inter-American Commission 
represents a broad form of the personal or individual model, known as the ‘state-agent 
authority’ model of extraterritorial jurisdiction. According to this model, if an agent or 
authority acting on behalf of the state has sufficient control or power over an individual, the 
state has jurisdiction over the individual in question. In applying the individual model of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, the key question hinges on what ‘effective control and/or ‘power’ 
over an individual amount to.  
Meanwhile, the European Court of Human Rights, in both Ocalan v. Turkey and Issa and others 
v. Turkey, found that jurisdiction was exercised extraterritorially in situations in which Turkey 
did not have effective or overall control over an area. In Ocalan v. Turkey, the Court stated that 
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once the applicant had been handed over to Turkish agents by the Kenyan authorities, the 
applicant was: 
‘under effective Turkish authority and was therefore brought within the “jurisdiction” 
of that State for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention, even though in this instance 
Turkey exercised its authority outside its territory.’636 
In Issa and others v. Turkey, the Court stated that: 
[A] State may also be held accountable for violation of the Convention rights and 
freedoms of persons who are in the territory of another State but who are found to be 
under the former State’s authority and control through its agents operating – whether 
lawfully or unlawfully – in the latter State. Accountability in such situations stems from 
the fact that Article 1 of the Convention cannot be interpreted so as to allow a State 
party to perpetrate violations of the Convention on the territory of another State, which 
it could not perpetrate on its own territory.637 
The above positions of the ECtHR, in judgments which followed the Court’s decision in 
Bankovic, therefore make the Court’s approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction rather confusing. 
The Al-Skeini decision, discussed in detail below, has somewhat (but not entirely), mitigated 
this confusion.   
 
The Al-Skeini decision: overturning Bankovic? 
As stated above, the ECtHR’s extremely narrow conception of extraterritorial jurisdiction in 
Bankovic and the subsequent confusion arising from its positions in Ocalan v. Turkey, and Issa 
and others v. Turkey has been mitigated (though not, as some commentators opine, completely 
overturned) by its 2011 decision in Al-Skeini. Al-Skeini, Wilde observes, ‘appears to combine 
both the ‘territorial’ and ‘individual’ triggers that had hitherto been treated separately’.638 In 
Al-Skeini, the Court found that, while jurisdiction is primarily territorial: 
‘as an exception to the principle of territoriality, a Contracting State’s jurisdiction 
under Article 1 may extend to acts of its authorities which produce effects outside its 
                                                           
636 Ocalan v. Turkey, 46221/99, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 12 March 2003. 
637 Issa and ors v Turkey, 31821/96, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 16th November 2004. 
638 Ralph Wilde, ‘The extraterritorial application of international human rights law on civil and political rights’, in Scott 
Sheeran and Sir Nigel Rodley eds., Routledge Handbook of International Human Rights Law, (Routledge 2013) 647. 
  157 
own territory.’639 
The Court noted that in addition to the exercising of public powers discussed in Bankovic, or 
the acts of its diplomatic and consular agents in certain circumstances, ‘the use of force by a 
State’s agents operating outside its territory may bring the individual thereby brought under 
the control of the State’s authorities into the State’s Article 1 jurisdiction.’640  
The Court further held: 
‘It is clear that, whenever the State, through its agents, exercises control and authority 
over an individual, and thus jurisdiction, the State is under an obligation under Article 
1 to secure to that individual the rights and freedoms under Section I of the Convention 
that are relevant to the situation of that individual. In this sense, therefore, the 
Convention rights can be “divided and tailored”. 
This of course directly contradicts, and indeed corrects, the Court’s earlier decision in Bankovic 
regarding the ‘dividing and tailoring’ of Convention rights. The Court also dismissed the idea 
of ‘espace juridique’ as articulated in the Bankovic decision, stating that: 
The Court has emphasised that, where the territory of one Convention State is occupied 
by the armed forces of another, the occupying State should in principle be held 
accountable under the Convention for breaches of human rights within the occupied 
territory, because to hold otherwise would be to deprive the population of that territory 
of the rights and freedoms hitherto enjoyed and would result in a “vacuum” of 
protection within the “legal space of the Convention” (see Cyprus v. Turkey, cited 
above, § 78, and Banković and Others, cited above, § 80). However, the importance of 
establishing the occupying State’s jurisdiction in such cases does not imply, a contrario, 
that jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention can never exist outside the territory 
covered by the Council of Europe member States.’641 
However, as previously noted, the Court’s decision in Al-Skeini does not ‘overturn’ its earlier 
decision in Bankovic. As Cowan writes: 
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‘…the decision leaves unanswered some key questions on the interrelationship 
between the effective control exception and the state agent authority exception, 
and the relevance of the “exercise of public powers” in relation to those 
exceptions.’642 
Nor does Al-Skeini provide the clarity, so badly needed, as to when exactly the ECHR applies 
extraterritorially. 
 
A third model of extraterritorial jurisdiction? 
As has been detailed above, both models of jurisdiction are somewhat lacking and, if taken 
alone, either allow for States’ to act abroad in ways which they would not be able to at home, 
or for jurisdiction to be extended to cover almost any act performed by a State overseas. To 
correct this, Milanovic proposes a third model of extraterritorial jurisdiction, which is entirely 
sensible, practical, and practicable.643 Described by Heyns et al as ‘a normatively desirable and 
principled basis for holding states to account’ in situations such as those examined here, this 
model melds, to an extent, the territorial model and the individual model.644 Milanovic’s model 
proposes that the notion of jurisdiction in human rights treaties ‘would be conceived of only 
territorially, as de facto effective overall control of areas and places.’645 This threshold would 
apply ‘only to the state’s obligation to secure or ensure human rights, but not to its obligation 
to respect human rights, which would be territorially unbound.’646 
In this model, where a State has effective overall control over a territory, it would be obligated 
to respect and ensure the rights of those within that territory. Where the agents of a State have 
control over an individual only, and not territory, it is not obligated to ensure rights which it is 
not in a position to guarantee (e.g. right to a fair trial), but it is obligated to respect those rights 
which it can affect – for example, in the case of targeted killing, the right to life.647 
In this model, the distinction rests on positive and negative obligations. The State does not have 
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a positive obligation to ensure the right to life of the individual in question if it does not have 
effective control over the territory in which the individual is situated. Rather, it has a negative 
obligation to ensure that it does not affect the individual’s right to life by killing her or him 
arbitrarily, and an obligation to investigate its own agents if the individual’s right to life is 
affected. Milanovic explains that he is not ‘advocating a strict separation between negative and 
positive obligations’: 
‘Rather, I am arguing for a separation between those positive obligations which require 
control over territory in order to be effective, such as the obligation to prevent inhuman 
treatment or secure human rights generally even from third parties, and those 
obligations whose effectiveness depends only on the state’s control over its own 
agents.’648 
He further clarifies: 
‘…for example, in the context of the right to life, the state has the negative obligation 
not to take life unjustifiably, but also the positive obligation to conduct an independent 
and effective investigation into a possible taking of life by its own agents…’649 
Milanovic discusses the Al-Skeini case to illustrate how this model works: 
‘Assume, for the sake of the argument, that even though the killings took place in 
British-occupied Basra, because of the strength of the insurgency Basra could not be 
qualified as an area under the UK’s effective overall control, and was hence outside its 
jurisdiction. Even so, in my view, the UK would still have not only the negative 
obligation to refrain from depriving the five applicants of life unjustifiably, but would 
also have the positive procedural obligation to conduct an effective investigation into 
their killing. Its existence depends solely on the UK’s own involvement in the killing, 
and in order to comply with it the UK need not do anything more than investigate the 
conduct of its own troops, which it is in principle perfectly able to do.’650 
He also applies the model to Bankovic: 
‘…on the facts of Bankovic, the respondent states should have been asked by the Court 
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to justify on the merits their killing of individuals who were not within their jurisdiction 
territorially conceived, as the killing implicates the states’ negative obligation to which 
some positive obligations may attach… though in my view the correct result in 
Bankovic would probably have been that the killings were unlawful, it is far from 
obvious that this should have been the case. The respondent states would have a case 
to answer, but they would also have something to answer the case with.’651 
Milanovic finds support for this model through textual interpretation of the relevant treaties 
and in customary international law. Regarding customary international law, as Droege writes, 
it is ‘uncontroversial’ that the prohibition on the arbitrary deprivation of life forms part of 
customary international law, as ‘respect for customary human rights is not a matter of 
extraterritorial application, because outside of treaty application clauses, respect for human 
rights has never been territorially confined.’652 Similarly, Heyns et al write that: 
‘In its customary form, at least the negative obligation not arbitrarily to deprive 
someone of their life appears not to be limited to application within a State’s territory. 
Indeed, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not contain a limitation clause 
on its geographical application and simply states that ‘[e]veryone has the right to 
life’.653 
As already stated, this model makes sense, providing us with: 
‘the best balance between universality and effectiveness with regard to the 
extraterritorial application of human rights treaties. Instead of being artificially limited, 
universality is brought to its logical (and moral) conclusion. States would have the same 
obligation to respect human rights both within and outside their territories. Whether 
they use drones for the targeted killings of suspected terrorists, use force in more 
conventional military operations…states would still have to abide by the restrictions 
that human rights law places on the arbitrary exercise of their power, and do so 
regardless of territorial boundaries. When, however, states are expected to do more than 
just refrain from adversely affecting the lives of others, when they need to take positive 
steps, from preventing domestic violence and safeguarding private property to 
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protecting lawful public assemblies and the free exercise of religion, they cannot fulfil 
such obligations effectively without having the tools to do so. Such obligations should, 
therefore, be territorially limited to areas and places under the state’s jurisdiction.’654 
Clearly, in the case of targeted killing, this model makes immediate sense. The current 
formulation of the state-agent authority or individual model of extraterritorial application, 
while at first glance seemingly applicable to such cases, is less convincing under examination 
given that the state-agent authority model privileges physical control or power over an 
individual as creating a jurisdictional link – something that is lacking in those targeted killings 
carried out by drones which are under examination here. However, under Milanovic’s model, 
where a State such as the U.S. had carried out a targeted killing by drone in another State in a 
non-armed conflict scenario, and where this operation had killed a person or persons, the 
United States would 1) have the negative obligation to ensure it had not deprived this person 
or persons of their right to life unjustifiably and arbitrarily and 2) the positive obligation to 
conduct an effective investigation into the killing or killings.  
Despite the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, perhaps the most important of the international human 
rights treaty bodies, providing little clarity as to when exactly the Convention applies 
extraterritorially, extraterritorial jurisdiction is certainly experiencing ‘a progressive unhinging 
of international human rights obligations from territoriality’.655 Furthermore, those human 
rights treaty bodies of which the United States is a member – namely, the ICCPR and the 
American Convention – have consistently applied a broad interpretation of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction based on the state-agent authority model. The tide of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
thus pulls heavily against the United States’ unsupported position that human rights do not 
apply extraterritorially, and it can be asserted that where the United States targets an individual 
or individuals outside the nexus of an armed conflict, it has a duty to respect the right to life of 
the individuals in question and, at the very least, the negative obligation not to arbitrarily 
deprive those individuals of their right to life. 
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The application of international human rights law in armed conflict  
It has now been established that international human rights law applies extraterritorially, where 
a State has effective overall control over a territory and where a State’s agents have power or 
control over an individual. It is now also widely accepted that international human rights law 
continues to apply during times of armed conflict. However, and again, akin to the 
extraterritoriality of human rights law issues, the primary question regarding the relationship 
between international human rights law and international humanitarian law today is not 
whether international human rights law applies, but how and to what extent it applies.  
While Milanovic notes that co-applying international human rights law with the law of armed 
conflict aims to further humanise international humanitarian law,656 Verdirame contends that, 
aside from any moral argument, it is also recommendable by virtue of practicality:  
‘international human rights law benefits from an enforcement machinery that, for all its 
faults and limits, is still much better developed than what international humanitarian 
law offers. Victims, and their lawyers, often have no alternative to articulating their 
cases in human rights term…’657  
As such, international courts have avoided dismissing such cases outright, and have instead 
preferred to broaden the scope of human rights.658  
The issues surrounding international human rights law and the ‘war on terror’ are well-
documented, as are the dangers of the increasing number of States applying an armed conflict, 
rather than a law-enforcement lens, to their uses of force abroad. Lubell succinctly sums up the 
dangers, well demonstrated with the targeted killing problem, of allowing international 
humanitarian law to become the dominant international law paradigm in the use of force : 
‘Accepting the complete dominance of IHL…combined with the possibility of existing 
interpretations of the threshold of armed conflict and determinations of individual 
status, risks creating situations in which it would be too easy for states to claim that 
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individuals are not protected civilians and that they are part of an armed conflict, and 
can therefore be targeted with a shoot-to-kill approach.’659  
As with the extraterritoriality of international human rights law in peacetime, the United States 
has consistently denied that international human rights law applies during armed conflict, and 
to the targeted killing programme, which it says operates as part of their non-international 
armed conflict with al-Qaeda and affiliated forces.660 While it is true that there are some 
targeted killings in an active theatre of war to which international humanitarian law obviously 
applies, and where recourse to international human rights law will likely be unnecessary - for 
example, those targeted killings which take place in Afghanistan -  for the vast majority of 
targeted killings, the interaction between international humanitarian law and human rights law 
is of extreme importance.  
 
International human rights law and international humanitarian law: Interpreting ‘lex specialis’ 
As established in Chapter One, the primary body of law which applies in armed conflicts, both 
of an international and non-international character, is international humanitarian law. During 
armed conflict, international humanitarian law is considered lex specialis. The International 
Court of Justice first expressed its position regarding the relationship between international 
humanitarian law and international human rights law in its Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion 
in 1996. The Court stated: 
 ‘…the protection of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not 
cease in times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain 
provisions may be derogated from in a time of national emergency. Respect for the right 
to life is not, however, such a provision. In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be 
deprived of one's life applies also in hostilities. The test of what is an arbitrary 
deprivation of life, however, then falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, 
namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct 
of hostilities. Thus, whether a particular loss of life, through the use of a certain weapon 
in warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 of 
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the Covenant, can only be decided by reference to the law applicable in armed conflict 
and not deduced from the terms of the Covenant itself.’661 
The Court’s position in the Nuclear Weapons opinion was taken by some to mean that 
international humanitarian law, as lex specialis, completely replaced international human rights 
law in armed conflict. However, the Court further clarified its stance regarding the application 
of international human rights law in armed conflict in its judgment in The Wall, when it found: 
‘…the Court considers that the protection offered by human rights conventions does 
not cease in case of armed conflict, save through the effect of provisions for derogation 
of the kind to be found in Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. As regards the relationship between international humanitarian law and human 
rights law, there are thus three possible situations: some rights may be exclusively 
matters of international humanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters of human 
rights law; yet others may be matters of both these branches of international law. In 
order to answer the question put to it, the Court will have to take into consideration both 
these branches of international law, namely human rights law and, as lex specialis, 
international humanitarian law.’662 
The Court again noted this position in its judgment in DRC v Uganda.663 However, the phrase 
‘lex specialis’ is open to some interpretation. Prior to the growing influence and codification 
of international human rights law, it was often held that international humanitarian law was the 
primary, and only, body of law applicable during times of armed conflict, displacing human 
rights law completely and unequivocally. This position still finds some support today, though 
supporters of this position are increasingly few and far between.664 The most common 
interpretation, and the one that the majority of commentators, courts and treaty bodies support, 
is that while international humanitarian law retains its primacy during armed conflict, 
international human rights law is not displaced completely in armed conflict. Instead, 
international human rights law continues to apply, but with derogation to international 
humanitarian law. As such, international humanitarian law and international human rights law 
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have a complementary relationship in armed conflict, with the lex specialis principle drawing 
upon the ‘natural complementarity’ of IHL and IHRL ‘in an attempt to interpret and apply the 
two legal regimes in a manner which renders them mutually reinforcing.’665  
As the right to life is the right most relevant to the discussion on targeted killing, the next 
section examines the right to life and its application during armed conflict.  
 
The issues and intricacies of concurrent applicability: applying the right to life in armed 
conflict situations 
This section addresses the complex issue of how international human rights law is applied in 
times of armed conflict, specifically regarding the right to life.  The right to life is considered 
the ‘supreme’ and most fundamental of all human rights.666  Protected under Article 6 (1) of 
the ICCPR, Article 2 (2) of the ECHR, Article 4 (1) of the American Convention of Human 
Rights and Article 4 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, the right to life is 
also considered customary law. Three of these treaties – the ICCPR, the ACHR and the ACHPR 
- state that no person may be ‘“arbitrarily” deprived of life without further explanation.’667 The 
ECHR, as Doswald Beck notes, gives us further guidance, providing three provisions under 
which the deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of the 
Convention.668 The right to life is also non-derogable under all four of these treaties, though 
the European Convention ‘does make an exception for “deaths resulting from lawful acts of 
war.”’669 To date, however, no State Party to the Convention which has been before the 
European Court has used this exception.670  Given its status as customary law, the right to life 
creates obligations for all states, regardless of whether they are a party to any of the 
aforementioned treaties.671  The fact that provisions for derogation in times of public 
emergency and armed conflict exist in human rights instruments also highlights that non-
derogable human rights continue to apply in armed conflict – ‘absent derogation, human rights 
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obligations as a general rule continue to apply in times of armed conflict.’672 According to 
Heyns, ‘this applies even more so to the right to life…’673 
Article 6 (1) of the ICCPR is most relevant to this discussion on the right to life in armed 
conflict, as the United States is, like the vast majority of states, a party to the ICCPR. It states: 
‘Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. 
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.’674 
As the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials note, 
non-violent means should be used, as far as possible, before force or firearms are used in a law-
enforcement operation.675 This is the well-established international human rights law principle 
of use of force as a last resort. When attempting, for example, to prevent an individual from 
committing a crime, non-violent means must be the first option employed; force should always 
be at the minimum level possible if force is used, and lethal force should only be used when 
strictly unavoidable.676 Any force used must also be necessary and proportionate, with 
intentional force ‘used only where strictly necessary to protect against an imminent threat to 
life.’.677  
The concepts of necessity and proportionality in international human rights law are starkly 
different to those concepts in international humanitarian law. In international human rights law, 
necessity means that: 
‘if the measures taken will result in a possible violation of a right, it must be shown that 
there measures were necessary in order to achieve the legitimate objective…’678 
While proportionality means that: 
‘for the use of lethal force to be considered a proportionate measure, its objective 
should be the prevention of a real threat to life, and outside the preservation of life, 
lethal force is likely to be disproportionate.’679  
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The ECthR, in McCann and others v. United Kingdom, found that the right to life of three 
Provisional IRA members killed by British forces in Gibraltar had been violated because the 
use of lethal force should have been avoidable; instead, the Court found that elements of the 
operation meant that ‘the use of lethal force was almost unavoidable’ and were not persuaded 
that the use of force which killed the three individuals in question was ‘no more than absolutely 
necessary’.680 
The concept of imminence in terms of the jus ad bellum under the law of international self-
defence was discussed at some length in the previous chapter. Like the concepts of 
proportionality and necessity, the human rights concept of imminence is very different from its 
counterpart found in the international law on the use of inter-state force. Despite their 
difference in meaning, the U.S. has consistently conflated the two concepts.  
The traditional view of imminence in international human rights law is that ‘imminence 
encompasses a person literally in the process of using deadly force’, and as such, imminence 
‘requires a visible threat to human life.’681 This imminence requirement is distinct from the 
concept of imminence required for the use of force by a State in pre-emptive or anticipatory 
self-defence.682 The two concepts should not be conflated. Any application of the inter-state 
use of force definition of imminence, rather than the IHRL concept of imminence, to an 
operation which requires that human rights standards be applied will be unlawful. 
It may seem paradoxical to discuss a right to life in armed conflict, given that an integral part 
of international humanitarian law is the ability to kill an individual based on their status and 
the use of force as a first resort, whereas killing is antithetical to the idea of human rights’: 
‘A universal right to life simply does not exist in IHL; indeed the entire body of law is 
based on its rejection because IHL assumes that killing in warfare can be regulated by 
distinguishing between lawful and unlawful targets.’683  
While international human rights law ‘confers rights and fundamental freedoms on every 
person without distinction and discrimination, the level of protection offered by the law of 
armed conflict to an individual depends on his or her status.’684 The primary purpose of IHL is 
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not, in fact, humanitarian – rather, it has the joint purpose of regulating warfare and balancing 
humanitarian considerations with military necessity.685 
 As such, it is necessary to provide a translation of concepts before one body of law can begin 
to understand the other. This is particularly true for the human rights concepts of necessity and 
proportionality, which, as mentioned already, are vastly different to the concepts of military 
necessity and proportionality expressed in international humanitarian law.  Regarding military 
necessity, Verdirame writes: 
‘Military necessity, one of the cornerstones of the laws of war, has no equivalent in 
human rights law. It reflects the realist and pragmatic assumptions of the laws of wars, 
which, while seeking to minimise the consequences of armed conflict, essentially 
regard war as a social fact and historical reality.’686 
Military necessity is an unknown entity and a wildly alien concept to international human rights 
law – how can it be acceptable to take human life due to an often tenuous belief that it will 
provide an important military advantage? While in human rights law, where the use of force 
‘must be absolutely necessary to save the life of another’, in international humanitarian law 
‘the action need only be necessary for the accomplishment of the conflict, which includes 
defeating the enemy as quickly as possible with the fewest risks to one’s own personnel.’687 
Regarding the law of armed conflict concept of proportionality, how can the destruction of 
property or life be deemed allowable because it is proportionate to the goal achieved? For 
human rights law - a system of law that places its greatest value on the life of the individual - 
it is surely anathema to accept that the law of armed conflict allows the individual’s right to 
life to become subordinate to the collective, and subordinate to the aims of a State – those very 
entities which are obliged to protect human rights.  
The targeting rules in each body of law are also at odds. In international humanitarian law, in 
an international armed conflict, two categories of person are targetable: combatants, at all 
times, unless they have surrendered or are hors de combat, and civilians directly participating 
in hostilities. In a non-international armed conflict, those members of an organised armed group 
who hold a continuous combat function, and civilians directly participating in hostilities, may 
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be targeted. As has previously been established, no other category of person – such as that of 
the ‘unprivileged belligerent’ or ‘unlawful combatant’ - exists. Any of these categories of 
individual can be targeted with lethal force as a first option, and not only as a last resort. This 
applies whether or not the threat from the individual is considered imminent. Persons who are 
not considered targetable are those who are hors de combat, and civilians. 
 In international human rights law, persons are not categorised according to their function. Each 
individual has the right to life, and the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of one’s life, except 
in certain specific and strict instances, in which the resort to force should be a last resort, any 
force used must be the necessary amount of force used for the aim in question and should be 
proportionate. The death of the individual should never be the ultimate aim.   
How then does the idea of international humanitarian law as lex specialis in armed conflict 
guide us in applying the right to life, particularly where individuals are targetable under very 
different strictures than those in international human rights law? As the ICJ stated in Nuclear 
Weapons, whether a particular loss of life is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life 
contrary to Article 6 of the ICCPR should be determined with reference to the applicable law.688 
In the case of armed conflict, then, international humanitarian law shapes the meaning of 
‘arbitrary’ – any use of force that kills or injures an individual and that abides by the rules of 
international humanitarian law will not be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life. Alston, 
the former Special Rapporteur, confirmed this in his 2010 report to the UNHCR: 
‘…whether a particular killing is legal is determined by the applicable lex specialis… 
To the extent that IHL does not provide a rule, or the rule is unclear and its meaning 
cannot be ascertained from the guidance offered by IHL principles, it is appropriate to 
draw guidance from human rights law.’689  
As such, Murray asserts that ‘in situations of armed conflict, deprivations of life consistent 
with the law of armed conflict will not be considered arbitrary’.690 Those killings which are 
contrary to international humanitarian law – i.e. those deaths which are not militarily necessary 
or proportionate in the international humanitarian law sense,  and any killing of civilians 
outside of those civilians directly participating in hostilities at the time they are targeted - will 
be considered as arbitrary deprivations of life under international human rights law. 
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International human rights law thus fills any lacunae in the application of international 
humanitarian law during armed conflict scenarios.691 
However, according to some commentators, the situation is not quite so clear cut, particularly 
in a non-international armed conflict scenario. Milanovic contends that there may be situations 
in which a killing considered lawful under international humanitarian law is considered 
unlawful under international human rights law, and that in certain instances, the international 
human rights law standards should be upheld and applied: 
‘A bolder approach to the joint application of IHL and IHRL would ask whether there 
are killings which do comply with IHL but are still arbitrary in terms of IHRL. Can, in 
other words, IHRL during armed conflict impose additional requirements for the 
lawfulness of a killing to those of IHL?  And can these requirements, while more 
stringent than those of IHL, still be somewhat less stringent than those set out in human 
rights jurisprudence developed in and for times of normalcy, and if so when and how? 
I think all these questions can be answered with a cautious ‘yes.’692 
The approach that international human rights law can impose additional requirements regarding 
the lawfulness of a killing is most relevant to the discussion on whether or not there exists a 
duty to attempt the capture of an individual before an attempt to kill him or her is made in a 
non-international armed conflict scenario. As  discussed, in international human rights law the 
use of force must be a last resort, force should only be used where absolutely necessary, the 
use of force must be proportionate, and death should never be the intended outcome of a law 
enforcement operation. A duty to capture therefore exists under international human rights law. 
In a situation in which international human rights law only applies – that is, in a law 
enforcement operation occurring outside an armed conflict – it is ‘uncontestably’ the case that 
a duty to capture exists. 
There are a variety of views to be found here regarding a duty to capture in an NIAC. Support 
for the existence of such a duty can be found in, for example, the ICRC’s direct guidance on 
direct participation in hostilities, and in the Israeli High Court’s Targeted Killings judgment, 
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and is further supported by Milanovic and Droege. Others, including Ohlin, strongly resist 
suggestions that a duty to capture should exist in the context of NIACs and targeted killings. 
As Milanovic notes, such assessments are heavily fact-based. He has also noted that 
international humanitarian law is ‘still a discipline about killing people, if in a civilized sort of 
way’.693 Therefore, while it is certainly preferable for a State to attempt the capture of an 
individual where feasible, rather than kill that individual, the creation of a duty to do so in an 
armed conflict scenario, while plausible, is likely to be resisted by States. 
 
Targeted killing and international human rights law 
International human rights law applies to all law enforcement operations which occur outside 
the nexus of an armed conflict. As noted by Alston, the ‘law enforcement’ model does not 
apply only to police forces or only in times of peace – it also includes a ‘State’s military and 
security forces, operating in contexts where violence exists, but falls short of the threshold for 
armed conflict.’694 Under scenarios which are governed solely by the international human 
rights law framework, the very idea of a ‘targeted killing’ operation is in and of itself illegal, 
as ‘the specific goal of the operation is to use lethal force’.695 Therefore, in most circumstances 
governed by the international human rights law framework, ‘targeted killings violate the right 
to life.’696 A state killing is, therefore, legal only if it is ‘required to protect life… and there is 
no other means… of preventing that threat to life…’697  If any other individuals are harmed or 
killed during such an operation, the right to life of those individuals will have been violated. 
It has now been established that for a killing to be lawful under international human rights law, 
it must a) have been a last resort; b) force used must have been in response to an imminent 
threat to life and in pursuit of a legitimate aim; c) force used must have been that absolutely 
necessary to respond to the threat in question; and d) the force used must have been 
proportionate. Where this killing takes place extraterritorially, the use of force must have a) 
been consented to by the State within whose territory force is used; or b) have been carried out 
in self-defence.  
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As stated, the very idea of ‘targeted killing’ is in and of itself unlawful. However, where an 
individual presents an imminent danger to the lives of others, he or she may be targeted. As 
such, a personality strike against a known individual who presents an imminent danger to others 
will not be unlawful, so long as no other less harmful means are available to those involved in 
the planning and execution of the operation, in order to stop the threat. The lawfulness of every 
targeted killing is case-dependent, and questions as to why that individual could not have been 
captured or otherwise incapacitated before there was a lethal resort to force should be asked in 
every instance.   
Given the prerequisites around lawful uses of force, human rights law strictures may lead us to 
conclude that all signature strikes are illegal under international human rights law. However, 
Heller finds that three signatures which are lawful or possibly lawful under IHL could also be 
lawful under IHRL: strikes that target individuals planning an attack; strikes targeting 
individuals handling explosives; and strikes which target individuals transporting weapons. 
According to Heller, each of these signatures could satisfy the proportionality requirement of 
IHRL, so long as the United States had evidence that the attack which these actions were related 
to involved a human target.698 Whether they satisfy the principle of necessity, however, is a 
more complex issue. The legality of any action utilising any of these signatures will rely largely 
on the definition of imminence used. As Heller asks: 
‘At what point should we conclude that a planned attack was so imminent that the 
United States could not have reasonably pursued non-lethal means of preventing it, 
such as attempting to apprehend the suspects or at least warning them that they would 
be attacked unless they turned themselves in?’699 
The United States erroneous conflation of imminence has already been mentioned. According 
to the U.S., the imminence of an attack depends on: 
‘considerations of the relevant window of opportunity to act, the possible harm that 
missing the window would cause to civilians, and the likelihood of heading off future 
disastrous attack.’700 
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Such a construction of imminence is alarmingly over-broad. Yet, as Heller comments, the 
traditional view of imminence under human rights law is ‘probably too strict outside of the 
domestic law-enforcement context.’ He believes the best interpretation to be such that, in the 
case of the three signatures mentioned above, the targets of such a strike: 
‘would have to be planning a specific attack, not simply preparing for unspecified 
future attacks. The second requirement, however, would be variable: as long as the 
United States could not feasibly use non-lethal means to neutralize the target, it could 
strike the target at any temporal stage of the intended attack – planning, preparing, or 
execution.’701 
This is also the interpretation of imminence proposed by Alston: 
‘the legal framework should take into account the possibility that a threat may be so 
imminent that a warning and the graduated use of force are too risky or futile (e.g. the 
suspect is about to use a weapon or blow himself up). At the same time, it must put in 
place safeguards to ensure that the evidence of imminence is reliable, based on a high 
degree of certainty, and does not circumvent the requirements of necessity and 
proportionality.’702 
The U.S. consistently justifies targeted killings by maintaining that every strike is conducted 
against an individual who poses an imminent threat.703 This comes with a number of conditions 
attached: 
‘…the condition that an operational leader present an “imminent” threat of violent 
attack against the United States does not require the United States to have clear 
evidence that a specific attack on U.S. persons and interests will take place in the 
immediate future.’704 
As such, a high-level official in a U.S. administration could conclude that: 
‘…an individual poses an “imminent threat” of violent attack against the United States. 
Moreover, where the al-Qa’ida member in question has recently been involved in 
activities posing an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States, and 
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there is no evidence suggesting that he has renounced or abandoned such activities, that 
member’s involvement in al-Qa’ida’s continuing terrorist campaign against the United 
States would support the conclusion that the member poses an imminent threat.’705 
This standard of ‘imminence’ flagrantly flouts the human rights standards around the use of 
lethal force. The U.S. has introduced the law enforcement terminology of imminence (while 
wildly distorting that conception of imminence) into what the U.S. argues is an armed conflict 
scenario -  yet this standard has no pertinence to the jus in bello. As such, the U.S. stands 
accused of mangling the law.706  
This is also the situation with regards to the United States’ assurance that the 2013 Presidential 
Policy Guidance, which does not apply to ‘areas of active hostilities’ (such as Syria, Iraq and 
Afghanistan), ‘generally requires an assessment that capture of the targeted individual is not 
feasible at the time of the operation.’707 The U.S. has decided that, as a matter of policy and 
not of law, it will make an assessment as to whether the capture of an individual is feasible 
before it decides to kill that individual. The U.S. of course cannot detail every instance in which 
capture is not feasible, but the Obama administration has stated the following: 
‘…terrorists are skilled at seeking remote, inhospitable terrain, places where the United 
States and our partners simply do not have the ability to arrest or capture them. At other 
times, our forces might have the ability to attempt capture, but only by putting the lives 
of our personnel at too great a risk. Often times, attempting capture could subject 
civilians to unacceptable risks. There are many reasons why capture might not be 
feasible, in which case lethal force might be the only remaining option to address the 
threat and prevent the attack.’708  
It appears from this statement that there are likely very few cases in which capture would be 
considered feasible, making force the first, rather than last resort, in cases where the danger 
presented by a targeted individual or group of individuals is not at all ‘imminent’.   
The issue of state consent for the targeting killing is also one that is often in flux. While consent 
has been given to the U.S. by Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, Pakistan’s consent was then 
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withdrawn, and while the consent of Yemen and Somalia continues, ‘the authority of those 
governments might call the validity of that consent into question.’709 Brian Egan, the former 
State Department Legal Adviser, has noted that: 
‘…the concept of consent can pose challenges in a world in which governments are 
rapidly changing, or have lost control of significant parts of their territory, or have 
shown no desire to address the threat... In particular, there will be cases in which…it is 
necessary to act in self-defense against the non-State actor in that State’s territory 
without the territorial State’s consent.’710 
Again, while the United States can use force in the territory of another state without that state’s 
prior consent, in response to an actual imminent threat, the use of force must still be consistent 
with the applicable legal framework.  
Rather than the ‘mangling’ of law being accidental or unintended, it reflects a deliberate 
attempt at obfuscation and deflection. The U.S. has approached the possible relevant regulatory 
frameworks of the targeted killing programme in an á la carte manner – ‘cherry picked from 
different legal regimes’, by amalgamating aspects of both international humanitarian law and 
international human rights law in their policy rhetoric, rather than simply abiding by the 
relevant rules in each case of targeted killing.711 In this way, the U.S. has purposely confused 
the applicable legal frameworks. While purporting to respect the applicable law, the U.S. has 
instead decided to acknowledge whichever rules it prefers in any given instance, with little 
evidence that they actually abide by these rules, regarding them instead as ‘discretionary rather 
than binding’.712  
 
Conclusion 
The fact that the U.S. has attempted to conflate human rights norms with the norms of the jus 
ad bellum, and stated that it will not target an individual ‘if it is feasible to capture the target at 
the time of the operation’ demonstrates that it is aware that it is international human rights law, 
and not the law of armed conflict, which applies to many of the drone strikes in the targeted 
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killing programme, even as the U.S. continues to deny international human rights law’s 
extraterritorial application and its complementary application with the law of armed conflict.  
In noting that ‘the drone campaign is saturated with the language of law’, Jaffer remarks that 
‘if this is law, it is law without limits – law without constraint.’713 And what is this a symbol 
of, other thank Kriegsraison? The political expedience and hyperbole of Kriegsraison is 
demonstrated in the actions and words of the U.S. in relation to its position on the 
extraterritoriality of international human rights law and its application in armed conflict. 
Despite the widely accepted positions that international human rights law applies 
extraterritorially, and continues to do so during armed conflict, the U.S. continues to actively 
resist this stance for reasons both policy and law-driven. It is far easier to describe the deaths 
of civilians in a drone strike as an ‘unfortunate’ or ‘tragic’ accident or as collateral damage 
when that strike takes place in the context of an armed conflict. Such arguments and positions 
are much less convincing, and harder to sustain, when, away from the battlefield or ‘hot spot’ 
of fighting, these individuals are imbued again with their right to life and those other rights 
which accompany it, and the decision to deprive them of their enjoyment of these rights must 
be convincingly explained and justified.  
The preceding legal analyses clarify the legality of the targeting killing programme, but it 
leaves two important questions unanswered, namely: why does the United States engage in 
such unlawful conduct, and how has it come to hold such contentious positions on international 
law and in the waging of war? The next chapter seeks to answer these questions through an 
examination of the place of war in U.S. history and national identity, and the domestic approach 
to Presidential war powers and international law. 
Chapter Five: The American Approach to National Security: War, Law, 
and National Identity 
 ‘We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality.’714 
Previous chapters have shown how the United States has contravened and manipulated 
international humanitarian law, international human rights law, and the international law on 
the use of force in the pursuit of the war on terror, and in particular through the targeted killing 
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programme. International law has long been a prized instrument in the United States’ imperial 
toolkit, but giving full attention only to those legal elements relevant to the targeted killing 
programme, and the reintroduction of the Kriegsraison doctrine, would entail a failure to 
consider the framework, within which the conditions that make the targeted killing programme 
possible, are systematically reproduced.715 It would also profoundly depoliticize both.716 As 
Marks writes, the issue of causation has always had a place in discussions of internationally 
protected human rights, and in the legal context, causation is particularly relevant to the 
determination of state responsibility for failure to comply with obligations.717 However, 
focusing on whether or not an actor can or should be held responsible for a legal wrong ‘does 
not address the question of why that wrong occurred, how it relates to other wrongs, or what 
its enabling conditions were.’718 When ‘the systemic context of abuses and vulnerabilities’ are 
‘removed from view’, attempts to explain human rights violations make them seem ‘random, 
accidental or arbitrary’: 
‘And if human rights violations are random, accidental or arbitrary, then the prospects 
of putting them to an end become as remote as though they belonged to the order of 
nature.’719  
As such, giving attention only to the legal aspects of the targeted killing programme and its 
violations of international human rights and international humanitarian law allows the United 
States to describe such violations using the language of ‘accidents’ and ‘tragic mistakes’ earlier 
described. Moreover, as Chimni argues, ‘the foreign policy of a state is integrally linked to its 
domestic policy.’720 An assessment of the legal reasoning of the U.S., absent an examination 
of the domestic realities that inform this reasoning, is ‘both too abstract and too specific’ to 
deal with the problem of targeted killing and America’s predilection for Kriegsraison: 
‘Legal argument frames its participants as abstract, self-contained individuals; as such 
it treats their actions, rather than the reasons for these actions, as decisive… these 
actions become relevant only in as much as they form the content of a dispute of abstract 
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individuals without ever touching on the logics which shape and condition their actions, 
and in this sense it is too abstract.721  
Furthermore, while legal argument can resolve specific violations of international law, ‘it never 
questions the general structural logics that lurk beneath them, and so cannot fully eradicate the 
problems it addresses.’722 This chapter attempts to understand more fully the general structural 
logic behind the United States’ targeted killing programme, to understand why the 
Kriegsraison doctrine has found its modern expression in U.S. practices today, and  to 
understand why the United States has such an ambivalent relationship with public international 
law. I aim to do so through an exploration of the influence of war and war-making on American 
national identity, with a particular focus on the place of war in The Federalist Papers; an 
examination of the centrality of law in U.S. society; an analysis of the war powers of the 
Executive Branch; and an enquiry into how U.S. presidents use their substantial executive 
power to influence international law creation and interpretation. The Federalist Papers are 
specifically examined here as they provide a compelling insight into the centrality of war and 
security in the creation of the modern American state, and in American national life, 
particularly as The Federalist Papers continue to influence readings of the U.S. Constitution 
in the present. 
 
War and American national identity 
War is not merely a shadow hanging over the United States of America; it is ‘the substance of 
American history’, argues historian Marilyn B. Young.723 Michael Sherry writes that America 
is ‘a nation deeply wedded to and defined by war, though maddeningly reluctant to admit it.’724 
War constitutes American history ‘as much as race, class, gender, religion, capitalism…’; it is 
the ‘engine’ of the American state and the ‘prototype’ for much of the state’s actions.725 War, 
argues Sherry – ‘gearing up for it, waging it, imagining many things in terms of it - is what the 
nation does’.726 ‘The seeds of the United States were sown in conflict’, writes Haas, ‘from the 
Battle of Lexington in 1775 to the ongoing war in Afghanistan and Syria, military conflict 
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reliably marks the time in U.S. history.’727 Or, as Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz puts it, ‘The United 
States has been at war every day since its founding, often covertly and often in several parts of 
the world at once.’728 
A national preoccupation with matters of war and security was in evidence during the creation 
of the U.S. Constitution, and can be traced even further back in history than this. The early 
colonists and their communities perpetuated and experienced extreme violence, and ‘the 
likelihood of violent consequences was never far from their minds.’729 For example, historians 
write that there were striking parallels between the earlier occupation of Ireland and the 
occupation of North America,730 and for approximately a century, from 1650 to about 1750, 
‘the English colonists in North America found themselves re-enacting on a small scale the 
horrors of Irish pacification and the Thirty Years War.’731  
The American colonies experienced warfare ‘less in terms of protection, of somehow insulating 
society against external violence…than in terms of retribution, of retaliating against violence 
already committed.’732 This perception has stayed the course of American history. In his history 
of American identity and the Vietnam War, Appy describes the ‘single potent assumption’ 
upon which stories of American victimhood are based: ‘our innocence and their treachery’: 
‘…virtually every U.S. war to follow [the colonisation of America] was justified as a 
righteous response to a real or imagined first strike by non-Americans – from the 
Boston Massacre (1770), to the siege of the Alamo (1836), to the sinking of the Maine 
(1898) and the Lusitania (1915), to the attack on Pearl Harbor (1941), to the Gulf of 
Tonkin incident (1964)… The standard story featured an unprovoked attack followed 
by glorious victory. Temporary victimhood was quickly forgotten in the glow of 
righteous retribution.’733 
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Similarly, writing on the aftermath of 9/11, Sherry refers to ‘a belief that had long undergirded 
America’s militarization’:  
‘whatever military system it had, its leaders presented it as forced on them by 
enemies—not America’s choice, not America’s doing, not done in the pursuit of power 
or in blind rage but in the interest of protection.’734 
With the advent in the 1700s of the long period of war between England and France, joined by 
Spain, the seventeenth-century military experience of the English colonists was intensified and 
perpetuated.735 These European wars had consequences for America’s English colonists, and 
left them ‘puzzled and frustrated’. Eventually: 
‘Strong but highly vulnerable, angered and frightened by repeated and ruthless attack, 
bewildered by the causes of war, disrupted by its effects, and powerless to prevent it, 
articulate English colonists by the end of the seventeenth century were making extreme 
proposals for the solutions of their military problem. Nothing would do…but the 
complete elimination of French and Spanish power from North America; anything less, 
it was claimed by those who purported to speak for America, was worse than useless, 
because it would create a false sense of security.’736 
Such ‘fantastic’ calls became commonplace, and by 1760 there already existed a ‘classic 
American demand for a definitive military solution’.737 These early experiences continue to 
have an important impact on the American approach to national security, and its perception 
and treatment of the jus ad bellum and jus in bello. As is discussed later, the framers of the U.S. 
constitution, for example, were heavily preoccupied with questions of national security and 
defence. The possibility of an internal war between the confederation of states themselves, and 
the threat of external hostility from foreign nations, was of great concern. As such, security has 
been one of the overarching and primary concerns in American national and political life since 
before the creation of the modern Constitution and was one of the most influential factors in 
its creation.  
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America’s military experiences in its first two centuries were formative, and in ‘a political, if 
not a physical sense’, military survival was a significant issue.738  
The issue of the military survival of the state itself was an issue until after the War of 1812, 
whereupon the U.S. entered ‘an age of free security’.739 For a century, America ‘enjoyed, and 
was conscious of enjoying, a remarkable freedom from external military threat.’740  By this 
time, certain attitudes toward security and war had been ‘implanted and powerfully 
reinforced.’741 A deep respect for military prowess, a ‘concept of military security that was 
expressed not in relative but in absolute terms’, and ‘an extraordinary optimism’ about what 
could be achieved by the employment of American military force, were foremost amongst such 
beliefs.742  Accompanying these convictions was a belief that ‘military security was an absolute 
value’. This belief continued to grow when little occurred to disabuse the U.S. of the notion, 
cumulating with a faith that American society had been ‘granted’ military security, 
‘presumably deserved it, and ought to be able to keep it.’743 The idea that the U.S. deserved 
absolute military security only reinforced further ‘the typically American belief that nothing 
less than a complete solution was required to solve the problem of American military 
security.’744 Both convictions continue to hold sway in American culture, and exert a 
considerable influence on U.S. war-making, just as they did in the nineteenth century.  
Even while America lived through its ‘age of free security’, it did experience conflict. The 
Civil War is, of course, a defining conflict in U.S. history, but it is the other wars – the Mexican 
War, the Spanish-American war, and many small wars against indigenous tribes, which Shy 
argues are most relevant to the American military experience.745 For the United States, each of 
these wars had a number of essential features in common, with the causes of each attributable 
to ‘atrocious behaviour by the enemy’. Although ‘enemy atrocities were by no means the only 
or even the main causes of these wars, and in all of them Americans themselves flagrantly 
broke the rules of civilized warfare…’:  
‘…the main point is that was very easy for Americans to explain and justify the 
outbreak of war in terms of the criminal conduct of an inhuman, perhaps degenerate, 
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foe. And once Americans had been attacked and killed, whether they were a few 
Western farmers or fur traders, a detachment of soldiers on the Rio Grande, or sailors 
on a battleship in Havana harbor, other arguments about the causes and objectives of 
war came to seem irrelevant.’746 
Victory in these wars, and the resulting gains in American territory and control, were seen as 
‘the natural rewards of superior virtue and military skills.’747 Later, America’s experiences 
during both World Wars reified these ‘historically implanted attitudes and beliefs’, as:  
‘delayed entry… followed by fairly uninterrupted progress towards victory, made it 
possible…for American’s to overlook the extent to which France, Britain, and Russia 
had worn down German strength, and instead to believe that the United States had really 
won the war.’748   
Writing in 1971, Shy contended that the United States, with its ‘absolute or dichotomous 
conception of security’, believes that ‘it is secure, or it is not; it is threatened, or it is not.’749 
Throughout American history, this absolute conception of security has markedly been 
expressed as absolute insecurity – as has been highlighted by President Donald Trump’s 
exhortation in his statement of support for Saudi Arabia in November 2018 that ‘the world is a 
very dangerous place!’750  
This national identity, built on a permanent sense of insecurity and coupled with ‘a fundamental 
self-confidence in the ability to fight’,751 contributes to what Marilyn B. Young identifies as a 
‘genuinely mad’ conviction: 
‘…that American power is such that it must prevail in any situation in which it has 
declared an interest; that the only obstacle to its triumph is the lack of determination to 
use that power.’752 
The events of 9/11, and the subsequent War on Terror, confirm that the United States continues 
to maintain the same absolute conception of security, and a confidence in its military abilities, 
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despite the fact that while the United States may excel at war, it no longer excels at winning 
it.753 Calls from successive U.S. presidents advocating for the complete eradication of terrorism 
and terrorist threats against the U.S. invoke the same fantastical and absolutist approach to 
national security, and making such rhetoric compatible with international law seems near 
impossible.  
 
American security in The Federalist Papers 
As has been noted, concerns around America’s security pre-date the Constitution, and 
abounded during its creation. While the “Founding Fathers” ‘certainly considered other 
motives when devising the new government’, ‘one of if not their primary purpose for the 
Constitution was the survival of the states…’.754  
The Founders presented the federal union as ‘the explicit solution to the problems of dwarfdom 
and vulnerability that had so afflicted previous republics’:755 
‘This union attempted to combine executive capability with mechanisms of popular 
accountability for a grouping of polities that were not city-states but rather as large and 
thus potentially powerful as a European nation-state, and that together would be as large 
as a Montesquieuean continental despotic empire. Their goal was nothing less than to 
transform the general prospects for free government by breaking the impasse of 
previous republics.’756 
The ‘provision of security through restraint on violence’ was therefore one of the Framers’ 
primary goals, with security an overarching issue at the Philadelphian Constitutional 
Convention in 1787.757 Totten explains that a common theme which emerged from speeches 
made at the Philadelphia Constitution Convention included the argument that: 
‘…constitutional reform was necessary to create a central government that could “draw 
forth the wealth and strength of the whole, for the defence of a part”, referring to how 
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the Constitution allowed for a federal authority to pool the resources of the union to 
protect its part from foreign powers.’758 
The first formal speech at the Convention, by Edmund Randolph, a representative for Virginia 
(who would later become the first United States Attorney General), criticised the existing 
Confederation for producing ‘no security against foreign invasion’, and its inability to ‘check 
the quarrels between states, nor a rebellion in any’.759 Randolph believed that uniting the States 
under the Constitution would make ‘our means of defence…greater… and the danger of attack 
less probable.’760 Future Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, John Marshall, also representing 
Virginia, argued that the objects of the national government would be ‘to protect the United 
States… Protection in time of war is one of its principal objects.’761 And, as Totten recounts: 
‘Well-known founders such as Fisher Ames, Bowdoin, Francis Dana, Ellsworth, 
Madison, John Marshall, Randolph, Roger Sherman, and Wilson, as well as many 
lesser-known leaders such as James Innes, Thomas McKean, and Thomas Thacher, 
repeatedly explained that the states would fall to foreign powers without stronger union 
under the new government.’762 
James Wilson, ‘considered the second “father” of the Constitution’, asserted that the adoption 
of the Constitution would secure the States ‘from danger and procure us advantages from 
foreign nations’, elaborating that: 
‘…this, in our situation, is of great consequence. We are still an inviting object to one 
European power at least, and, if we cannot defend ourselves, the temptation may 
become too alluring to be resisted.’763  
Meanwhile, Madison argued that federal authority was a necessity, because without a 
‘controuling [sic] power to call forth the strength of the Union to repel invasions, the country 
might be over-run and conquered by foreign enemies.’ 764   
More explicit articulations of the primacy of security concerns to the drafting of the 
Constitution are to be found in The Federalist Papers (hereafter the Papers), which proffer the 
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opinions of three of the “Founding Fathers” on the necessity of ratifying the new Constitution. 
In October 1787, Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, together under the 
pseudonym ‘Publius’, wrote the Papers, which are ‘often considered the primary explanation 
of the Constitution.’765 As Deudney explains, ‘Publius’ analyses the political theory of the 
American founding as ‘a new solution to the severe security problems that had animated 
Republican security theory from its ancient inception.’766  
Consisting of eighty-five essays, the Papers refer to ‘security’ 116 times, and ‘war’ and ‘wars’ 
79 times. Numbers 1-9, as well as 22-29 and 41-43, ‘concentrate entirely’ on security issues, 
ranging from defence against external enemies to the roles of the militia, army and navy.767 
Reflecting the same preoccupation with the need for national unity and concerns regarding war 
and defence as had been heard in the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, Publius 
repeatedly argues that the adoption of the new Constitution is necessary to ensure the security 
of the union. The threat of hostility is not considered to emanate solely from foreign nations; 
addressing the danger of internal conflict between members of the Union is a priority: 
‘America, if not connected at all, or only by the feeble tie of a simple league…would 
by the operation of such opposite and jarring alliances be gradually entangled in all the 
pernicious labyrinths of European politics and wars; and by the destructive contentions 
of the parts, into which she was divided would be likely to become a prey to the artifices 
and machinations of powers equally the enemies of them all.’768 
But it is hostile behaviour emanating from foreign nations that concerns Publius most in the 
first articles of the Papers. In Federalist 3, Publius, in this instance John Jay, argues that ‘a 
cordial Union, under an efficient national government, affords… the best security that can be 
devised against HOSTILITIES from abroad’, and further writes that ‘one good national 
government affords vastly more security against dangers of that sort [war] than can be derived 
from any other quarter.’769 The ‘people of America’, it is argued: 
‘are aware that inducements to war may arise… and that whenever such inducements 
may find fit time and opportunity for operation, pretenses to color and justify them will 
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not be wanting. Wisely, therefore, do they consider union and a good national 
government as necessary to put and keep them in SUCH A SITUATION as, instead of 
INVITING war, will tend to repress and discourage it. That situation consists in the 
best possible state of defense, and necessarily depends on the government, the arms, 
and the resources of the country.’770 
In Federalist 41, Publius (James Madison) writes that ‘Security against foreign danger is one 
of the primitive objects of civil society. It is an avowed and essential object of the American 
Union.’771 While it is argued in Federalist 3 that a national government, being ‘more temperate 
and cool’, would also be better at accommodating and settling amicably any likely cause of 
war, proceeding as it would with more ‘moderation and candour’, this coolness and moderation 
is lacking in those essays of the Papers which further elaborate on war, and the war powers 
granted to the respective branches of the federal government of the United States in the new 
constitution.772 In Federalist 4, Publius writes that ‘nations in general will make war whenever 
they have a prospect of getting anything by it’,773 which, as Levinson notes, presents an ‘almost 
Hobbesian vision of the international political system’.774 A similar vision is propounded in 
Federalist 31:  
‘To judge from the history of mankind, we shall be compelled to conclude that the fiery 
and destructive passions of war reign in the human breast with much more powerful 
sway than the mild and beneficent sentiments of peace; and that to model our political 
systems upon speculations of lasting tranquillity, is to calculate on the weaker springs 
of the human character.’775 
Twice in the Papers, Publius makes dismissive reference to ‘parchment barriers’ and 
‘parchment provisions’, and the prior-noted statements on war and foreign nations lead 
Levinson to posit that Publius: 
‘…may have viewed treaties with other nations as what he would describe in a 
later essay as “parchment barriers,” to be breached whenever it was thought 
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advantageous to do so. Peace – and protection of vital American interests – 
required strength, which he believed could come only through union.’776 
That Publius may have viewed treaties with other nations as mere ‘parchment barriers’ when 
vital American interests were at stake is compelling. On numerous occasions throughout the 
Papers, Publius writes on matters of defence in terms often starkly reminiscent of Kriegsraison. 
The following quote, penned by Alexander Hamilton and titled ‘The Necessity of a 
Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union’ (Federalist 23) 
reminds us again of the centrality of security to America:   
‘These powers (the ability to raise and support armies and navies and to establish rules 
to govern them) ought to exist without limitation, BECAUSE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO 
FORESEE OR DEFINE THE EXTENT AND VARIETY OF NATIONAL 
EXIGENCIES, OR THE CORRESPONDENT EXTENT AND VARIETY OF THE 
MEANS WHICH MAY BE NECESSARY TO SATISFY THEM. The circumstances 
that endanger the safety of nations are infinite, and for this reason no constitutional 
shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is committed… 
This is one of those truths which, to a correct and unprejudiced mind, carries its own 
evidence along with it; and may be obscured, but cannot be made plainer by argument 
or reasoning. It rests upon axioms as simple as they are universal; the MEANS ought 
to be proportioned to the END; the persons, from whose agency the attainment of any 
END is expected, ought to possess the MEANS by which it is to be attained’ (capitals 
in original).777 
The above quote, as Levinson remarks, still holds the power to startle.778 Later remarks by 
Publius (in this case, James Madison) support the above argument, and specifically invoke self-
preservation: 
‘With what color of propriety could the force necessary for defense be limited by those 
who cannot limit the force of offense? If a federal Constitution could chain the ambition 
or set bounds to the exertions of all other nations, then indeed might it prudently chain 
the discretion of its own government, and set bounds to the exertions for its own safety. 
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How could a readiness for war in time of peace be safely prohibited, unless we could 
prohibit, in like manner, the preparations and establishments of every hostile nation? 
The means of security can only be regulated by the means and the danger of attack. 
They will, in fact, be ever determined by these rules, and by no others. It is in vain to 
oppose constitutional barriers to the impulse of self-preservation. It is worse than in 
vain; because it plants in the Constitution itself necessary usurpations of power, every 
precedent of which is a germ of unnecessary and multiplied repetitions. If one nation 
maintains constantly a disciplined army, ready for the service of ambition or revenge, 
it obliges the most pacific nations who may be within the reach of its enterprises to take 
corresponding precautions.’779 
Self-preservation is referenced in similar terms again in Federalist 43. Publius (Madison again), 
writing further on the powers of the Constitution, argues that Constitutional ratification was 
required from only nine of the thirteen states of the Confederation because ‘To have required 
the unanimous ratification of the thirteen States, would have subjected the essential interests of 
the whole to the caprice or corruption of a single member.’ In answering the self-posed question 
‘On what principle the Confederation, which stands in the solemn form of a compact among 
the States, can be superseded without the unanimous consent of the parties to it?’, Publius 
writes: 
‘The first question is answered at once by recurring to the absolute necessity of the 
case; to the great principle of self-preservation; to the transcendent law of nature and of 
nature's God, which declares that the safety and happiness of society are the objects at 
which all political institutions aim, and to which all such institutions must be 
sacrificed.’780 
It is clear that the repetition of arguments of necessity and self-preservation ‘underscores the 
fact that there was nothing remotely inadvertent about such appeals.’781 As has been shown in 
previous chapters, similar appeals to ‘necessity’ are often made in alleged service to the 
security of the state today. We ‘simply cannot escape the extent to which the drums of war 
provide the background accompaniment to most of Publius’s arguments for adoption of the 
                                                           
779 Federalist No. 41 (n758). 
780 Federalist No. 43. Available at: https://www.congress.gov/resources/display/content/The+Federalist+Papers; 
Levinson notes that the relevant quote features the only reference to God in any of the 85 essays of The Federalist Papers. 
Levinson (n761) 162. 
781 Levinson (n761) 162. 
  189 
new U.S. Constitution.’782 Nor can we escape the sound of those drums, which continue to 
reverberate through American political life some 230 years later.  
The Founders’ security concerns were enshrined within the Constitution. The Preamble to the 
Constitution explains that the Constitution will ‘provide for the common defense’, and in 
Article IV section 4 guarantees ‘to every States in this Union a Republic form of Government’ 
which will ‘protect each of them against Invasion.’783 Porter notes that ‘of the eighteen clauses 
defining the powers of Congress, nine directly concern military affairs’.784 The Papers continue 
to exert considerable influence on constitutional interpretation and wider American political 
life. Wood argues that this is because America’s “Founding Fathers” continue to have a ‘special 
significance’ for Americans, a significance that is often linked to the relative youthfulness of 
the United States and its founding ‘on a set of beliefs, and not...on a common ethnicity, 
language or religion.’785 As a result, in order to establish their nationhood, Americans ‘have to 
reaffirm and reinforce periodically the values of the men who declared independence from 
Great Britain and framed the Constitution.’786 ‘As long as the Republic endures’, says Wood, 
‘Americans are destined to look back to its founding.’787 Writing on the influence of the Papers 
on the Supreme Court, Durchslag posits that: 
‘citing “the Framers” generally and The Federalist Papers particularly is the secular 
equivalent to citing the Bible. It is an appeal to a higher and more revered authority. It 
not only establishes an ethos of objectivity but the perception of infallibility.’788 
Of course, the Declaration of Independence and the “Founding Fathers” do not hold the same 
appeal for all peoples, and the idea that there existed ‘one American people’, though fatuous, 
was oft-repeated.789 In Federalist 2, Publius wrote that: 
‘Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country to one united people 
– a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing 
the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their 
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manners and customs, and who, by their joint counsels, arms, and efforts, fighting side 
by side throughout a long and bloody war, have nobly established general liberty and 
independence.’790 
That the United States, even in 1787, consisted of ‘one united people’, with the same language 
and the same religious beliefs, is obviously erroneous. Levinson points out that even among 
the British settlers, ‘there were remarkable variations of background.’791 Statements alluding 
to ‘one connected country’ and ‘one united people’ are quite telling as to whom the “Founding 
Fathers” considered as American, and telling as to the racial, ethnic, and religious identities of 
the “Founding Fathers” themselves. Commenting on the ‘myth of American unity’ today, the 
author and journalist Ta-Nehisi Coates notes that ‘American unity has always been the unity 
of the conquistadors and colonizers.’792 Indeed, the character of the American revolution was 
not one in which the revolutionaries aimed to liberate themselves and wrest their identity away 
from a coloniser; rather, it was one in which the revolutionaries ‘were asserting their superior 
rights as colonizers, claiming to be better representatives of the civilization being brought to 
the New World and denouncing Britain for treating them as colonial subjects rather than 
actors.’793  
In any case, the increasing racial, ethnic, and religious diversity of the United States made it 
‘ever less feasible to base American nationalism on nationality.’794 After the War of 
Independence, American society was as fractured as it had ever been, and, argues McDonnell, 
the Constitution and other national institutions were created through ‘a sheer act of will’ by a 
‘small group of elites’ – the “Founding Fathers” – to foster amongst the wider public a national 
identity that, at that point in time, was non-existent.795 Indeed, McDonnell determines that  the 
Constitution was ratified ‘not on the basis of a new and popular national identity forged in the 
revolutionary war, but despite an anti-national legacy, and in a critical sense, because of it.’796 
The republican beliefs upon which the United States was founded grew to become a ‘very 
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developed and self-conscious republican political ideological tradition’, and a central indicator 
of American identity:797 
‘Americans first and foremost thought of themselves as ‘free’ and ‘virtuous’. At a time 
when individual freedom, political democracy, and social egalitarianism were rare and 
widely perceived to be precarious, this fundamental liberalism of the American people 
was both a potent and distinguishing basis of political identity.’798  
Of course, these republican beliefs and values were altogether inconsistent with ‘the United 
States’ disparate treatment of those deemed Other.’799 ‘Freedom’ and ‘Liberty’ did not apply 
to subjugated Native Americans and black slaves. Whiteness was a key element in determining 
eligibility for consideration as an American and of citizenship, and, at that, ideally that 
whiteness came of British or North-western European descent.800  
‘In many ways’, writes Appy, ‘the nation was founded on the faith that it was blessed with 
unrivalled resources, freedoms, and prospects’, and these convictions become so deeply held 
and so deeply engrained in the American psyche that they were ‘beyond debate.’801 
Yet, even today, the idea that American citizens are ‘freer’ than those of other countries remains 
strong, and as Deudney and Vaswani have noted, the notion that the American regime and the 
American people are exceptional in their commitment to ‘freedom’ remains vibrant in 
American popular discourse:802 
‘According to this line of thought, the United States has been, through most of its 
history, sufficiently extraordinary in its ‘liberalism’ (in the broad sense of individual 
liberty, popular sovereignty, private property and limited constitutional government) to 
be not just different, but ‘exceptional’.803 
In an oxymoronic manner, another phenomenon has served to further support the confidence 
of many Americans in their republican values – war.   As has already been discussed, war and 
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security were central in the development of America’s political system, ‘shaping the 
institutions of American government and stimulating its growth.’804 Not only were these 
concerns extremely pertinent in the creation of the Constitution, but war and conflict, for 
example, also led to the ‘first central administrative organs of American government came into 
being’ during the War of Independence, while the Civil War invigorated and strengthened a 
previously much weaker Federal Government.805 War was similarly important in the creation 
of American national identity. As has been mentioned, the Constitution itself came of a desire 
for security and attempts to solidify American identity after the War of Independence, while 
World War II is said to have given ‘unprecedented salience to the ideological dimension: for 
‘a whole generation, the question “what does it mean to be an American?” was answered 
primarily by reference to “the values America stands for”…’806 
With its many and disparate ethnic, racial and religious groups, war became a cultural and 
political touchstone for American society, with ‘the collective efforts entailed in waging war’ 
becoming ‘one of the most important factors in shaping America’s consciousness of itself as a 
unified nation’:807 
‘War for America was “a factor as important as geography, immigration, the growth of 
business, the separation of powers…” War served as an engine of nationalism, a 
socializing and integrating force that united Americans of diverse origins in common 
efforts both on the battlefield and the home front. Every constitutional extension of the 
suffrage in American history – the 15th, 19th, and 26th Amendments – was enacted 
during or in the immediate aftermath of war.’808  
As Young has posited, the United States has been involved in war to the point that America’s 
‘progression’ of wars looks ‘less like a progression than a continuation…’;809 Dudziak observes 
that war is embedded in American culture to the point that it is a feature of everyday life;810 
Sherry argues that war has become both a habit and a way of life for the United States.811 The 
set of founding beliefs integral to American mythos, the ‘American creed’ of ‘freedom, 
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equality, justice and humanity’,812 combined with America’s militancy and its dichotomous 
approach to military security, have led to a conception of national identity in which we find 
‘two quite different representations of U.S. identity – one which is characterized by 
universalism and one which is characterized by particularism.’813 ‘The global military 
supremacy that the United States presently enjoys – and is bent on perpetuating – has become 
central to our national identity’, writes Bacevich.814  
On the one hand, the U.S. is a bastion of liberal, republican values. On the other, despite these 
values being considered universal, the U.S. is exceptional in the ‘freedom’ it embodies. It is 
widely accepted that military force should be used to protect this ‘freedom’. Both these 
representations are usually deployed together, coalescing to create a representation of America 
as a powerful sovereign state, exceptional in its embodiment of universal values.815 An inherent 
tension exists within such representations, explains Lock: 
‘The pursuit of military pre-eminence and the unconstrained use of force against 
existential threats is inconsistent with the construction of international rules and norms 
that might regulate international society and therefore require restraint on the part of 
the members of that society.’816 
Yet American war-making has ‘strengthened rather than weakened American national identity 
as liberal and democratic.’817 Conflicts in which America has been involved are: 
‘explicitly constructed, interpreted and justified by leaders and viewed by large 
segments of the American public as wars to establish, expand or preserve free 
institutions against adversaries who were less liberal or anti-liberal.’818  
Even the Vietnam War, which saw the creation of one of the largest ever American protest 
movements and which triggered the questioning of core assumptions about American identity 
by many, failed to have a substantial long-term effect on American war-making. Writes Appy: 
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‘The war divided every significant class, group, and category of Americans. There were 
bitter debates about the war within both major political parties, all the military branches, 
every religious denomination, every race and region, every school, every union and 
professional organization, the young and the old, the rich and the poor… It was no 
longer possible to see America as inevitably victorious and invincible; no longer 
possible for a vast majority of citizens to regard their nation as the greatest on earth or 
a clear force for good in the world.’819 
Yet, any lessons learned in Vietnam did not stick.820 Instead, an idea of the Vietnam war as an 
American tragedy ‘that victimized our troops, our pride, our national identity’ was reinforced: 
‘the destruction of Vietnam was supplanted by American suffering.’821 An effort to rebuild 
American pride began under President Ronald Reagan – an effort that ‘required some serious 
scrubbing of the historical record.’822Appy observes that while ‘few Americans still believed 
their country had been “forced” to fight in Vietnam’, Reagan ‘certainly tapped a widespread 
desire to recover a faith in national virtue and resolve.’823 Meanwhile, post-Vietnam 
nationalism contains striking similarities to the nationalism seen in the U.S. today: 
‘Post-Vietnam nationalism contained a deep animus toward “big government.” By that, 
most people meant the immense, federal, civilian “bureaucracy.” According to the most 
strident New Right critics, the government was a faceless bastion of waste, 
incompetence, and oppressive rule-mongering that was stripping the nation of the kind 
of virtues on display in Top Gun and The A-Team. Yet their critique carefully excluded 
the government’s most significant institution – the military. The military could still be 
heroic, along with “anti-government” political leaders like President Reagan.’824 
The United States’ ‘genuinely mad’ conviction that ‘the only obstacle to its triumph is the lack 
of determination to use that power’ was certainly in evidence in the years after Vietnam, when 
the political right argued that the U.S. had lost the war ‘only because soldiers had been “denied 
permission to win.”’825 Similarly, much as the Bush administration dismissed the Geneva 
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Conventions as ‘obsolete’,826 President Trump argues today that giving the military ‘total 
authorization’ has made a ‘tremendous difference’ to the conflict in Afghanistan.827  
Paradoxically, there is a strong history of considerable resistance to a robust centralised state 
in the U.S. One of the central attributes of this resistance had long been situated in hostility to 
standing armies. Indeed, as a standing army involved ‘both high taxes and the threat of royal 
tyranny’, this hostility was ‘a central motivation for the American revolt against Britain’.828 
The ‘Founding Father’s saw standing armies as ‘antithetical to liberty’.829 James Madison, a 
staunch supporter of a centralised state, argued at the 1787 Philadelphian Constitutional 
Convention that ‘a standing military force, with an overgrown Executive will not long be safe 
companions to liberty. The means of defence against foreign danger, have been always the 
instruments of tyranny at home.’830 Bacevich observes that this did not mean that, in practice, 
Americans ‘were given to pacifism. If anything, the reverse was true.’ Prior to the creation of 
Truman’s National Security Act (NSA) of 1947, which led to a major restructuring of the U.S. 
government’s military and intelligence branches, the U.S supplemented its small, standing 
army by resorting to conscription. It did so to fight three wars – the Civil War, WWI and WWII 
– but, as Lieven notes, ‘each time, victory was followed by very rapid demobilization.’831 
The substantial standing army in existence today, along with the United States’ enormous 
defence budget of some $695 billion dollars (more than the next seven countries combined)832 
comes as a result of Cold War foreign and defence policy and is entirely without precedent in 
American history. With the inauguration of the 1947 NSA and 1950’s National Security 
Council document number 68 (NSC-68), which ‘established the parameters and rationale for 
post-war United States foreign policy’833, the growth of military spending and the ‘military-
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industrial-academic sector’ became ‘fundamental to the U.S. economy, U.S. economic growth, 
and above all, U.S. technological development.’834   
That the republican, liberal identity that associates American ‘freedom’ with war-making 
persists, despite the fact that, since the Cold War, war-making has strengthened the centralised 
American state and the Executive Branch, and weakened ‘various forms of popular and 
individual liberty’,835 is attributed to ‘the historical fact that there existed a strong ‘liberty 
gradient’ between the United States and its principle military adversaries’, in terms of their 
systems of government:836 
‘…that the United States was ‘first in freedom’, historically precocious in its adaptation 
of liberal-democratic forms, means that its inter-state rivalries and wars inherently were 
more likely to be against non-liberal and anti-liberal states. In short, because it was an 
‘early liberalizer’, the process of nation and state-building in international war-making 
strengthened rather than weakened liberal-democratic political identity in America.’837 
After the Cold War, demobilisation did not occur. Instead, the military retained the central 
position in U.S. national life that it occupies today. Bacevich identifies four premises that have 
steered U.S. military policy since the end of the Cold War: ‘…a broad (if unratified) consensus 
regarding the inherent desirability of military power; a commitment to maintaining U.S. global 
military supremacy in perpetuity; and support for maximising the utility of U.S. military might 
by pursuing an ambitious, activist agenda’, as well as the maintenance of the international 
order, ‘thereby enabling the processes of globalization to continue and the American people to 
reap its rewards.’838 
This national identity, which is strongly informed by a belief in valorous war-making for the 
furthering of ‘fundamental freedoms’, combined with the militarisation of U.S. society and the 
United States’ approach to military security, has had a profound impact on America’s 
relationship with its domestic war powers and international law.  
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A nation of war, a nation of law 
The United States is not only a country built on war, but a country built on law.839 It has been 
stated that law is ‘the central instrument of the self-constituting of American society.’840 Scott 
argues that it is due to the ‘centrality of law in the US psyche and in the conduct of its foreign 
relations’ that the U.S. often defends legally dubious actions ‘with contrived legal justifications 
that lose sight of the spirit, if not the letter, of the relevant law.’841 In other words, the legalistic 
nature of the U.S. domestic sphere extends into its international relations and foreign policy. 
Because the U.S. believes itself to be a protector and defender of those universal values which 
it claims to embody, it refuses to perceive of itself as a violator of international law and attempts 
to tailor international law to fit its policy positions, rather than the other way around. ‘State 
identity shapes states interests which in turn shape policy over time’, and the tensions in 
American national identity – that of being an exceptional state which embodies universal values 
and therefore must be protected – come to the fore in America’s relationship with international 
law.842 The U.S. has long presented itself as a champion of international institutions and 
international law, but tends to engage with international law only to the extent that it believes 
the law will maintain or further U.S. security. Scott argues that ‘the nature of US engagement 
with international law has contributed to the relative power of the United States’,843 and that 
America’s relationship with international law is the ‘pursuit of legal security’.844 Where 
international law impedes or frustrates U.S. action, the U.S. tends to either ignore it and act 
anyway, as in the case of President Trump’s strikes in Syria against the Syrian government, or 
attempts to reconcile its unlawful positions with international law through the use of legalistic 
language, á la the targeted killing programme. 
This has been the case since the foundation of the United States. The ‘Founding Fathers’ 
attempted to secure the United States from external threats ‘by gaining recognition from the 
European powers of its independence and rights under international law.’845 As such, ‘the early 
American Republic embraced…the law of nations as a means of consolidating the sovereignty 
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of its people and securing its place among an international society of sovereign states.’846 It 
was also a strong supporter of the institutions of international society, as they afforded the U.S. 
‘some relief from European predation.’847 However, in invoking the law of nations, the 
‘Founding Fathers’ were also immediately coming into conflict with that law. At that time, 
there was no right of self-determination under international law and colonies did not have a 
right to rebel, and it was therefore not possible to base their claims for independence in legal 
terms.848 Furthermore: 
‘the international law they invoked…explicitly privileged the rights of colonizing 
powers over Indigenous peoples, and in asserting a legal right to rebel under these 
conditions the colonial leaders certainly were not prepared to recognize a similar right 
of American Indians to self-determination.’849 
Notably, one of the grounds on which the revolutionaries claimed a right of self-determination 
was by proffering the accusation that the British monarch’s actions ‘were leaving them 
unprotected against “the merciless Indian Savages whose known rule of warfare, is an 
undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes, and conditions.”’850 The United States, then, has 
been creating exceptions to the application of international law to itself on the grounds of 
security since its creation. Indeed, ‘its very existence represented an American exception to the 
prevailing structures of international legal theory, rationalized by the American claim to more 
fully represent the principles of freedom and democracy within a “higher” and universally 
applicable law’, with identification as a “government of laws, not of men” central to American 
claims to legitimacy.851 The Declaration of Independence itself, argues Taylor Saito, is a 
declaration of the existence of ‘an unprecedented entity’: 
‘…a settler colonial state claiming that it should be recognized as a member of the 
hitherto exclusively European community of “civilized” nations because it represented 
a more evolved, “progressive” phase of Western civilization. To justify this expansion 
of the prevailing European paradigm, and its radical divergence from international law 
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as then framed, the American leaders called upon a “higher” law, a natural law that 
recognized freedom, equality and democracy as inherent rights.’852 
At the domestic level, the concept of “rule of law”: 
‘permeates the Constitution from its initial recognition of “We the People” to its explicit 
creation of a government of limited power, its complex system of checks and balances, 
and its specification of “the supreme Law of the land.’853 
The ‘Founding Fathers’ were especially concerned with the conception of America as a 
‘government of laws’, as a legal framework helped to further legitimise ‘their claims for 
dominion over lands and peoples, for law was essential to distinguishing civilization from a 
“state of nature”.854 This, too, necessarily involved the embrace of international law to further 
the legitimacy and equality of the United States of America with other members of the 
‘community of “civilized nations”’.855   
On many fronts, as discussed in previous chapters, the U.S. no longer embraces international 
law. Ralph puts forward the argument that perhaps this is so because of a fundamental 
mismatch between the United States’ republican values and the universalism of human rights: 
‘…as international society has evolved to include all human beings as rights-bearing 
citizens and as it considers delegating judicial authority to supranational courts in order 
to protect those rights, the match between republican and international principles has 
come under threat.’856 
Both Deudney and Ralph assert that this behaviour can partially be explained by America’s 
conception of itself not just as a self-governing republic, but as a self-governing republic that 
exemplifies universal, liberal values. For Ralph, the tensions inherent in U.S. interactions with 
international law can be understood: 
‘if one considers that the United States is founded on the universalist principles of 
natural law while simultaneously claiming to be a self-governing Republic with no 
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international obligations other than those the representatives of the American people 
accept on their behalf.’857 
Ralph illustrates this point with reference to the United States’ approach to the ICC, and a 
discussion of the U.S. Alien Tort Statute and the Filártiga decision. Objections to the ICC, he 
says, arise from U.S. politicians who believe that the Court is not accountable to democratically 
elected politicians, and is therefore open to abuse.858 Noting that supporters of the Court have 
pointed out that the Prosecutor can be checked by pre-trial judges and that all Court officials 
are accountable to the Assembly of State Parties, he writes: 
‘This is no consolation for American opponents of the Court whose main concerns is 
not checks and balances per se, but those specific checks and balances that hold 
prosecutors to account before the American people. In this respect, the issue of 
American opposition to the ICC is not a different conception of accountability but a 
different conception of the community that politicians, prosecutors and judges are 
accountable to.’859 
With regard to the jurisdiction issue, in which the ICC asserts its jurisdiction over those 
American citizens who are accused of committing crimes on the territory of ICC state parties, 
the Bush administration, and subsequent U.S. administrations, have regarded this as ‘a threat 
to U.S. sovereignty and thus to U.S. constitutional democracy.’860 This reminds us that while 
the U.S. may claim to share the Court’s values, ‘US opposition to the ICC reminds us that the 
American Revolution was as much about asserting the independence of a particular community 
as it was about that community being governed by the rule of universal law.’861 The American 
Revolution was not, after all, ‘a war of rebellion by one ethnic or religious group against 
domination by another. Rather, this struggle was understood by Americans to be about the 
defence of their traditional rights as Englishmen.’862  
Regarding customary international law, the Filártiga decision concerned Dolly Filártiga, a 
resident of the U.S. who had sued Norberto Peña-Irala, the former Inspector General of Police 
in Asuncion, for her brother’s torture and murder. Both were Paraguayan citizens and the 
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alleged crime had occurred in Paraguay. Peña-Irala had been arrested in the U.S. for being an 
illegal alien, and Filártiga, hearing of his arrest, sued him in the United States. The Second 
Court of Appeals found in favour of Filártiga, overturning an earlier decision by the court for 
the Eastern District of New York, which had dismissed the case. The Appeals Court found that 
in §1350 of the 1789 Judiciary Act, known as the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), the first Congress 
had ‘established District Court jurisdiction over “all causes where an alien sues for a tort only 
(committed) in violation of the law of nations.”’863 The Court of Appeals stated: 
‘Construing this rarely-invoked provision, we hold that deliberate torture perpetrated 
under color of official authority violates universally accepted norms of the international 
law of human rights, regardless of the nationality of the parties. Thus, whenever an 
alleged torturer is found and served with process by an alien within our borders §1350 
provides federal jurisdiction.’ 
This judgment was particularly controversial, notes Ralph, ‘because the Second Court applied 
an interpretation of customary international law on torture that had not, at that time, been 
approved by Congress in the form of a statute or a treaty.’864  While opponents to ATS litigation 
in general ‘complain that it complicates investment decisions and that it impedes the fight 
against terrorism’, these arguments are secondary and ‘marginal compared with those that 
oppose ATS litigation on the grounds of American identity.’865  Bradley provides an example 
of an identity-linked resistance to the application of customary international law: 
‘The most populist branch of government, the Congress, has at best a very indirect role in 
the formation of customary international law. Rather, US involvement in customary 
international law formation comes primarily from the Executive Branch. Nor, even with 
that involvement, is there any guarantee that the US position will prevail or that customary 
international law will reflect US legal traditions and culture. The United States simply has 
one important voice in a community of over 190 diverse states.’866 
For many Americans, argues Ralph, customary international law is a law that exists in ‘the 
normative imagination of legal scholars’, which has neither received the consent of the 
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American people nor the consideration of their representatives. Because of this, application of 
customary international law: 
‘cannot possibly be consistent with a notion of good international citizenship because it 
ultimately undermines the independence of peoples who have proclaimed the right to be 
self-governing, and although critics like Bradley do not use this kind of language, they 
clearly oppose Filártiga because in their eyes it cannot be squared with the idea of the 
United States as a self-governing Republic.’ 
Criticism of this and other ATS litigation provides: 
‘the decision on when and what aspects of international law should be applied is 
ultimately a political decision. This is necessary not only because the sovereignty of the 
American people is expressed through their political representatives but also because 
the Constitution has clearly invested the power to conduct foreign relations in the 
political branches of government. From this perspective then, the direct application of 
customary international law…undermines the principles of republicanism and is thus a 
threat to the vision of an international society based on orderly relations between self-
governing republics.’867 
Meanwhile, Deudney argues that any liberal internationalism which the United States 
proclaims to advance through international organisations is largely due to necessity, rather than 
any kind of Wilsonian idealism – in this reading, liberal internationalism is ‘the continuation 
of isolationist republicanism in interdependent circumstances’:868 
‘the republican security agenda of Liberal internationalism seeks to populate the 
international system with republics and to abridge international anarchy in order to 
avoid the transformation of the American limited government constitutional order into 
a hierarchical state.’ 
As Taylor Saito points out, U.S. history with international organisations is highly contradictory 
– the U.S., in certain domains, has exerted ‘tremendous influence over the development of 
international institutions and simultaneously prevented them from fulfilling their potential’. On 
the other hand, the U.S. has, in general, tended to act quite quickly and in favour of international 
economic agreements and treaties. Rather than isolationism, then, the U.S. approach ‘is perhaps 
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more accurately described in terms of the tension between unilateralism and multilateralism’, 
with these contradictory positions reconciled ‘when viewed through the lens of perceived 
American “interests” …’869 Almost always, writes Taylor Saito, ‘those advocating for 
unilateral or multilateral policies and practices …have agreed about the underlying principle 
of “America First.”870  
This republican security agenda was certainly in evidence during the presidency of Woodrow 
Wilson, when we first see U.S. foreign policy positions justified with legalistic rhetoric and 
appeals to higher ideals. America’s entry into the First World War, for example, was framed 
by Wilson not as a war waged to protect American interests, but as ‘a war fought to make the 
world safe for democracy’, with Wilson telling Congress that the German people ‘were not to 
be blamed’ for the war, as the war was ‘determined upon as wars used to be determined upon 
in the old, unhappy days when peoples were nowhere consulted by their rulers.’871 ‘Self-
governed nations’, he said: 
‘do not…set the course of intrigue to bring about some critical posture of affairs which 
will give them an opportunity to strike and make conquest. Such designs can be 
successfully worked out only under cover and where no one has the right to ask 
questions.’872 
And while Wilson’s League of Nations ultimately failed, partially due to the fact that the U.S. 
was not a member, its establishment ‘marked a significant transition from an international legal 
system in which individual legal states were the only recognized subjects, or actors, to one in 
which those states had come together to create a supranational actor.’873 Since the presidency 
of Theodore Roosevelt, U.S. leaders have seen: 
‘the development of an effective international legal system that would promote political 
stability and pave the way for economic expansion as very much in its national interest, 
and U.S. lawyers, operating solidly in the positivist tradition, played a significant role 
in ensuring its consolidation.’874 
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But it was Wilson’s foreign policy, and its linking of American security with ‘universal values’, 
which paved the way for future U.S. involvement with international organisations. Walker 
notes that Wilson’s goal with his Fourteen Point Plan was ‘comparable to that of America’s 
founding generation in that all peoples should aspire to republican governance, whereas the 
reality was that it would come sooner for some than for others…’.875 Wilsonianism was infused 
with a logic of security, which turned: 
‘the exceptionalist credo from an ideal, which others might emulate, into a tocsin, a call 
to arms as it were, compelling the export of market capitalism and growth of democracy 
in the name of security…To be sure, Wilsonianism had an idealistic sheen; it also 
proffered a vision of political economy and a willingness to employ force… 
Wilsonianism and the various foreign policies it spawned were quintessentially 
American: They comprised an end-of-history project.’876 
‘The Wilsonian paradigm,  - as worldview and as a basis for charting and articulating the 
nation’s purpose – left an indelible imprint on American statecraft’, writes Bacevich, and at its 
core, Wilson’s vision ‘sought a world remade in America’s image and therefore permanently 
at peace.’877 From Wilson onward, the U.S. has consciously associated its approach to foreign 
policy and international law as one of ‘universal values’ promotion. Even prior to the United 
States’ entry into World War II, President Franklin D. Roosevelt stated that the war ‘directly 
assailed’ the ‘democratic way of life’, arguing that ‘the future and the safety of our country and 
of our democracy are overwhelmingly involved in events far beyond our borders’.878 Roosevelt 
also ‘laid the groundwork for what would be a new global order by “look[ing] forward to a 
world founded upon four essential human freedoms.” Freedom, said Roosevelt, “means the 
supremacy of human rights everywhere… To that high concept there can be no end save 
victory.”879  
This identity is also intrinsically linked with the concept of ‘civilization’ and of the civilizing 
power of law. The concept of law as a product of Western civilization, and of the United States 
as the ideal and greatest example of Western civilization, as both a bastion and defender of the 
‘product’, continues to exert great influence on American national identity, on American 
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foreign policy, and on American interpretations of international law, all of which have had 
significant consequences for international law and the international community.880 The United 
States, through its words and deeds, exemplifies ‘the belief that civilization constructs law’: 
‘…and that, because civilization is ever evolving towards higher stages, law as it is 
known at one stage of the process can be overridden in the interest of the further 
development or expansion of civilization. In turn, this belief has facilitated U.S. 
deviations from accepted international law, for when the larger goals of U.S. growth 
have conflicted with law, law has been “trumped” fairly consistently by the benefits to 
civilization said to accrue from such expansion.”881 
Indeed, the most recent example of a U.S. president invoking terms such as ‘civilization’ and 
‘barbarity’ in relation to an unlawful use of force has also provided one of the most blatant 
examples of a President not just overstepping, but ignoring, their domestic war powers, in a 
use of force which was also a clear and stark violation of international law. In April 2018, 
President Trump announced that the U.S., despite the lack of Congressional authorization and 
absent any direct threat to the United States, would carry out military strikes against targets of 
the Al-Assad regime in Syria. President Trump noted that, a century ago, ‘civilized nations’ 
had joined together to ban the use of chemical weapons in warfare.882 Trump asked Russia if it 
would ‘join with civilized nations as a force for stability and peace.’883 Arguing that the U.S., 
British, and French strikes were intended to provide a deterrent to further use of these weapons, 
Trump described the strikes as an example of Britain, France, and the United States marshalling 
their ‘righteous power against barbarism and brutality.’884 This vision of the United States as 
the epitome of Western civilisation, and as the defender of its associated values, coupled with 
a national identity which, to a great extent, has been forged through the waging of war, has not 
only had had consequences internationally. It has also had serious implications for U.S. 
presidential power and for domestic war powers.  
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War powers in the United States: The Imperial Executive Branch and the Irrelevance of 
Congress? 
As has been discussed, the U.S. has played an important role in international law creation. 
Within the U.S., it is the President and the Executive Branch who possess the most power over 
international law interpretation and enforcement. It is therefore important to understand U.S. 
domestic law on the use of force and the division of war-making powers in the U.S. federal 
government, as this is ‘crucial for understanding how the United States conceptualizes and 
engages with international law on the use of force’.885  As Bradley and Galbraith note:  
‘Because the United States plays such a major role in relation to international law on 
the use of force – even though U.S. positions on this law are often in tension with 
prevailing interpretations – U.S. domestic law on the use of force has an important, 
though indirect, effect on the shape and development of international law.’886 
U.S. war-making powers, presidential power over international law, and the place of 
international law in the U.S. legal system are hotly debated and widely interpreted. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to draw some conclusions as to what the Executive Branch itself 
perceives its powers over each of the first two areas to be, and to what extent it needs to take 
account of opinions of and from the third. Each of these three areas will be examined in turn.  
 
War powers and the U.S. Executive Branch 
With the U.S. being ‘so practiced in the application of military force’, writes Haas: 
‘the uninitiated might reasonably expect that the American political apparatus for 
employing the military works like a well-oiled machine. In truth, the federal 
government’s power to make war represents a longstanding and contentious issue 
between the chief executive and the legislature, between a so-called imperial presidency 
and a watchdog Congress.’887 
War-making powers in the U.S. are divided between Congress and the Executive Branch, and 
in theory (though, as is discussed, not in practice), the Executive Branch’s ability to approve 
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the use of force is constrained by Congressional powers. Under the division of the war powers 
of the U.S. federal government according to the U.S. Constitution, the President is the 
Commander in Chief of the armed forces, as is stipulated in Article II, but it is Congress that 
has the power to declare war, and to raise and support the armed forces, according to Article 
I.888 The difference in language between Article I and Article II means that Congressional 
powers are ‘exhaustive’, with Congress not allowed to do more than enumerated, while the 
illustrated powers for the Executive Branch are ‘illustrative’, ‘implying the existence of powers 
not specifically mentioned in the government’s written charter. As a result, advocates for 
increased presidential war making infer from this distinction just such power.’889 Thus there is 
substantial debate as to the exact scope of Executive Branch power as it relates to national 
security, given that the U.S. constitution contains only a limited discussion of and reference to 
those powers,890 and neither the term ‘national security’ nor ‘foreign affairs’ is used or referred 
to in the text of the constitution.891 Gonzales identifies the three sources of presidential power 
most commonly cited by judges and scholars relating to the areas of national security and 
foreign affairs: ‘authority expressly granted by the U.S. Constitution’; ‘authority granted by 
Congress by statute or through a declaration of war or authorization to use force’; and ‘inherent 
or implied authority emanating from the Constitution.’ Even in the case of that authority 
expressly granted by the Constitution and authority granted by Congress, however, Gonzales 
writes that: 
‘…while the text of the Constitution or a congressional statute may appear 
unambiguous, the authority of the Executive Branch to exercise discretion in the 
execution of our laws affords the President great flexibility. This in turn often gives rise 
to disagreements between the elected branches over the scope of power even when a 
statute or the Constitution appears unambiguous on its face.’892 
While Gonzales (who, it should be noted, acted as legal counsel to Bush administration from 
2001-2005), admits that from ‘a strict construction of the Constitution’s text… the President 
cannot declare war’, and that ‘one can argue that the President has no authority (beyond acting 
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in self-defense) to initiate force or engage in military operations unless authorized by Congress 
to do so’, he also argues that war power roles have become ‘increasingly murky’ due to 
Congress’ ‘frequent reluctance and failure to act’, the judiciary’s ‘inclination to demur’, and 
the increasing number of severe threats ‘requiring decisive and rapid responses that only the 
President can provide.’893 Bradley, in broad agreement, writes that ‘even if Congress has the 
sole power to declare war for the United States, the text of the Constitution does not clearly say 
that Congress has the sole power to authorize uses of military force when war is not 
declared,’894 adding that ‘it may be that not all uses of force even qualify as acts of war.’895 As 
noted already, and by Gonzales and Bradley, it has generally been agreed historically that aside 
from the president’s Constitutional Article II powers and absent agreement or permission from 
Congress, the Executive Branch also has the authority to respond in self-defence to an attack, 
and to take defensive measures in the face of an imminent threat.896  To assume that these are 
the only circumstances in which a president may authorise the use of force today would be 
erroneous, but the extent to which presidents have a unilateral right to order the use of force is 
contentious. Haas identifies two major schools of thought regarding the subject of prerogative 
power and war powers. The first ‘suggests that the president rightfully retains war-making 
powers independent of strict legislative approval by way of inherent powers’897 The second 
approach argues that ‘the Constitution leaves much less discretion to the president in the 
execution of the war power.’898 
Former Assistant Attorney General William H. Rehnquist, and John Yoo, former deputy 
assistant attorney general in the Office of Legal Counsel during the George W. Bush 
administrations (and author of many of the so-called ‘Torture memos’ which asserted that the 
Geneva Conventions were not applicable to the war on terror),899 are among the principal 
proponents of the first approach. Rehnquist envisions a ‘core of exclusive presidential 
commander in chief authority’, with Congress having the power ‘in certain situations to restrict 
the President’s power as Commander in Chief to a narrower scope than it would have had in 
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the absence of regulations.’900 Ramsey, on the other hand, writes: ‘the original war powers 
design, as we are able to understand it today, is best described as a core of exclusive 
congressional power surrounded by an area of arguable independent presidential authority’,  
though this area of independent presidential authority is one which leaves the executive with 
‘substantial plausible avenues to justify the independent use of force.’901 For example, an 
opinion from the White House’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) of 1970, written by Rehnquist 
to defend the lawfulness of President Nixon’s decision to deploy U.S. ground and air forces 
into Cambodia for the purpose of destroying base camps in use as supply depots and sanctuaries 
by the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong, offers a broader interpretation of executive war-
making powers.902 Rehnquist proffered the opinion that the Constitution accommodates two 
interests: ‘the prohibition of one-man commitment of a nation to war and the need for prompt 
executive response to international situations’, and further argued that ‘in changing the original 
wording from the power of Congress to make war to the power of Congress to declare war’,  
the “Founding Fathers” intended to distinguish between the initiation of armed conflict, which 
is for Congress to determine, and armed response to conflict situations, which the Executive 
may undertake.’903 Rehnquist, writes Powell: 
‘argued that the history of political practice makes it appropriate to recognize the 
existence of some degree of presidential power to employ military force without 
statutory authorization, not only in the uncontroversial circumstance of an attack on the 
United States (a concept fuzzy on the edges, as we have seen) but also as a tool of 
foreign policy.904 
The opposite conclusion, in which ‘only the emergency created by an attack justifies non-
statutory presidential action, is ‘a poor fit with U.S. constitutional history’, argues Powell, as 
it: 
‘disregards the claim of right under which presidents have made unilateral use of force, 
the reasoned discussions in Congress and between the political branches at various 
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times about the validity of that claim, and Congress’s general acquiescence over 
time.’905 
Today, it is generally accepted that the President may also use military force without prior 
permission from Congress in the case of an emergency, in order to protect citizens or repel an 
invasion.906 Murray notes that Congress has used full Declarations of War only sparingly, and 
instead has tended to authorise the President to use military force for specific instances through 
a statue, an example of which is the 2001 AUMF authorising the use of force against those 
responsible for the 9/11 attacks.907 The 2001 AUMF is discussed in detail later in this chapter.  
As the United States became more powerful and increased its military reach, establishing a 
‘large permanent military less dependent on the Congress to raise funds for action, presidents 
and lawmakers have begun to interpret the prerogatives of the Commander-in-Chief more 
broadly.’908 Executive power has expanded, and the Executive has relied less and less on 
Congress when deciding to engage in hostilities. Following the United States’ involvement in 
the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam – ‘two long and unpopular wars’ – Congress ‘acted to 
reclaim its war-making authority.’909 It did so partially on foot of a report by the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee which said that ‘Congress’s failure to challenge executive claims to the 
war powers’ was ‘“probably the singly fact most accounting for the speed and virtual 
completeness of the transfer” of authority and initiative.’910 Failure to challenge the Executive 
Branch had led to Congress ‘“giving away that which is not its to give, notably the war power, 
which the framers of the Constitution vested not in the executive but, deliberately and almost 
exclusively, in the Congress.”’911 
The route Congress took in attempting to rein in presidential power led to their passing the War 
Powers Resolution (WPR), or War Powers Act, in 1973, over President Richard Nixon’s veto. 
912 The WPR is intended to: 
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‘insure that the collective judgment of both Congress and the president will apply to the 
introduction of United States into hostilities, or into situations where imminent 
involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued 
use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.’913  
The WPR further notes that the constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief 
to introduce U.S. armed forces into hostilities are exercised only pursuant to a declaration of 
war, specific statutory authorization, or a national emergency created by attack upon the United 
States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.914 As noted above, President Nixon 
vetoed the WPR, claiming: 
‘it would limit flexibility in foreign policy; members of Congress responded that 
“flexibility has become a euphemism for presidential domination.” The nation’s ability 
to make decisive choices, they stressed, was not equivalent to the president’s ability to 
do so.’915 
However, since Nixon, U.S. presidents have ‘consistently taken the position that the War 
Powers Resolution is an unconstitutional infringement upon the power of the Executive 
Branch’,916 and the Resolution has not been effective - pursuant to this, numerous U.S. 
presidents have approved the use of military force without prior Congressional approval, the 
most recent example, as mentioned earlier, being President Trump’s military strikes on targets 
held by the Al-Assad regime in Syria on 14 April 2018.917 Successive administrations have 
kept their ‘flexibility’ in spite of the existence of the 1973 WPR. 
Furthermore, U.S. courts ‘have not been willing to adjudicate challenges to purported 
presidential noncompliance with the War Powers Resolution.’918 While presidents can deploy 
troops for short-term interventions of less than sixty days (having notified Congress of said 
troop deployment within the first 48 hours) under the WPR, these troops are supposed to return 
home to the U.S. if Congressional approval has not been given by the time the sixty-day mark 
has been reached. In practice, however, ‘presidents have used loopholes, saying that deployed 
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troops are not involved in “hostilities”’919, and courts have ‘reasoned that the meaning of 
“hostilities” in the Resolution…is a nonjusticiable political question that must be worked out 
by Congress and the Executive Branch rather than the courts.’920 In cases where a military 
operation is expected to ‘take time and cost American lives’, presidents had generally come to 
Congress for an authorisation.921 Yet presidents do not concede that a Congressional 
authorisation is necessary – presidents often see Congressional authorisation as “support” for 
their actions, rather than as “permission.”922 
The WPR also includes an obligation on presidents to submit a report to Congress ‘within 48 
hours any introduction of armed forces into hostilities or conditions where hostilities are likely 
to occur, along with details of the reason(s), circumstances, and authorities relevant to his 
decision.’ Between 1975 and 2009, presidents submitted reports under the WPR 127 times, and 
given that, aside from this obligation, Presidents tend to ignore the WPR, this suggests that ‘by 
and large, the WPR serves little purpose other than as a mechanism to force the president to 
report to Congress on his intentions to use force, or that he had already done so.’923 In practice, 
then, the division of war powers does not occur exactly as laid out in the Constitution and the 
1973 WPR. The Executive Branch now claims a wide range of powers related to war-making, 
and relatedly, to the interpretation of relevant international law.  
It is notable that the 1973 WPR was enacted in an attempt to ensure that Congress was involved 
in decisions on the use of force after the 1970 OLC opinion discussed above. Despite this 
attempt to restrain Executive power, a number of scholars argue that the power of the President 
and of the wider Executive Branch over the initiation of the use of force continues to expand, 
especially since the events of September 11, 2001. Bradley and Goldbraith note that ‘Executive 
Branch lawyers have been interpreting [the war powers] resolution in ways that whittle down 
its practical affect’, and that ‘where the Executive Branch is interpreting statutes that authorize 
presidential uses of force, it tends to read these statutes expansively.’924  
Regarding the 1970 OLC opinions by Rehnquist, it seems reasonable to assert that his stance 
on the power of the president in this arena is correct in terms of what the Executive Branch 
today perceives its power to be. A 2011 OLC memo on the use of force in Libya by the Obama 
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administration, for example, also emphasised the power of the president to use force as a tool 
of foreign policy, asserting that the president can ‘take military action [abroad] for the purpose 
of protecting important national interests, even without specific prior authorization from 
Congress.’925 This position was highly disputed, however, as is discussed later in this section. 
In a letter to Congress, Trump’s 2018 strikes in Syria were justified as being pursuant to his: 
‘…constitutional authority to conduct foreign relations and as Commander in Chief and 
Chief Executive and in the vital national security and foreign policy interests of the 
United States to promote the stability of the region, to deter the use and proliferation of 
chemical weapons, and to avert a worsening of the region’s current humanitarian 
catastrophe.926 
Trump further asserted that ‘the United States will take additional action, as necessary and 
appropriate, to further its important national interests.’927  In 2016, Ramsey argued that the only 
major military actions taken since Vietnam which ‘clearly lacked a basis in the Constitution’s 
original allocation of war power’ were the decisions of President Clinton to intervene in 
Kosovo, and the decision by President Obama to intervene in Libya. President Trump’s 2017 
and 2018 Syria strikes should certainly be considered under this rubric. Apart from Kosovo 
and Libya, wrote Ramsey, ‘recent practice might be better described as consolidating 
presidential authority over the “grey areas” of the original Constitution’s war powers rather 
than overthrowing the central constitutional allocation.’928 While Ramsey had maintained that 
changes in the traditional understanding of presidential war-making powers had come ‘not in 
actual practice but in presidential assertions of war initiation power,’ recent practice belies this 
statement.929 Furthermore, even assertions of unilateral presidential war-making power are 
important.  A number of presidential assertions on the extent of executive power were put 
forward during the administration of President George W. Bush, following the events of 
September 11, 2001. The Bush administration was staffed by a number of ‘executive power 
ideologues’,930 who pursued an exaggerated reading of the president’s constitutional war-
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making powers, repeatedly asserting that the president could use force where and when he saw 
fit.931 One of the most pertinent memos relevant to such assertions is that written by John Yoo 
on September 25 2001, eleven days after the 2001 AUMF had been passed by Congress, in 
which it was stated that: 
‘military actions need not be limited to those individuals, groups, or states that 
participated in the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon: the Constitution 
vests the President with the power to strike terrorist groups organization that cannot be 
demonstrably linked to the September 11 incidents, but that, nonetheless, pose a similar 
threat to the security of the United States and the lives of its people, whether at home 
or overseas.’ 
The memo further reasoned that Congressional statutes such as the WPR and the 2001 AUMF 
cannot: 
‘place any limits on the President’s determinations as to any terrorist threat, the amount 
of military force to be used in response, or the method, timing, and nature of the 
response…The President may deploy military force pre-emptively against terrorist 
organizations or the States that harbour or support them, whether or not they can be 
linked to the specific terrorist incidents of Sept. 11’.932 
Murray notes that this opinion established that the president could ‘unilaterally take the very 
actions that Congress had denied, meaning that the president could unilaterally use force 
against actors who did not attack the country on 9/11.’933 However, despite the Bush 
administrations’ ‘aggressive assertions of presidential power’, the administration nevertheless 
had no episodes of Congressionally unauthorised initiations of force – the 2001 AUMF was 
passed by Congress, as was the 2002 AUMF for use of force in Iraq.934 That period, then,  ‘is 
more accurately described as encompassing significant presidential uses of force with arguable 
constitutional justifications, together with presidential assertions of broad and generally 
unspecified war initiation powers.’935  
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An examination of President Obama’s constitutional record on the use of military force by 
Ramsey finds that ‘while the record is mixed, it is not clear that the administration’s legacy 
will be or should be an expanded view of presidential war initiation powers.’936 Ramsey argues 
that the Obama administrations’ interpretation of the AUMF as applying to ‘affiliated or 
associated’ organisations of al-Qaeda may be debatable, but that it ‘does not seem implausible’, 
noting that the president and his spokespeople ‘principally relied on congressional 
authorization rather than independent power, even though an independent power justification 
was potentially available.’937 Obama’s attempts to justify actions against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, 
however, were less well received domestically. Ramsey notes that the Obama administration 
originally relied on his independent constitutional authority, writing in a letter to Congress that: 
‘I have directed these actions, which are in the national security and foreign policy 
interests of the United States, pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct U.S. 
foreign relations and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive.’938 
However, as operations expanded, Obama claimed that operations against ISIS were covered 
by the 2001 AUMF and the 2002 Iraq AUMF, writing that authority for such actions were 
provided to him by existing statutes, and expressing his commitment to working with Congress 
to pass a new AUMF.939 Ramsey notes that both these arguments – that of existing statutory 
support for actions against ISIS and independent constitutional authority – met with strong 
objections.940 Yet, Ramsey concludes that while the Obama administration ‘arguably stretched 
the meaning of prior congressional authorizations and the War Powers Resolution, an 
aggressive reading of an express authorization reflects something of a concession on 
independent presidential power.’941  
The Obama administration’s 2011 air campaign in Libya is described as representing Obama’s 
most aggressive unilateral use of force. While approved by the UN Security Council, there was, 
writes Ramsey, ‘no plausible claim to congressional authorization.’942 The OLC memo 
supporting U.S. actions in Libya concluded that ‘the use of military force in Libya in was 
supported by sufficiently important national interests to fall within the President’s 
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constitutional power’, and argued that actions in Libya did not amount ‘to a “war” in the 
constitutional sense necessitating congressional approval under the Declaration of War 
Clause.’943 This defence was ‘sharply criticized by commentators, and represented a substantial 
expansion in claimed presidential power, measured against either an originalist or pre-2008 
modern baseline.’944  
Overall, Ramsey believed that the Obama administration’s war-initiation power legacy was 
‘likely more constraining than expansive’, leaving executive power in the national security and 
foreign affairs arena as broad as Obama found it in 2008, if not slightly less so. Bradley and 
Galbraith, however, disagree. They write that when the U.S. executive pushes the boundaries 
of its legal authority, it is: 
‘simultaneously creating precedents that become part of legal discourse going forward. 
As these precedents build up, they then have the effect of expanding the actual or 
perceived scope of legal authority for the unitary actors.’945 
As Bradley and Galbraith note: 
‘the OLC uses “historical precedents” as the “framework” for its constitutional analysis 
on the use of force. Although practice does not always favor executive power…its 
overall direction tends to do so... Historical practice both helps to provide a domestic 
law foundation for presidential actions relating to war and, over time, tends to further 
the development of the law in favour of stronger executive power.’946 
While Presidents Bush and Obama might not have always acted practically to invoke their 
perceived constitutional war-initiation powers, the fact that this perception of unilateral 
presidential power was asserted, in statements, letters, and memos, demonstrated that those 
administrations believed that those broad powers existed for the Executive Branch, should a 
future president wish to rely on them. With President Trump’s unauthorised strikes on Syria in 
both 2017 and 2018, past assertions of presidential power and past practice have coalesced to 
grant the Executive Branch an exceedingly broad remit in the area of the use of force, with 
Congress seemingly powerless to halt military action.   
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More importantly for the implications of this thesis, however, are the effects of such assertions 
of power on international law and interpretations of international law both domestically in the 
U.S. and internationally. Bradley and Galbraith find that domestically, U.S. separation of 
powers ‘is relevant to international legal practice on the use of force, because it influences U.S. 
practice and the United States plays an outsized role internationally with regard to the use of 
force.’947 Importantly, they find that where an Executive Branch is supported by strong 
domestic legal authority, whether that is either or both of constitutional war-making powers 
and/or congressional authorisation, the Executive Branch develops a broader international legal 
interpretation.948 Congressional authorisation for the use of force is thus held to be a highly 
relevant factor in whether, and how far, a president may attempt to push the boundaries of 
international law.  
In describing this ‘interactive effect’ of presidential decision-making on the use of force, 
Bradley and Galbraith note the example of United States’ assertions of its right to invoke self-
defence against non-state actors on the territory of states that are ‘unwilling or unable’ to 
suppress those non-state actors themselves.949 Arguing that the U.S. acquired ‘increased state 
acquiescence’ for the existence of an “unwilling or unable” standard after September 11th, at a 
time when the Executive Branch had ‘strong domestic legal grounding’, the Executive Branch 
then invoked the “unwilling or unable” standard to justify uses of force to domestic audiences 
in situations where the President’s ‘domestic legal grounding was much weaker.’950 Similarly, 
in its campaign in Syria against ISIS, for which the Obama administration had ‘fairly weak 
authority under domestic law’, it relied instead on ‘some indeterminate combination of the 
President’s constitutional authority and expansive readings of the 2001 AUMF and of the 2002 
AUMF’, while under international law, the U.S. relied on the “unwilling or unable” standard 
in conjunction with the collective self-defence of Iraq, as well as asserted individual self-
defence. The 2013 DOJ targeted killing memo is also provided as a specific example of how 
international and domestic legal argumentation are intertwined in the U.S., wherein the Obama 
administration emphasized that its targeted killing policy would comply with international law 
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when describing how the targeting policy would be consistent with domestic law.951 
Essentially: 
‘the U.S. pushes the boundaries and restraints of international law at a time when it has 
strong domestic support, claims that it has created a precedent in international law or 
an agreed-upon norm, and then invokes this precedent or norm to use force at a time 
when domestic support is lacking.’952 
These prior examples are instructive on the leveraging of international law by the U.S. 
Executive Branch as a means to assert and expand presidential power in the realm of national 
security and foreign affairs. This is an issue which Ingber has explored in some depth. While 
international law has traditionally been understood as a constraining influence on state actors 
in general, Ingber argues that international law is regularly invoked as an enabling force within 
the U.S. domestic legal system.953  In what Ingber deems the ‘empowerment phenomenon’, the 
U.S. executive uses international law to: 
‘support expansive interpretations of statutory or constitutional grants of authority; to 
narrow statutory or constitutional prohibitions on executive action…; and to justify the 
displacement of the ordinary operation of domestic legal rules, at times with the effect 
of exchanging the ordinary domestic legal architecture for a more permissive 
framework based in international law.’954 
This empowerment phenomenon not only ‘facilitates the Executive’s aggrandizement of its 
own authority; at times it affirmatively induces it to do so.’955 For the purposes of this 
discussion, Ingber’s examination of presidential invocations of international law to expand 
executive power, while also referencing international law as a limiting principle in the area of 
the 2001 AUMF and targeted killing are particularly relevant. In both cases, international law 
is used to provide legitimacy for Executive Branch actions. It is then used to assert the 
Executive’s ‘wartime authority to act, at a minimum, to the limits of international law.’956 The 
result of this empowerment phenomenon is to create an ‘executive-inferred exception’ to 
domestic constraints, ‘shaped by an international law standard that the Executive defines.’957 
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Regarding the targeted killing memos, Ingber tracks the OLC’s statutory and constitutional 
arguments, noting that while the OLC purported to apply and satisfy the Fifth Amendment’s 
Due Process clause, instead the memoranda in question: 
‘the memoranda put forward a substantive standard under which the Executive may 
assert an exception to due process requirements. They base that exception upon a 
showing that 1) capture is infeasible; 2) the individual is part of enemy forces; and 3) 
the individual poses a “continued and imminent threat to U.S. persons or interests.”’958  
Given that the substance of each of the three requirements set out above are largely defined as 
the Executive Branch sees fit, ‘the memoranda thus propose an exception to ordinary due 
process, defined by a substantive standard that turns predominantly on the Executive’s 
international law analysis regarding the lawfulness of the target.’959 The OLC’s Fourth 
Amendment analysis also rests ‘in large part on internal tests derived from international law.’960 
Ingber concludes that, in essence: 
‘…the Executive’s position is that the existing executive order prohibiting 
assassination, statutory prohibitions on the killing of U.S. citizens, and fundamental 
constitutional protections all contain implicit exceptions for killing that is lawful under 
the international laws of war. The effect of this reasoning is thus: the lawfulness under 
domestic law of the targeted killing of an individual abroad turns on the Executive’s 
interpretation of the lawfulness of the act as a matter of international law.’961 
 
The 2001 AUMF 
It is worth taking some time here to discuss the 2001 AUMF, as it has had profound 
implications for Executive war powers in the United States, for the role of Congress in 
restraining and overseeing those powers, and for the United States approach to international 
law and war-making. The 2001 AUMF is the Congressional authorisation which the U.S. 
Executive Branch continues to invoke as an umbrella to cover the majority of its range of anti-
terror related activities, including the targeted killing programme. The importance of the 2001 
                                                           
958 Ingber (n940) 68. 
959 Ibid 69. 
960 Ibid. 
961 Ibid 70. 
  220 
AUMF and the implications it has had domestically and internationally since its passing are 
difficult to overstate, and a thorough discussion of the 2001 AUMF and its interpretation by 
the three presidents to which it has applied is of some importance. It has been described as 
‘unusual in its lack of limits’,  and as one of ‘the most remarkable legal developments in 
American public law in the 21st century’,962 while the myriad possibilities in its interpretation 
have caused it to become ‘a protean foundation for indefinite war against an assortment of 
terrorist organizations in numerous countries’.963 It is a prime example of the effect of 
assertions of expansive Executive Branch war powers, coupled with a Congressional 
authorisation for the use of force and the ‘empowerment phenomenon’. Successive presidential 
administrations, from the first George W. Bush administration to the Trump administration 
today - have derived their authority to use force against al-Qaeda and associated forces (and to 
detain alleged members of same) and to carry out military operations against ISIS outside Iraq, 
from this AUMF. This Congressional authorisation was passed on the 14th September 2001, 
following the 9/11 attacks three days previously, and signed into law by President George W. 
Bush on 18 September 2001. Since it was passed into law, the 2001 AUMF remains a 
controversial authorisation, given the ever-expanding range of uses of force in numerous 
territories and against the myriad non-state groups to which it has been said to apply.  
A mere sixty words long, the 2001 AUMF reads as follows: 
IN GENERAL. – That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate 
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, 
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 
2001, or harboured such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of 
international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or 
persons.  
As stated in the text, the AUMF authorises the use of force only against those ‘nations, 
organizations, or persons’ that are determined to have been involved in the planning, 
authorisation, committing or aiding of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, or that 
‘harboured such organizations or persons’, so as to prevent any future acts of international 
terrorism against the United States.  
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As Murray has recounted, the initiative for the AUMF came directly from President George 
W. Bush’s White House. It was written in haste, and its passage was rushed.964 A first draft for 
the AUMF created by the administration’s Executive Branch lawyers was rejected by Congress 
on the evening of September 12 due to its sweeping language which, according to Senate 
Majority Leader Tom Daschle, would have granted the president ‘a blank check to go 
anywhere, anytime, against anyone the Bush administration or any subsequent administration 
deemed capable of carrying out an attack.’965  This draft read: 
That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those 
nations, organizations or persons he determines planned, authorized, harbored, 
committed, or aided in the planning or commission of the attacks against the United 
States that occurred on September 11, 2001, and to deter and pre-empt any future acts 
of terrorism or aggression against the United States. (Quoted in Abramowitz 2002, 
emphasis added).966 
The wording of the AUMF was then ‘haggled over’, until the final wording of the 
Authorization that exists today was agreed upon.967 Yet the final wording still provided the 
Executive Branch with much leeway, given that no clear geographical bounds were stipulated 
in the final wording, and nor were the ‘nations, organizations, or persons’ against whom force 
could be used clearly defined.968 As a result, despite Congress’s belief that it had successfully 
restrained the White House with the seemingly more restrictive language in the final version 
of the 2001 AUMF, in authorising authority against non-state actors without clear geographical 
bounds or an expiration date, it had still gifted the Bush Administration almost exactly what it 
had desired.969 Given the failure of Congress to provide clear geographical boundaries for the 
use of force, and that the targets in question were left to presidential discretion,970 the 2001 
AUMF has since proven to be an imperfect and all too easily manipulated Congressional 
authorisation. To date, the 2001 AUMF has been invoked for uses of force in a number of 
states, including Afghanistan, Yemen, Pakistan, Somalia, Libya, Niger, Iraq and Syria, and 
against numerous non-state armed groups, some of which were not in existence at the time of 
the September 11 attacks. As such, many of these uses of force have occurred in states, and 
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against groups, that have at best a tenuous connection to the September 11 attacks. Considering 
where and how the U.S. has used force, particularly pre-emptive force, and justified these 
actions with reference to the powers granted by the 2001 AUMF, the way in which the 2001 
AUMF has been used in practice tracks much more closely with the language found in the draft 
AUMF rejected by Congress than with the final version of the AUMF passed by Congress. Yet 
the 2001 AUMF remains in place and seems unlikely to be replaced in the near future. No 
authorisation for the use of military force has been passed since the 2002 AUMF authorising 
war in Iraq. Recent practice by President Trump and by President Obama before him have 
confirmed the inadequacy of Congressional responses to unilateral presidential decisions on 
the use of force. No AUMF has been sought by the Trump administration to sanction uses of 
force in Syria against the Syrian government. Neither has Congress attempted to intervene in 
this situation, leading to the accusation that Congress: 
‘is abdicating its constitutional  responsibilities to determine whether the United States 
should make war on other nations when it makes no effort to take advantage of the 
ample time available to it to deliberate on how the United States should respond to the 
use of chemical weapons by a rogue regime and when it makes no effort to develop a 
collective response to presidential threats to use military force against foreign 
governments with which the United States is not already at war. The executive branch 
is indicating the irrelevance of Congress to the warmaking process when it announces 
that the president’s Article II authority should be understood to include the power to 
initiate military force against foreign nations whenever he deems American national 
interests to be at stake.’971 
With the passing of the 2001 AUMF, it appears that Congress has effectively erased its own 
role in decision making around war powers, and at the very least, hastened its slide towards 
irrelevance in this area. As Rudalevige says: 
‘much of the expansion in presidential power has not been taken but given… While the 
framers expected that “ambition would counteract ambition,” that other actors would 
rise to the occasion when presidential power overflowed its bounds, frequently in recent 
years this expectation has not been met.’972 
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‘The accretion of central power in America has occurred most easily during wars’, wrote Porter 
in 1994.973 Now in a near-permanent state of war, the Executive Branch’s war powers appear 
almost unlimited. The accretion of Executive Power cannot be considered at a remove from 
the society in which the U.S. government operates. The United States’ obsession with war and 
security, so tied up in its national identity, has been a primary factor in the establishment of a 
new ‘imperial’ presidency. Coupled with the remove at which the majority of U.S. citizens 
experience war – that is to say, not at all – Presidents have been able to accrue more and more 
‘flexibility’ in the area of war. Dudziak explains that a ‘crucial…factor in the demise of 
political restraints on presidential power to use military force is the distance between American 
civilians and the carnage their wars have produced.’974 The use of armed drones and the 
targeted killing programme only increases this distance, allowing the U.S. government to 
portray war as high-tech and almost risk free for those (very few) Americans fighting it.975 As 
Dudziak notes, ‘a president’s ability, albeit imperfect, to shape the way Americans perceive 
war is a tremendously important aspect of presidential war power.’976  
 
The President and International Law 
Another way in which Presidents shape the way Americans perceive war is by portraying it as 
lawful. International law, war, and presidential war powers are intertwined. As has been 
discussed, war has been used to justify breaches of international law, and international law has 
been invoked to justify acts of war, with both acting as expansionary resources for executive 
power. As the ‘sole organ of the nation in its external relations and its sole representative with 
foreign nations’ and given that ‘the restrictions on the use of force are directed at the political 
and military organs of government and concern relations between nations rather than the 
treatment of individuals’,977 the interpretation and enforcement of the international law of war 
occurs within the Executive Branch. There is little interference with presidential control over 
international law interpretation at the judicial level, as international law is generally considered 
to concern questions of politics rather than questions of law. This has partially contributed to 
the U.S. perception of international law as a pliant, legitimating tool and as a foreign policy 
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and security resource. The accumulation of war-making powers in the Executive Branch is thus 
a matter of concern for the international law on the use of force, as decisions taken by U.S. 
presidents to use armed force abroad against states and non-state actors directly implicate this 
law. As the exercise of the nation’s foreign affairs is a matter for the Executive Branch, the 
President has the power to interpret, and to inform the creation of international law. U.S. courts 
have granted ‘substantial deference to the President as to both the substance and form of 
international law-making.’978 Given the increasing power of the Executive Branch over issues 
of war-making and uses of force, this is particularly concerning for the international law on the 
use of force.  
In the United States, the President exercises vast control over international law, without any 
systemic regulatory or judicial oversight ‘to guide or review the exercise of presidential 
discretion in this context.’979 Presidents ‘have come to dominate the creation, alteration, and 
termination of international law for the United States’980, write Bradley and Galbraith, as has 
been demonstrated, by example, by President Trump’s unilateral decision to remove the United 
States from the Iran nuclear deal.981 ‘However limited the President’s domestic law-making 
authority may be’, writes Weisburd, ‘he clearly has considerable authority to create legal 
effects in the international context:’982 
This presidential control is of particular concern in the area of customary international law, 
where the ‘vast majority’ of relevant U.S. governmental practice for customary international 
law is Executive Branch practice,983 and where ‘the President almost always decides the U.S. 
view on CIL… and is able to affect CIL both through affirmative actions and statements and 
through decisions about whether to acquiesce in the practices and statements of other 
nations.’984 Weisburd notes that ‘…to the extent the United States participates in the formation 
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of customary international law, it does so largely through the President’s acts.’985 The U.S. 
Supreme Court’s Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino decision noted: 
‘When articulating principles of international law in its relations with other states, the 
Executive Branch speaks not only as an interpreter of generally accepted and traditional 
rules, as would the courts, but also as an advocate of standards it believes desirable for 
the community of nations and protective of national concerns.’986 
Regarding judicial interference in the practice of Presidents with respect to customary 
international law, Weisburd argues that: 
‘…since the President acts as the primary American legislator in the field of customary 
international law by determining the day-to-day practice of the United States, judicial 
efforts to control that practice on non-constitutional grounds amount to interference 
with legislative discretion vested in the President by the Constitution. The field of 
legislation is different – international as opposed to domestic law – but the 
constitutional question is the same. By giving the President control of most of the state 
practice of the United States, the Constitution vested the President with legislative 
discretion to cast the “vote” of the United States in matters of customary law.’987 
Therefore, the accumulation of war-making powers in the Executive Branch has direct 
consequences for the creation of customary international law on the use of force, the 
interpretation of treaty rules regarding uses of force, and the interpretation of rules governing 
any uses of that force. This is not to say, of course, that enhanced or increased Congressional 
involvement with U.S. war powers and Presidential decision-making on the use of force would 
necessarily make any uses of force more compliant with existing customary international law 
or treaty law on the use of force, but rather that, without any significant Congressional 
involvement in war-making decisions, Presidential decisions to use force, and the 
accompanying interpretation of the relevant law, acquire even more importance. Furthermore, 
‘almost all courts have held that the president and other high-level executive officers (such as 
the Attorney General) have the domestic legal authority to violate CIL.’988   
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Regarding arguments that the President’s constitutional authority as Commander in Chief is 
‘implicitly limited by the international laws of war’, Bradley argues that this is likely ‘true only 
of the international law relating to jus in bello rather than jus ad bellum’: 
‘Although modern international law does sharply limit the permissible use of force, as 
a matter of practice presidents have exercised the sovereign authority of the United 
States to decide whether and how to comply with the jus ad bellum, and a number of 
presidentially initiated military operations in the post-World War II period have 
arguably been inconsistent with it.’989 
Congress could, writes Bradley, attempt to impose jus ad bellum restrictions on the President 
in the form of codified statues, but ‘has shown no inclination to do so’, and the completely 
ineffective 1973 War Powers Resolution, discussed earlier in this chapter, which represents 
Congress’ ‘most significant effort to regulate Presidential initiation of war’, makes no mention 
of international law.990 On 13th December 2018, the Senate invoked the WPR for the very first 
time when it passed a resolution calling for an end in U.S. military aid to the Saudi-led coalition 
fighting in the conflict Yemen. However, at the time of writing, this vote is largely symbolic – 
in order for the resolution to become law, it would have to also be passed by Congress, and 
could still face a veto from President Donald Trump.991 
The two most significant attempts to influence customary international law on the use of force 
in the past two decades have come from U.S. presidents. For example, the attempted creation 
of an ‘unwilling or unable’ test, in which the U.S. asserts its right to use force in self-defence 
against a non-state actor in a third country, without the consent of that third country, if that 
country is unwilling or unable to address the threat posed by the non-state actor.992 Attempts 
by the U.S. to expand the definition of ‘imminence’ for the purposes of the targeted killing 
programme also pose challenges for customary international law on the use of force.  
In the realm of jus in bello, there also exists debate as to whether, and to what extent, the 
Executive Branch’s constitutional power is bound by the relevant customary and treaty law, in 
particular the Geneva Conventions. The George W. Bush administration, for example, took a 
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very flexible approach to the Geneva Conventions application; the administration’s position 
essentially being that: 
‘even assuming that the Geneva Conventions are binding on the United States as a 
matter of international law, they do not bind the President as a matter of domestic law 
because the President has the constitutional authority to violate specific provisions of 
the Conventions to protect national security.’993  
This position was used to justify the use of torture against people suspected of involvement 
with al-Qaeda and affiliated forces, to justify holding suspects for years at Guantanamo Bay 
and to deny prisoners their habeas corpus rights, and to justify the use of military commissions 
to try individuals involved in the 9/11 attacks. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004), the Supreme Court 
ruled against the Bush administration and found that enemy combatants held in the United 
States had a right to due process,994 and the Court’s 2006 decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 
rejected the Bush administration’s attempts to create military tribunals, noting that, in the case 
of the war on terror, the use of such tribunals would violate the Geneva Conventions.995 
Regarding the use of torture under the administration, ‘the legal memoranda justifying the use 
of these techniques only offer sustained analysis of whether the techniques constitute “torture” 
within the meaning of U.S. criminal law’, and do not consider whether they violate the Geneva 
Conventions (though they undoubtedly did).996 Jinks and Sloss state that the Executive Branch 
is bound by the Geneva Conventions,997 though ‘the precedent for implied limitations on the 
commander-in-chief is limited at best.’998 As a presidential candidate, President Trump 
commented that the Geneva Conventions were a ‘problem’, opining that ‘we can’t waterboard, 
but they can chop off heads. I think we’ve got to make some changes, some adjustments.’999 
While President Trump has yet to comment on the Geneva Conventions at this point in his 
presidency, he has ushered in relaxed rules of engagement for the U.S. military.1000 In October 
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2017, Trump said that he has ‘totally changed the rules of engagement. I totally changed our 
military.’1001 This relaxation or ‘total change’ in the rules of engagement has been accompanied 
by a substantial increase in civilian casualties in American theatres of war.1002  
 
Conclusion 
Why does this contextualisation of U.S. identity and war-making matter for international law 
and for the targeted killing programme? Why does the violence of early settler populations 
affect the U.S. today? And what does it have to do with Kriegsraison? It matters, writes 
Dunbar-Ortiz, ‘because it tells us that the privatization of lands and other forms of human 
capital are at the core of the U.S. experiment’: 
‘…the origins of the United States in settler colonialism—as an empire born from the 
violent acquisition of indigenous lands and the ruthless devaluation of indigenous 
lives—lends the country unique characteristics that matter when considering questions 
of how to unhitch its future from its violent DNA.’1003 
If we want to return Kriegsraison to its grave and effectively understand why the United States 
has the relationship with international law that it does, it is imperative that we understand how 
the U.S. views war and why it feels such insecurity.  
It is also critical to examine what U.S. interpretations of international law and Kriegsraison 
can tell us about international law more generally. The next and final chapter of this thesis asks 
what the Kriegsraison doctrine itself represents for the international community and the 
international legal system, and what can be done to address this damaging doctrine. 
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Chapter Six: Targeted Killing, Kriegsraison, and the Strategic Legalism of 
Imperialism 
 
In prior chapters of this thesis I have asserted that the U.S. targeted killing programme violates 
numerous rules of international humanitarian law and international human rights law, and that 
it also violates the international law on the use of force. These violations, combined with the 
language of self-defence and necessity used in justifying the programme, are representative of 
Kriegsraison. But what does the resurrection of Kriegsraison represent itself? What is its place 
in the ‘larger picture’ of public international law and the international rule of law? What does 
it tell us about international law on the use of force, international humanitarian law and 
international human rights law? I contend that Kriegsraison is representative of imperial power, 
of conduct and actions at both the political and military level which operate not outside the 
existing liberal order but rather in a state of exception inside the liberal order, often through 
the harnessing of international law rules. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, U.S. identity and the U.S. approach to international law 
have been strongly influenced by the country’s history of war-making and war-fighting. 
Meanwhile, the United States’ approach to public international law, in particular its approach 
to international human rights law and the international law on the use of force, is both highly 
utilitarian and deeply exceptionalist. While the U.S. views itself both as an exceptional state 
and as a state who can, when necessary, exempt itself from the international legal system and 
the rule of law, it tends to do so through the ‘creative’ interpretation of already existing legal 
rules, and of course the obvious flouting of others (in particular, the international law on the 
use of force). U.S. exceptionalism is thus situated not in a sphere outside the international rule 
of law, but rather in an exceptional space within a structurally imperial rule of law system. In 
his book ‘Legalist Empire: International Law and American Foreign Relations in the Early 
Twentieth Century’, Coates describes how ‘it has become conventional to think about 
exceptionalism and empire, on one hand, and compliance with international law, on the other, 
as mutually exclusive. More international law means less empire; more exceptionalism means 
less international law.’1004 Coates finds that history does not support this interpretation, noting 
that ‘law did much to make empire possible’, and that ‘lawyers provided policymakers with 
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arguments to justify the annexation of the Philippines and US control over Panama.’ And when, 
in the era of decolonisation, ‘formal empire lost its lustre’, lawyers ‘advocated the spread of 
international legal institutions as a means of enforcing a basic standard of treatment for 
American overseas capital.’1005 This is a phenomenon that continues today, though often 
through much more discreet and insidious means. This chapter thus aims to highlight the 
compatibility of international law and empire, of international law as a ‘locus of oppression’ 
through the targeted killing programme, but also to emphasise the emancipatory potential of 
international law and international law’s ‘constant promise for liberation.’1006 
Accepting the premise that law and empire continue to be entwined of course has implications 
for the international rule of law and the ways in which we consider international law to operate, 
whether as a restraint on state action, or as a progressive good. This final chapter, then, explores 
the imperial character of the Kriegsraison doctrine, of the international law on the use of force, 
and the implications of the targeted killing programme for international law today. I find Susan 
Marks’ conception of totality useful here, with totality in international law highlighting ‘the 
need for a complex kind of analysis that connects international legal norms with the wider 
processes through which their interpretation is shaped and enabled.’1007 The concept of totality, 
writes Marks, urges us ‘to approach things relationally, rather than in isolation, and to pay 
attention to the larger social forces that create the conditions in which international legal ideas 
and concepts emerge, develop and get deployed.’1008 In this thesis, in assessing not just the 
United States legal justifications for the targeted killing programme and examining the 
application of international humanitarian law and human rights law to the targeted killing 
programme, but also analysing the shaping of the concepts of necessity and military necessity 
in international law, discussing the portrayal of armed drones and the shaping of American 
national identity and its approach to international law, I have attempted to implement the 
concept of totality and keep to the fore the processes engaged by the U.S. to sustain the myth 
that the targeted killing programme is compliant with international law and that it is the best 
option for tackling the current cycle of terrorist violence. In this chapter, I present an overview 
of the ideas of ‘legitimacy’ and ‘lawfulness’ in the targeted killing programme during the 
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Obama administration, and the use of the term ‘civilization’ in the Trump administration to 
date. Claims of ‘lawfulness’, and ‘civilization’ have long been ideas which are not only 
intrinsic to empire, but which are indispensable for its legitimacy and its maintenance. Or, as 
Poulantzas puts it, ‘nothing could be more mistaken than to counterpose the rule of law to 
arbitrariness, abuse of power, and the prince’s act of will….’1009 
Writing on European empire in the nineteenth century, Jennifer Pitts describes ‘the ideological 
complex…that Europeans had developed to justify their commercial and imperial depredations 
of societies throughout the extra-European world’ – one that can be read as a description of 
American government today, and for many decades past: 
‘They read their military supremacy as evidence of their moral superiority; they looked 
with contempt on societies of which they lacked the most basic understanding; and with 
a stunning parochialism, they not only saw their own standards of beauty, right, and 
reason as paramount, but also expected others to embrace those supposed standards 
despite the Europeans’ consistently abhorrent conduct. Central to this ideology was a 
story about law: about the supposed absence of law in the despotic empires of Asia, 
where tyrants dominated their enslaved subjects without any legal or moral restraints, 
and about the unique virtues of the European law of nations, which had tempered war 
with consensual rules among free and equal states and whose benefits would one day 
be conferred on others when they achieved “civilization.”’1010 
The imperial character of Kriegsraison is evident primarily in that, in the current system of 
international law, it can only be wielded effectively by those states that possess both political 
and military power. One of the means by which the U.S. wields Kriegsraison is through 
engaging in strategic legalism, defined by Maguire as ‘the use of laws or legal arguments to 
further larger policy objectives, irrespective of facts or laws…’1011 The U.S. has long engaged 
in such strategic legalism, and it is particularly observable in the targeted killing programme. 
As Gunneflo notes, ‘legal texts, laying down a specifically legal rationality, have played an 
enormously important role in the emergence of targeted killing.’1012 
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This is particularly interesting given that, on many occasions throughout its history and 
certainly with the Trump administration today, the United States has often taken an ‘anti-
legalist’ approach to foreign policy, as described by Orford. This ‘anti-legalist’ approach 
presents ‘legality’ and ‘legitimacy’ as being in opposition to each other, with legality 
‘presented as involving a blind adherence to restrictive rules of limited relevance to 
contemporary security challenges and doubtful moral value in the face of pressing 
humanitarian crises’.1013 It is worth quoting Orford at length here. Legitimacy is presented as: 
‘…everything that law ought to be – it results from decision-making that is principle 
yet pragmatic, taken by actors who are representatives of conscience yet guarantors of 
protection, concerned with means yet never at the expense of ends, and leads to 
interventions undertaken by politically effective operators who are nevertheless 
committed to humane values and able to balance the demands of security and justice. 
While legality is rigid, legitimacy is flexible.’1014 
While Orford discusses the ability to intervene in civil wars, her analysis here is also relevant 
to the targeted killing programme. ‘Where international law is an ally to the extent that it 
preserves the equilibrium and stability of the existing order from which those states benefit’, 
writes Orford, ‘it is an enemy to the extent that it constrains the policy space for 
intervention.’1015 
The differentiation between ‘legality’ and ‘legitimacy’ highlights the political character of 
international law and the ability for the U.S. to present its war on terror conduct as either legal, 
legitimate, or both. While international law is often considered as being inherently progressive, 
Hurd warns against taking ‘an enchanted view’ of international law, noting that international 
law tends to be viewed ‘as a governance system that is either apolitical and technocratic or 
naturally beneficial.’1016 Yet law is, as Koskenniemi writes, ‘irreducibly political.’1017 As Hurd 
explains: 
‘…once the premise that lawfulness confers legitimacy is widely shared, then legal 
resources become useful instruments for political advantage and contestation. The 
                                                           
1013 Anne Orford, The Politics of Anti-Legalism in the Intervention Debate (Global Policy Journal blog, 30 May 2014) 




1016 Ian Hurd, ‘The Empire of International Legalism’ (2018) Ethics & International Affairs 32 (3) 271. 
1017 Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law (Hart Publishing 2011) 64. 
  233 
political system that is thereby created requires governments to fit their policies within 
parameters defined by international law.’1018 
As such, ‘the international legal system is also a political system based on the dominance of 
law over politics for governments around the world. This relationship is appropriately 
described as an empire.’1019 As has been pointed out by B.S. Chimni, political power is ‘a force 
that continuously informs the creation, interpretation and enforcement of international law’.1020 
Despite this, ‘interpretative disputes and their outcomes are never seen as a function of power 
but simply as a result of unclear texts that are a product of compromises arrived at during the 
course of international negotiations.’1021 Chimni further observes that states usually act 
lawfully – because ‘a complete mismatch between the rules of international law and the 
interests and practices of powerful states is rare’, and as such, ‘violation is not a frequent event. 
However, when there is a mismatch in periods of rapid development… either the rules 
themselves are transformed… or those are violated.’1022 During the Obama administration, the 
United States ‘helped advance a version of international law distorted by American interests, 
which allows powerful countries to engage in militarized policing at the time and place of their 
choosing.’1023 With the targeted killing programme, the U.S. presented a policy – that of 
targeted killing – and in almost every instance discussed it in legal terms, which, as de Londras 
has discussed, has enabled the U.S. to ‘get out of answering harder moral questions.’1024 
Yet, as Koskenniemi notes, a demonstration that law ‘”all depends on politics” does not move 
one inch towards a better politics’.1025 The political character of law does not ‘cancel out’ law’s 
legal character – it merely points ‘to the inevitable moment of choice in legal practice in favour 
of one contested meaning against another.’1026 Legal interpretation and the politics of 
international law, the politics of choosing between different legal interpretations, has been 
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especially in evidence in U.S. attempts to create a right of pre-emptive self-defence in 
international law, in establishing the category of ‘unlawful combatant’, in attempts to introduce 
the ‘unwilling or unable’ doctrine to international law, and in the naming of the tactic of 
‘targeted killing’. Here is where we situate Kriegsraison. The violence of the targeted killing 
programme is representative of Kriegsraison because it falls outside of the regulated violence 
usually deemed acceptable by international law, both in terms of the justification of the 
programme at the rhetorical and jus ad bellum level by the United States and in the use of force 
in the territory of a sovereign entity, and in terms of the actual physical manifestation of 
violence at the operational and jus in bello level, primarily in its unlawful targeting. 
 
The imperial character of Kriegsraison: sporadic, disconnected acts & the issue of 
intervention 
The issue of intervention is illustrative of the imperial character of the Kriegsraison doctrine. 
The targeted killing programme violates not just the rights of individuals, but also the rights of 
communities and states. But in its current iteration, Kriegsraison centres the individual and 
urges us to focus our attention on the harm committed against the individual. A focus on the 
individual, it has been argued, may lessen our attention on the ‘bigger picture’ of the targeted 
killing programme, with the programme represented as sporadic and disparate incidents of 
force used against specific targeted individuals, when it is in fact a programme of widespread 
violence, committed not just against individuals in militant groups, but against civilians and 
their communities, and the states in which they are situated. Today’s American iteration of 
Kriegsraison, through the targeted killing programme, privileges the security of the United 
States and the perceived necessity of its self-defence over the sovereignty of those states in the 
‘Global South’ in which the targeted killing programme operates, and over the rights of the 
communities and individuals affected by its violence.  
Gunneflo has noted how a focus solely on the rights or status of individuals ‘risks 
decontextualizing and depoliticising what amounts to one of the most systematic, if not 
extensive, forms of North on South violence in the post-colonial era’.1027 Chimni, meanwhile, 
has highlighted how this exercise of unilateral extraterritorial jurisdiction is confined to 
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advanced capitalist countries such as the United States.1028 Parfitt argues that international law 
and its sovereigns – i.e. states - are characterised by an ‘inherently expansionist logic’.1029 But 
states, as Parfitt points out, cannot all be permitted to grow. Growth, whether through territorial 
conquest or access to markets, is the privilege of those states who possess the most power, of 
those states who, over the course of five centuries, have accumulated resources and been 
involved in their distribution.1030 The international legal system was not created on a level 
playing field. Accepting that all states are ‘free’ and ‘equal’ has, as Parfitt argues, ‘predictable 
and deleterious effects on the distribution of wealth, power and pleasure…’1031 And ‘only the 
most powerful states – those with the biggest ‘markets’ and the largest reservoirs of resources 
– can get away with resisting some of the rules they so rigorously enforce amongst their 
peers.’1032 As Hurd notes, ‘when a strong state has influence over what the law says, it can be 
expected to use that influence to decide that the two do indeed converge. Law and power 
become entangled by this process…’1033 
Gunneflo is correct in his argument that treating the targeted killing programme as a question 
primarily of human rights and international humanitarian law, and not as one of intervention 
and aggression against sovereign states, contributes to ‘a restructuring of legitimate forms of 
warfare with tremendous effects for post-colonial states and for international law more 
generally.’1034 I am also in agreement with his assertion that the United States’ treatment of the 
use of force appears to be developing in a similar manner as that seen in the shift in the 
international law regime on trade from an international regime to a transnational regime, and 
concur that should the use of force regime move from an international to a transnational regime, 
this would further embed, rather than break with, the colonial past of international law.1035 
Though our current international law regime may be flawed, it  does presents a barrier to U.S. 
imperial ambition, primarily with its privileging of state sovereignty. We cannot deny the 
colonial heritage of international law and the influence that this history continues to hold today. 
But, as Tzouvala points out, contemporary international law is ‘more than an “undercover” 
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continuation of older international legal structure.1036 Since 1945, international law has 
experienced a ‘profound reconfiguration’, not least through the privileging of state sovereignty 
in Article 2 (4), which has been, and continues to be, an extremely important principle for 
postcolonial and non-Western states.1037 
The prime example of U.S. attempts to influence, and indeed eradicate, the existing norm of 
non-intervention is represented in the ‘unwilling or unable’ doctrine, which advocates for a 
right of individual or collective self-defence against a threat ‘when…the government of the 
State where the threat is located is unwilling or unable to prevent the use of its territory for 
such attacks.’1038 The ‘unwilling or ‘unable’ doctrine ‘reintroduces a hierarchy of states in the 
operation of jus ad bellum’, which is ‘reminiscent of the infamous nineteenth-century 
distinction between civilized, semi-civilized and uncivilized states’.1039 Tzouvala argues that 
the ‘unwilling or unable’ doctrine ‘replicates this hierarchy, directly adopting certain 
“civilization” criteria, such as the existence of a strong, effective, centralized state with a 
certain level and certain mode of control over its territory.’1040 All of the states in which the 
targeted killing programme operates are states of the Global South, and the ‘unwilling or 
unable’ doctrine similarly has also applied, in ‘virtually all cases’, to states of the Global South, 
a number of which do not have a strong, effective and centralised state.1041 Tzouvala identifies 
a “red thread” connecting the standard of civilization with the ‘unwilling or unable’ doctrine, 
noting that the ‘unequal international legal structure promoted by these arguments is intimately 
linked to an unequal political structure, characterized by the dominance of the Global North 
over the Global South.’1042 The ‘unwilling or unable’ doctrine enables the states of the Global 
North to use force not only against the sovereignty of states, argues Tzouvala, but against the 
‘life and security of the citizens of states of the Global South…’1043 
Even in cases where the ‘unwilling or unable’ doctrine is not invoked, and where the consent 
of the state in which a drone strike takes place has been given to the U.S., the issue of 
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sovereignty is still in question. Extraterritorial assassinations are, says Gunneflo, ‘one of the 
most systematic, if not extensive, forms of North on South violence in the post-colonial era.’1044 
It is true that there has been a failure to deal with this issue of aggression. But, under the current 
international regime, if consent has been ‘freely given’ by the state in question to the United 
States, under the rules of international law it is difficult to argue that drone strikes constitute 
aggression. In order for consent for intervention to be accepted as legitimate, the International 
Law Commission requires that consent be ‘freely given and clearly established.’1045 This 
consent can be ‘vitiated by error, fraud, corruption or coercion.’1046 Consent must also be given 
by the ‘legitimate’ government of a state.1047 This final qualification is interesting, considering 
that the de facto legitimacy of many of the countries in which the U.S. has government consent 
to carry out anti-terror operations is in question, if not their de jure legitimacy.1048 As for the 
first criterion, that consent be ‘freely given and clearly established’, it is far from clear that the 
consent of governments in states such as Yemen, Libya and Somalia can be ‘freely’ given. 
Given the highly unequal power balance between the United States government and the 
governments of these states – states whose governments may have only de jure control of their 
respective territories at best, with little or no de facto control; states who rely heavily on 
development aid and other financial aid from the United States; can an equal relationship in 
which consent can be freely given actually be said to exist? All states may be equal in the eyes 
of the law, but in relations between states, some are more equal than others. If international law 
is to truly ‘break with its colonial past’, these inequalities must be taken into account.1049 
Kriegsraison aims to elide discussions of sovereignty. Through ‘necessity’, whether actual or 
merely proclaimed, state sovereignty becomes irrelevant. What matters for Kriegsraison is 
whether the force employed is necessary – or can be claimed to be necessary -  for the security 
of the state; in this case, the U.S. Kriegsraison bypasses questions of state sovereignty 
altogether. For Kriegsraison, sovereignty is irrelevant, because self-preservation makes it so.  
The U.S. is thus impelled to portray the targeted killing programme both as one component in 
a larger battle against terrorism, and also as a set of separate, distinguishable, individual 
incidents of violence. Kriegsraison diverts the focus of our enquiries from whether the use of 
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force is lawful in the first instance, i.e. at the jus ad bellum level; to whether the use of force is 
lawful at the second instance, i.e. the jus in bello level - whether or not this specific incident of 
violence can be said to be lawful and/or necessary. Because, to return to the first chapter of this 
thesis, Kriegsraison makes the belligerent ‘the sole judge of the necessity’ of using force – for 
the state whose practice amounts to Kriegsraison, it is not for those of us in academia, or for 
other states in the international community, to question this ‘necessity’.  
It is undoubtedly true that the rise of neoliberalism has been accompanied by an increased focus 
on the individual in international affairs,1050 just as it is true that, regarding extraterritorial 
assassinations and the targeted killing programme of the United States, there has been a 
‘massive shift’ in the past thirty years, with ‘questions of sovereignty being consumed by 
consideration of the rights or status of the individual’s affected.’1051 The injustices of the 
targeted killing programme are disassociated from the wider war on terror, and made to appear 
as ‘random, accidental and arbitrary’. And if, as Marks’ writes, they are: 
‘…random, accidental and arbitrary, then the prospects of changing them become every 
bit as remote as if they were fated. The category of possibility – not just abstract 
possibility, but real, historical possibility – drops out of sight.’1052 
Like Gunneflo, Moyn also argues that there has been too great a focus on the harm done to the 
individual in the course of U.S. uses of force in the ‘war on terror’.1053 It is likely true that 
focussing on the legality or otherwise of the tactical and operational aspects of the targeted 
killing programme does nothing to dissuade the U.S. from its continuation, and does little to 
halt the further spread of the programme in the Middle East and Africa. Perhaps it may serve 
only to drive the U.S. to present the targeted killing programme as ‘lawful’ and ‘clean’. 
‘Atrocitarianism’, as Moyn terms it, ‘fixates on the final step in the causal pathway to civilian 
mass death’, noting that aside from the consequences for civilians, war is ‘regularly disastrous 
for all others concerned.’1054 Does a focus on making war more ‘clean’, and of ensuring that 
those individuals who are targeted are targeted ‘legally’, absolve itself of asking the perhaps 
more difficult, political questions?  Decrying the lack of attention given to the aggressive 
manoeuvres of the United States, Moyn writes that, from the 1970s onward, ‘atrocity took the 
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place of aggression as what demanded most zealous opposition, and crimes of war became 
increasingly tolerable to a broad public that had once stigmatized war as crime.’1055 Yet how 
much had war as a crime really been stigmatized? The ban on the use of force, except in cases 
of self-defence, was inaugurated only with the introduction of the U.N. Charter in 1945, and 
following its creation, the United States alone was involved in numerous foreign wars, 
including in Korea and Vietnam. While ‘atrocity law’ reflects ‘good and honourable 
intentions’, argues Moyn, it has also fit ‘shifting international politics as the world moved from 
the age of global empire to the age of “globalization”.1056 He contends that the era since 9/11 
surprises us ‘precisely because it returned American security to the form of widespread direct 
intervention…’: 
‘…as a result, the risk of condemnation for atrocity certainly accrued…but the risk was 
largely contained. By contrast, the new international criminal law posed no obstacle to 
the new kind of war the times allowed and dictated: global, interminable, and clean. 
Even when America’s own arguments for crossing others’ borders in pursuit of 
terrorists fail to convince everyone, there is no charge of aggression to fear. Today, the 
way powerful states fight war…is fully compatible with an international criminal law 
that long excluded aggression to shift to atrocity instead.’1057 
The perceived ‘cleanliness’ of the targeted killing programme, and ‘the containment and 
minimization of violence in America’s war… have only made it harder to criticize America’s 
use of force in other countries’, Moyn believes.1058 This brings Moyn to the nub of his 
argument: 
‘The more containment succeeds…the more likely it is that the war will continue 
indefinitely. What if its worst feature is not collateral death, or even violence, but an 
attempt at global control and ordering that no one opposes?’1059 
I agree with Moyn that the ‘wars’ in which the U.S. is currently engaged represent an attempt 
at ‘global control and ordering’. The assertion that the U.S. practices ‘containment’, however, 
must be challenged. The war is ‘contained’ in as much as those of us in the Global North neither 
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see nor experience the vast majority of the direct, physical violence inflicted by the United 
States in those countries targeted in the ‘war on terror’. To say that U.S. violence in the Middle 
East is ‘contained’ is extremely misleading. A study released by Brown University in 
November 2018 found that, from 2001 to 2018, at least 38,480 civilians had been killed in 
Afghanistan, 23,372 civilians in Pakistan, and between 182,272 - 204,575 civilians in Iraq: an 
estimated total of between 244,124 - 266,427 civilians in total.1060 These figures do not include 
civilian deaths in Yemen, Somalia, Libya or Syria. They do not account for the civilian 
wounded or psychological harm to civilians. Overall, including U.S. military and civilian 
contractors, National Military and Police forces, other Allied troops, opposition fighters, 
journalists and media workers, and humanitarian and NGO workers, an estimated 480,000 – 
500,000 have been killed since the beginning of the war on terror.1061 Again, this is ‘an 
incomplete estimate of the human toll of killing in these wars’, and the author of the report 
acknowledges that ‘we may never know the total direct death toll in these wars.’1062 While the 
United States has not been directly responsible for each of these deaths, its failure to contain 
the violence of its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the violence of the targeted killing 
programme, has had an immeasurable influence on instability in the region.  Describing the 
war on terror as ‘clean’ further feeds into U.S. government descriptions of its targeting 
measures. 
I maintain, however, that a focus on the individual, and on the individual’s rights in both 
international human rights and humanitarian law, remains important. As has been demonstrated 
in previous chapters, the targeted killing programme is far from compliant with either the 
international human rights or humanitarian law regime. I have discussed how the United States 
refuses to acknowledge the applicability of human rights law, in particular the ICCPR, to its 
targeted killing programme. Even as regards international humanitarian law, the United States 
has used IHL compliance as a smokescreen for the mistreatment and unlawful killing of 
individuals and for its unlawful use of force. For instance, the U.S. was particularly vocal about 
the lawfulness of its actions under the law on recourse to force and the law of armed conflict 
under the Obama administration, going so far as to assert that the administration held its drone 
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strikes to higher targeting standards than required by IHL.1063 Where the Bush administration 
asserted the war on terror’s legitimacy to justify its internationally unlawful conduct to an 
electorate which was eager to see forceful action against those responsible for the 9/11 attacks, 
the Obama administration asserted its legality for an electorate jaded by war and aware of the 
scandals of Guantanamo Bay, torture and rendition. Meanwhile, the Trump administration 
shies away from statements and discussions about the international legality or the legitimacy 
of its conduct, with his primary constituency viewing international law as inherently anti-
American. 
In numerous speeches on the subject of counter-terrorism and defence, for example, President 
Obama took pains to convince the American public, and the wider world, of the legality of U.S. 
actions at the jus ad bellum level, and particularly at the jus in bello level, and of the ‘high 
standards’ to which the U.S. held itself, claiming that the U.S. often took measures that went 
above and beyond those required by international law. In his landmark speech at the National 
Defense University (in 2013, made the day after Obama had sanctioned the public release of 
the 2013 Presidential Policy Guidance, known widely as the drone ‘playbook’, Obama said: 
‘America’s actions are legal.  We were attacked on 9/11…. Under domestic law, and 
international law, the United States is at war with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and their 
associated forces… So this is a just war -- a war waged proportionally, in last resort, 
and in self-defense…’1064 
He went on to state that ‘…before any strike is taken, there must be near-certainty that no 
civilians will be killed or injured -- the highest standard we can set.’1065 
Speaking again at the MacDill Airforce Base in Florida in December 2016, in one of the last 
major speeches of his presidency, President Obama against mentioned the ‘high standards’ of 
targeting, using almost the exact same words he had previously used in his 2013 NDU speech: 
‘…under rules that I put in place and that I made public, before any strike is taken 
outside of a warzone, there must be near certainty that no civilians will be killed or 
injured.  And while nothing is certain in any strike, and we have acknowledged that 
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there are tragic instances where innocents have been killed by our strikes, this is the 
highest standard that we can set.’1066 
Other key figures in his administration also stressed this message. In a speech at New York 
University’s School of Law in November 2016, Jennifer M. O’ Connell, then General Counsel 
at the Department of Defense, remarked that: 
‘We [the United States] not only follow the law of armed conflict, but in many cases, 
when it is feasible, we do more than what the law requires by applying policies and 
standards that are more protective of civilians than required by the law of armed 
conflict. President Obama, like other Presidents before him, has established policies 
that apply conditions to military operations beyond what is required by the law when it 
is practicable to do so.’1067 
Former State Department Legal Adviser Brian Egan, speaking earlier in 2016 at the Annual 
Meeting of the American Society of International Law, also extolled U.S. targeted standards, 
stating that the 2013 PPG: ‘…imposes certain heightened policy standards that exceed  the 
requirements of the law of armed conflict for lethal targeting.’1068 The President had imposed 
these standards, said Egan, out of a belief that the implementation of such standards outside of 
hot battlefields ‘is the right approach to using force to meet U.S. counterterrorism objectives 
and protect American lives consistent with our values.’1069 He also argued that the standard 
imposed by the PPG is: ‘higher than that imposed by the law of armed conflict, which 
contemplates that civilians will inevitably and tragically be killed in armed conflict.’1070 Egan 
also went on to add that ‘the President always retains authority to take lethal action consistent 
with the law of armed conflict, even if the PPG’s heightened policy standards may not be 
met.’1071 
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Other administration figures, such as John O. Brennan, then Assistant to the President for 
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, and Eric Holder, the then Attorney General of the 
United States, discussed and defended the legality of the targeted killing programme at the jus 
ad bellum and jus in bello levels.1072 
Given what we know of the targeted killing programme at the jus ad bellum and jus in bello 
levels, of its targeting of groups deemed to be ‘affiliated’ with al-Qaeda, many of which were 
not in existence at the time of the September 11th attacks, and of the targeting of high- and low-
level militants (whether ‘continuous imminent threats’ or not), of the ‘accidental’ targeting of 
civilians, and of civilians killed as collateral damage to drone strikes, it is clear that the U.S. 
has effectively been using its alleged ‘higher standard’ of targeting and of IHL compliance as 
a fig leaf to avoid deeper discussions about the legality and legitimacy of the targeted killing 
programme at the first instance, that is, at the jus ad bellum level. International humanitarian 
law, as Smiley observes when writing about the U.S. war in the Philippines and other historical 
colonial endeavours: 
‘…could be relevant to imperial wars as more than a static set of constraints to be 
obeyed, a symbol invoked to justify colonialism, or an obstacle to be avoided. It was 
also a way to structure and articulate violence itself.’1073 
This is precisely what has occurred with the targeted killing programme. The United States has 
used international humanitarian law to structure and articulate the violence of the targeted 
killing programme, and the wider war on terror. The use of armed drones in the fulfilment of 
such a programme was unprecedented by existing international law. While the U.S. saw itself 
as being exceptional enough to create and carry out the targeted killing programme regardless, 
it utilised existing laws to justify the programme and to assure the international community that 
the programme operated within the bounds of IHL.  
Gunneflo’s assertion that the focus on the individual has lessened, or altogether removed, the 
focus on the U.S.’ supposed right of intervention in the territories where drone strikes take 
place, and on the aggression of U.S. actions as a violation of Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter, 
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may be correct.1074 But a focus on the rights of individuals allows us to remove the United 
States’ smokescreen of alleged IHL compliance, to see through the fog and understand that 
U.S. conduct has been far from compliant, that targeting standards and procedures remain 
extremely secretive and unaccountable, and that measures such as the 2013 Presidential Policy 
Guidance are, effectively, placebos – designed to make the U.S. government and domestic 
audiences feel more comfortable with U.S. drone strikes, and easy to remove with little notice 
and with no ill effects for the U.S., as evidenced by President Trump’s September 2017 
replacement of the 2013 PPG with a new set of guidelines, reportedly named the ‘Principles, 
Standards and Procedures’ (or PSP, for short).1075 The PSP is apparently designed to make the 
bureaucracy of the PPG ‘disappear’, with fewer ‘hurdles’ for drone operators to clear before 
launching strikes, reinstating the CIA’s purview, including over Afghanistan, where until 2017 
all drone strikes were carried out by the military. It also reduces the need for higher-level 
government involvement, with more responsibility over strikes given to the Pentagon and the 
CIA, and eliminates the requirement that those targeted in strikes be considered an ‘identified 
high-value terrorist’ (a ‘HVT’),  or a terrorist that poses a continuing, imminent threat.1076 
Unfortunately, the PSP document has, to date, not been made public. 
Furthermore, in March 2017 President Trump also took the decision to reclassify parts of 
Somalia and Yemen as being ‘areas of active hostilities’, i.e. territories in which the 
‘heightened’ standards of the PPG do not apply.1077 In September 2018, The New York Times 
reported the existence of a new CIA drone base in Niger, another state in which, prior to this, 
only the military has conducted strikes.1078 At the time of reporting, one official alleged that 
drones flying from this base had been used only for surveillance.1079 However, a Nigerien 
official said that a drone from that base had already targeted and killed an al-Qaeda member in 
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southern Libya.1080 Another military base in Agadez, some 350 miles west of the CIA base, is 
used by the Pentagon to carry out lethal strikes, and represents the largest construction project 
ever undertaken alone by the Air Force.1081 Aside from the expansion of the targeted killing 
programme in this manner, the number of civilian casualties in a number of territories has 
increased significantly.  
We must remember, again, that the 2013 PPG and the new PPS applies only to those territories 
considered as ‘areas outside of active hostilities’. The majority of U.S. drone strikes, and other 
air strikes, take place in ‘areas of active hostilities’, in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. Numerous 
reports state that U.S. airstrikes – those carried out by drones, helicopters, and fighter jets – 
more than doubled in the first year of Trump’s presidency,1082 while coalition strikes in the 
fight against ISIS rose by 50% in 2017, with a 215% rise in civilian casualties. In Iraq, the U.S. 
accounted for the vast majority of these strikes – some 68.4% up to June 2017.1083 In Syria, 
U.S. strikes accounted for approximately 95.5% of strikes taken up to June 2017 (at which 
point the Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve, aka CJTF-OIR, ceased to 
release strike data).1084 Civilian casualties have reportedly also substantially increased in 
Afghanistan. The UN reported a 39% increase in civilian casualties from aerial attacks by U.S. 
and Afghan forces, with the U.S. responsible for about half of these.1085 In 2016, the Obama 
administration introduced an executive order which required that the White House submit a 
report to Congress by 1st May every year detailing a list of all U.S. military operations which 
caused civilian deaths (the CIA was not included in this executive order).  
However, the Trump administration has thus far failed to deliver any reporting on civilian 
casualties to Congress, and a White House spokesperson told The Washington Post on 1st May 
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2017 that the relevant executive order is ‘under review’ and could be ‘modified’ or 
‘rescinded’.1086 Like the Obama administration’s 2013 PPG, the executive order requiring the 
reporting of civilian casualties represented a panacea for accountability, with little practical 
effect, and extremely easy for the subsequent administration to ignore or overturn. While the 
Department of Defense must submit a similar report to Congress under Section 1057 of the 
2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), and it seems that the Pentagon continues 
to take heed of the Obama administration’s 2016 executive order, this report similarly doesn’t 
include strikes by the CIA or other agencies.1087 Moreover, as with previous U.S. claims around 
civilian casualties, this DoD report has been heavily criticised for undercounting civilian 
deaths.1088 
The Trump administration does not appear to be particularly concerned with ensuring that U.S. 
policy is seen as either legal or legitimate under international law and indeed seems to have a 
deeply ambivalent relationship with international law on the whole. Legality and legitimacy 
featured little in the 2017 National Security Strategy, with questions of legality in the document 
mostly focused on immigration policy. Legality and legitimacy are little mentioned in speeches 
by President Trump. National Security Adviser John Bolton, in a September 2018 speech on 
U.S. policy towards the ICC, discussed the ‘fantasies’ of international law and was forthright 
on the United States’ aversion to allowing the ICC to prosecute crimes of aggression. ‘History 
has proven’, argued Bolton, ‘that the only deterrent to evil and atrocity is what Franklin 
Roosevelt once called “the righteous might” of the United States and its allies…’1089 Aside 
from this speech, the most detailed legal position from the Trump administration has come in 
the form of a speech given by William S. Castle, Deputy General Counsel at the Department 
of Defense, to the New York City Bar Association in December 2017, on the subject of 
AUMFs, and why the administration does not believe that a new AUMF is necessary. 
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It would be dangerous, said Castle, to impose ‘artificial and unnecessary limitations in any new 
AUMF, in particular imposing either temporal or geographic limitations’, as such limitations 
could hinder the United States ‘ability to respond effectively and rapidly to terrorist threats to 
the United States.’1090 It would also be unwise, Castle argued, to ‘put a timeline on this fight 
against an adaptive enemy or we risk unintentionally emboldening our enemies to outlast us.’ 
Further, he stated that ‘to define the geographic scope of military operations would undermine 
their efficiency by advertising to our enemies where to seek safe haven.’ 
The phrase above – ‘emboldening our enemies to outlast us’ – is striking. The ‘war on terror’ 
is still, seventeen years after the events of September 11th 2001, represented as an existential 
threat to the United States. 
As stated earlier, that remote interventions of the kind typified by the targeted killing 
programme do not occur outside the ‘Global South’ is telling of the programme’s neo-colonial 
and imperial impulses. Attempting to inflict lawfulness through violence has been a 
characteristic of colonialism throughout its history. That the violence of the targeted killing 
programme is inflicted through the use of UAVs, and not through ‘boots on the ground’, does 
not lessen its colonial qualities. In this sense, too, Kriegsraison is telling: as has already been 
noted, the U.S. can often achieve its policy goals while remaining observant of relevant law, 
making choices which are generally agreed to be lawful. Actions such as the drone strikes of 
the targeted killing programme, which are criticised as not being adherent to this law, further 
highlight the often imperial nature of the rule of law and of U.S. actions in the Middle East and 
Africa: policy choices made by the U.S., justified in the name of necessity and self-defence, 
which go far beyond what the law sanctions, are available to the U.S. because of the localities 
in which these actions are carried out, i.e. outside the ‘west’ or the ‘Global North’. A worrying 
ahistoricism, typical of imperialism, also accompanies such actions; consider, for example, 
President Trump’s statement on his administration’s strikes on Syria in April 2018, in response 
to alleged chemical weapons use by pro-Assad forces. Trump deemed the Middle East a 
‘troubled place’, stating that the U.S. will ‘try to make it better’ – failing to acknowledge (as 
with previous administrations) how U.S. actions have contributed to making the Middle East 
the ‘troubled place’ it is today.1091 
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The idea of ‘civilisation’ is inherent in this Global North - on - Global South violence. The 
trope of the West, and of white America (and Europe) representing a higher form of civilisation, 
prevalent for so much of world history, has appeared again in force under the Trump 
administration. Speaking at the G20 summit in Warsaw in July 2017, President Trump 
repeatedly referred to ‘the West’, alleging that there are ‘dire threats to our security and to our 
way of life.’1092 Trump asked those assembled, ‘do we have the desire and the courage to 
preserve our civilization in the face of those who would subvert and destroy it?’1093 Towards 
the end of his speech, Trump said: ‘I declare today for the world to hear that the West will 
never, ever be broken. Our values will prevail. Our people will thrive. And our civilization will 
triumph.’1094 In his April 2018 statement on U.S. strikes against Syria, President Trump twice 
referred to ‘civilized nations’, and declared that ‘today, the nations of Britain, France, and the 
United States of America have marshalled their righteous power against barbarism and 
brutality.’1095 The administration’s 2017 National Security Strategy argues that ‘the scourge of 
the world today is a small group of rogue regimes that violate all principles of free and civilized 
states.’1096 
While ‘civilization’ was also mentioned in speeches given by President Obama during his 
administration, most notably in his 2009 speech at Cairo University in Egypt entitled ‘A New 
Beginning’, the difference in the manner in which ‘civilization’ is invoked in this speech 
compared to Trump’s use of the term is striking. Obama references ‘civilization’ four times in 
the ‘A New Beginning’ speech, noting ‘civilization’s debt to Islam’ and recognising the Middle 
East as the ‘cradle of civilization.’1097 
The use of ‘civilization’ as a concept also featured heavily, of course, in President George W. 
Bush’s speeches, with the term ‘becoming a permanent fixture of this president’s statements’ 
on the ‘war on terror’.1098 On the 20th September 2001, Bush referred to the ‘war on terror’ as 
‘civilization’s fight.’1099 In December 2001, Bush stated that the ‘great divide’ in our time was 
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‘between civilization and barbarism.’1100 Through her analysis of statements and speeches 
delivered by President Bush between 11 September 2001 and 2004, Collet finds that, for the 
Bush administration, civilization can be defined as: 
‘(a) universally accepted standards of human dignity […] which are currently under 
threat from the Other, who seeks to impose its counterculture in every nation and might 
use weapons of mass destruction to do so.’1101 
‘Terror’ is defined as ‘an absolute negation of civilization’, with the fight being one for ‘all 
who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom.’1102 While Bush, unlike Trump, 
did not explicitly equate ‘civilization’ with the West, Collet argues that ‘the implicit or tact 
presence of the uncivilized world in the…discourse may explain why so many Americans are 
convinced that their nation, and by extension the West, are involved in a ‘clash of 
civilizations.’1103 Furthermore, despite the ostensible differences in the political rhetoric of the 
Bush, Obama and Trump administrations, Pilecki et al find that ‘President Obama largely 
maintained the war-on-terrorism discourse that emerged during the Bush administration.’1104  
In practice, as I have shown in earlier chapters, the imperial character of the war on terror 
changed very little between administrations. President Obama may have condemned the use of 
terror and pledged to close the U.S. prison at Guantanamo, but the targeted killing programme 
was extended and industrialised, and the 2013 PPG has proven otiose in terms of placing any 
constraints on the targeted killing programme for the Trump administration. Kriegsraison, as 
a product of the United States’ hegemonic project, is essentially impervious to administrative 
changes. Whether a U.S. president is a Democrat or a Republican matters little in terms of how 
the U.S. approaches and practices foreign and security policy and defence policy, such is the 
level of militarisation in U.S. society and its imperialist aims. Primary differences are found in 
terms of how foreign and security policies are presented to either Democratic or Republican 
electorates.   
The relation between ideas of civilisation and the international law of war is, of course, far 
from recent. To return somewhat full-circle in the American story of law and war, it is useful 
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to return again to Francis Lieber, the author of the ‘Lieber Code’, discussed in Chapter 1. Lieber 
considered international law itself as a ‘blessing’ of modern civilisation.1105 Considered to have 
created one of the great humanitarian documents of law when he drafted his ‘Instructions for 
the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field’, Lieber was not by any means anti-
war. A number of Lieber’s other views as regards war and civilisation are rarely discussed, 
perhaps because they are, today, unpalatable to many. Writing in 1844, Lieber stated that 
‘Blood is occasionally the rich dew of History. Christ proclaimed peace but struggle and contest 
too.’1106 He believed that war had ‘morally rescued’ many nations, imparting them with ‘new 
vigor.’1107 The U.S. war with Mexico would, by advancing the sphere of Anglo-American 
civilization, ‘be instrumental in achieving “the most momentous results in the history of 
civilization.”1108 Lieber believed that the ‘Anglican race’ had a ‘peculiar gift’, with ‘civil liberty 
making up its very bones and marrow.’1109   
In his book On Civil Liberty and Self-Government, his writings took on a particularly American 
and Wilsonian tone. Lieber wrote: 
‘We belong to that race whose obvious task it is, among other proud and sacred tasks, 
to rear and spread civil liberty over vast regions in every part of the earth, on continent 
and isle. We belong to that tribe which alone has the word Self-Government.’1110 
While Lieber’s alleged ‘humanitarianism’ apparently led him to ‘…regret the ruthless way in 
which the white exterminated or brutally pushed back the Indian into the less fertile places in 
the wilderness, he believed that such a fate was both inevitable and on the whole desirable.’1111 
Lieber was, at base, a white nationalist, and ‘wanted the United States to be a white-man’s 
country.’1112 In one of his letters to Secretary of State Hamilton Fish in 1870,  Lieber argued 
that ‘the white race is to rule over the Earth and we are under no obligation to ruin our people 
by a bastard mixture of Mongolian, Negro and White’.1113 That Lieber is generally presented 
as one of the great liberal humanitarian thinkers in international law is telling as to what 
international law and its practitioners have chosen to forget. This mixture of nationalism, a 
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belief in white racial superiority, the notion of the United States as a nation with an imperial 
‘manifest destiny’, and with a government ‘in which the sway of the law alone is 
acknowledged’, as represented in Lieber’s work, has long informed U.S. treatment of the law 
on the use of force.1114 In the ‘Lieber Code’ itself, ‘civilized nations’ are referred to three times, 
in Articles 14, 27 and 148. ‘Uncivilized people’ are referred to once, in Article 24. It is also 
made clear in the Lieber Code that ‘uncivilized’ peoples and ‘barbarous’ armies wage war by 
different rules. 
Returning to the political organisation of a state and the right of intervention, Gong mentions 
that one ‘objective’ test for political organization, and thus recognition as a ‘civilized state’ in 
the early 1900s, was the ability of a state to organise for self-defence. In this case, notes Gong: 
‘…where political organization is defined in terms of capability for self-defence, then 
‘civilized’ states are those which successfully repel aggression; ‘backward’ or 
‘uncivilized’ states are those which fail to do so. Such thinking reduces international 
law to the efficacy of force, and equates civilization with the ability to wage war.’1115 
By any measure, the U.S. has quite clearly satisfied this test for at least the past seven decades. 
There is no other state in the current international system that could more successfully repel 
aggression, and no other state has proven more capable at organising for its self-defence. 
Successive U.S. presidents have proclaimed the might of the U.S. military, and it is regularly 
– and correctly – exalted as being the most powerful military in history. In 2018, the Trump 
administration received the largest military budget in the history of the United States. Trump 
argued that the figure allocated on military spending – some $1.3 trillion – was necessary 
because ‘we have to have, by far, the strongest military in the world.’1116 In a speech at Fort 
Drum on August 13 2018, Trump stated that: 
‘…we know that to survive and having that survival of our freedom, it depends upon 
the might of our military. And no enemy on Earth can match the strength, courage, and 
skill of the American Army and the American Armed Forces. Nobody is even close. 
They never will be.’1117 
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Trump went on to say that ‘military might is more important than even jobs’, and said ‘America 
is a peaceful nation. But if conflict is forced upon us, we will fight and we will win.’1118 He 
stated that ‘we will ensure that the next great chapter in history is written by the heroes of the 
United States military.’1119 This extraordinary focus on the military might of the U.S. highlights 
that ‘civilization’ is now considered a ‘contested and vulnerable concept that requires 
defending by a strong United States, acting unilaterally if necessary’, with the U.S. intervening 
‘to defend civilization from barbarism or savagery, rather than to promote its development.’1120  
As has been demonstrated in this thesis, ‘the result has been a series of high-profile rejections 
of international law and international legal institutions’, but, as Coates points out, the contempt 
for international law expressed by the Bush administration, and subsequent administrations, 
represents a difference of degree rather than a ‘dramatic break with the past.’1121 
 
Focussing on the individual in international affairs 
The critiques of Gunneflo and Moyn on the focus on the individual in international affairs is 
both well-meaning and necessary. They beg us to ask the question: if much of the international 
law framework can be utilised for violent, imperial policies, can we continue to utilise 
international law for truly progressive causes? The answer is yes. 
A focus on the rights of the individual under international human rights and humanitarian law 
highlights that proclaimed U.S. adherence to the relevant law (which, as discussed in previous 
chapters, the U.S. holds to be only international humanitarian law) is merely that – proclaimed, 
but not actual. By removing the fig-leaf of precision and allegedly impeccable targeting 
standards from the U.S., it loses the primary basis under which it justifies its conduct in the 
‘war on terror ‘and highlights the illegality and illegitimacy of the programme at all levels, 
whether jus ad bellum or jus in bello. 
As recognised by O’ Connell, there is a disjuncture in this question between critical theory and 
critical practice. While there is an increasing focus in academia on the problems with framing 
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issues like the war on terror and the targeted killing programme in terms of the contravention 
of individual rights, at the actual level of the individual: 
‘…millions of people are attempting to confront the misery and injustices heaped upon 
them by the contemporary global order through, in part, mobilising the language of 
human rights to advance and defend their interests.’1122 
O’ Connell goes on to write that: 
‘human rights cannot be blithely dismissed as a sham, or ideological apologia for the 
status quo. They often are these things, but at the very same time they provide a 
language for critiquing and challenging the extant social order.’1123  
In the current system within which we live, then, ‘the assertion of a human right becomes, of 
necessity, a rejection of the logic of the market, of the basic impulse of the capitalist system’, 
and of the inherent violence of this system.1124 We must continue to critique and reject the U.S. 
targeted killing programme on the basis of its human rights and international humanitarian law 
abuses, while also remaining alive to the fact that this violence should be criticised not only for 
these violations, and not only to make the use of force ‘cleaner’, but also criticised in toto, and 
treated as the imperial and neo-colonial form of violence that it represents. Human rights and 
its language may be, as Knox has argued, particularly susceptible to ‘hijacking’ by 
neoliberalism because the language of rights is abstracting, depoliticising, and elitist.1125 
Scrutinising U.S. conduct is essential, but it is not going to solve the problems presented by 
U.S. imperialism. Addressing these issues in order to bring about effective change requires a 
language other than that of pure law and the language of human rights. It requires re-
envisioning the language of human rights, and actively articulating it as a language that is 
concrete and politicised, and not just egalitarian, but actively anti-elitist. For Kriegsraison and 
the targeted killing programme, this means a language couched in the effects of U.S. militarism 
and imperialism, not just for the human rights of individuals and communities, but on society 
at large.  
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Conclusion 
Overtly political choices continue to be made in U.S. legal interpretations. Rather than looking 
only at what the end results of these choices are – at the thousands of deaths resulting from the 
targeted killing programme, at the steady erosion of international law principles such as non-
intervention and the attempted broadening of the right to use force in self-defence, we also 
need to ask what interests these choices serve. What interest is being served when the U.S. 
takes the political decision to interpret Article 51 of the UN Charter as allowing it to use force 
in pre-emptive self-defence? What interest is served when the U.S. takes the political decision 
to attempt to create a right of intervention if a state is ‘unwilling or unable’ to counter a terrorist 
threat emanating from its territory? What interest is served when the U.S. takes the political 
decision that the ICCPR does not apply extraterritorially? What interest is served when the 
Trump administration makes the political decision to relax the rules of engagement? What 
interest is served when the U.S. takes the political decision to refer to incidents in which 
civilians are killed in already unlawful strikes as ‘accidents’ or ‘tragedies’? 
These questions do not necessarily have easy answers, but they do all have one facet in 
common: each serves to make U.S. attempts at the ordering and control of the Global South 
and the wider international community easier, less bureaucratic, less lawfully problematic and 
more politically palatable. Accepting U.S. attempts to make many of these issues look like 
questions of law rather than questions of politics hides the irreducibly political choices behind 
them. Tying the answers to all of these questions to the issue of state security, the very survival 
of the United States, and indeed the survival of ‘Western civilisation’, allows the U.S. to frame 
the answers to all of these questions along similar lines, and in a similarly vague manner: each 
practice serves the interests of security; serves the interests of freedom; serves the interests of 
civilization; serves the interests of the rule of law.  
For decades now, the U.S. has not believed that it ‘wages’ war. Instead, it believes that it is the 
world’s policeman, imposing order where it finds necessary or in its best interests, and now, 
with the advent of drone warfare, ‘raining security from the skies.’1126 Since it began in 2001, 
the U.S. has presented the ‘war on terror’ as a ‘war’ waged to make not just the West, but the 
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entire world, a safer and more liberal place. Yet, as Moyn as pointed out, the ‘war on terror’ 
has: 
‘involved a horrendous ethical price—achieving the opposite of its declared aims, 
breeding the insurgencies it was supposed to suppress, and failing to address the root 
causes of global violence…’1127  
It has ‘only produced an even greater dependence on violence, a proliferation of undeclared 
wars and new battlefields, a relentless assault on civil rights at home – an exacerbated 
psychology of domination…’1128 
With security at the political level tied to military necessity at the operational level, 
Kriegsraison not only allows for but encourages the state to seek out figures, groups and 
territories that could potentially cause it harm, and encourages the state to address these 
potential threats through forceful and violent means. As discussed in the prior chapter, at the 
political level, the United States, throughout its history, has felt its foundational ideas to be 
under threat and its security imperilled. The U.S. continues to have a significant global military 
presence, with approximately 800 formal military bases in 80 countries, or more than 1000 if 
troops stationed at embassies, missions and ‘lily-pad’ bases are included – amounting to an 
estimated 138,000 soldiers around the world as of January 2018.1129  
In 1978, Poulantzas wrote: ‘it is exactly as if the State had to apply less force to the very degree 
that it holds a monopoly of its legitimate use.’1130 While the U.S. may not hold a monopoly on 
the legitimate use of force, it certainly acts as if this is the case, and the targeted killing 
programme allows it to apply less force in more locations, instead of the traditional, large-scale 
warfare of the kind revisited during the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. The violence of the targeted 
killing programme, the violence not only from the kinetic force of hellfire missiles, but the 
violence of constant surveillance, has been perpetrated against peoples of the Global South for 
almost two decades now.   
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In 2017, on the eve of the 99th anniversary of the official end of the First World War, Pankaj 
Mishra noted that ‘the modern history of violence shows that ostensibly staunch foes have 
never been reluctant to borrow murderous ideas from one another.’1131 At present, the United 
States is the only state with a far-reaching targeted killing programme. But for how long more? 
Armed drone proliferation has rapidly increased, and an estimated eighteen countries now 
possess the technology.1132 While these states do not possess the worldwide military 
infrastructure of the U.S., nevertheless their acquisition of the technology will likely pose 
problems for international humanitarian law and international human rights law. 
While the question of state sovereignty and intervention is a crucial one, in many of the states 
in the Global South, governments cannot, or will not, deny the U.S. the permission to intervene 
in their territory, and governments may not always take the best interests of their citizens into 
account. Effective resistance to the targeted killing programme is much more likely to come 
from below, at the level of the individual citizen acting within and through a concerned 
community. As Cox asks: 
‘…who is to bring about change? It is…unlikely in the extreme that those who benefit 
from and control these processes and relationships will be the main actors in 
transforming them in a more democratic, egalitarian and diverse direction. It does not 
take very much reflection to conclude that it is the exploited, the (formally) powerless 
and the marginalised who have most to gain from a change of course.’1133 
As such, analysing the targeted killing programme through the lens of the individual, asking 
which rights of the individual are harmed, and how, whether in an individual drone strike, 
through the targeted killing programme as a whole, or through militarism more generally, 
provides an explanatory account, most importantly, of the harms caused to humans as 
individuals and communities, and the harms caused to human rights law and international 
humanitarian law. This explanatory account can be harnessed for protesting and resisting the 
targeted killing programme and other forms of violence committed in the name of the ‘war on 
terror’.  In countering and impeding the spread of military violence, human rights are ‘one of 
the key “inadequate tools” we have at our disposal today’.1134 And, while ‘the assertion of 
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human rights will not bring about fundamental transformation in and of itself’, they can, as O’ 
Connell contends, ‘play an important role in broader struggles to do that’.1135 
Five general themes of Marxist theory of law are articulated by Alan Hunt. They are as follows: 
• Law is inescapably political…; 
• Law and state are closely connected; 
• Law gives effect to, mirrors or is otherwise expressive of the prevailing economic 
relations; 
• Law is always potentially coercive and manifest’s the state’s monopoly of the 
means of coercion; 
• The content and procedures of law manifest…the interests of the dominant classes; 
• Law is ideological…1136 
In answering the core questions set out in the introduction, this thesis has also successfully 
demonstrated that each of the five points above apply to international law as much as they do 
to domestic legal regimes. Through an examination of Kriegsraison and the principles of 
military necessity and self-defence in Chapter 1, the thesis shows how the spirit of Kriegsraison 
was kept alive, and its reinvigoration made possible, by Article 51 of the UN Charter, and is 
manifested today most explicitly through the U.S. targeted killing programme. In Chapter 2, 
its assessment of the use of the language of ‘precision’ and ‘humanity’ in the use of armed 
drones, the thesis highlights the important connections between international law and security 
policy, with the migration of the language of strategic legalism into the security field in order 
to make certain choices more palatable to differing publics, and more readily available to policy 
makers. Through the doctrinal analysis presented in Chapters 3 and 4, on the targeted killing 
programme’s violation of the rules of international humanitarian law and international human 
rights law, the thesis elucidates how the content and procedures of both bodies of law favour 
the state, and not those who are the victims of an assault on their human rights. In Chapter 5, 
the discussion of the history of U.S. belligerency (within and outside the U.S.), the influence 
of The Federalist Papers, and the role of the Executive branch in deciding the U.S. approach 
to international law clarifies the ideology of international law, and its inescapably political 
nature.  
                                                           
1135 Ibid 988. 
1136 Alan Hunt, ‘Marxist Theory of Law’, in A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (D. Patterson, ed.; 
Blackwell Publishers, 1996), 355. 
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In so doing, the thesis makes a substantial and original contribution to the field of critical 
international law and critical security studies, drawing together heretofore unconnected areas 
of both fields. In doing so, the thesis argues that while the entire field of international law is 
tainted by imperialism, the history and militarist national identity of the United States, 
combined with the U.S. enormous military reach and the level of influence the Executive 
branch holds over U.S. international law understandings, the United States is better placed than 
any other state to exploit this imperial character, and that it does so explicitly through the 
targeted killing programme, which is, in itself, a manifestation of Kriegsraison.  
The use of Kriegsraison by the United States in the Global South should be a cause for concern 
for all who value human rights and respect for the international law on the use of force. The 
degradation of international law which began in earnest in 2001 carries on apace today, and, 
under the current U.S. administration, shows little sign of abating. The challenge presented to 
valued international norms should not be underestimated. As this thesis demonstrates, the U.S. 
resists the application of international human rights law in contexts where it should be applied, 
wilfully subverts the application of international humanitarian law and the law on the use of 
force, and avoids all attempts at meaningful oversight of the targeted killing programme, 
domestically and internationally. The extremely broad interpretations of the American national 
interest presented in various legal opinions by successive U.S. administrations underscores the 
imperial elements of the targeted killing programme, wherein national security neither admits 
to nor knows any geographical or temporal boundaries.1137 Where the U.S. spreads its attempts 
at global ordering and control, Kriegsraison will likely follow. 
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